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Essays on the Role of Banks in the Macroeconomy
Abstract
This dissertation consists of four essays that explore the interaction between banks and the
supply of safe assets in the macroeconomy.
The first essay, "Banks as Safety Multipliers: A Theory of Safe Assets Creation", argues
that the role of banks is to multiply safety. The optimal risk-sharing arrangement between
risk-neutral banks and risk-averse investors is implemented with the bank issuing debt
securities. To guarantee their safety, banks hold on their balance sheets long-term public debt,
whose return is negatively correlated with macroeconomic shocks. I show that lowering
the supply of safe public debt induces banks to shrink their balance sheet, which hurts
the supply of safe private debt. The decentralized equilibrium is constrained inefficient, as
agents do not internalize the benefits of issuing long-term securities. I document that the
supply of bank debt is positively correlated with the supply of public debt in Europe, where
risk-averse investors heavily rely on banks to create safe assets.
The second essay, "Leverage and Reputational Fragility in Credit Markets", develops
a bargaining model of short-term secured debt markets. It characterizes the equilibrium
leverage of borrowers differing in the strength of their reputation and their long-term
relationships. I show that borrowers with higher reputation and with more stable funding
relationships are more levered and more profitable, but also more fragile to aggregate
shocks, as reputation endogenously vanishes when net worth gets closer to zero. Reputation
acts as a stabilization mechanism in good times but as an amplification in bad times. I find
that these predictions are confirmed on the repo market, a predominant source of financing
for US banks.
iii
The third essay, "Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector", shows that
banks issue liabilities that are more liquid than their assets. We define and construct a
liquidity mismatch index (LMI) for 2870 banks. The aggregate LMI worsens from -$2 trillion
in 2004 to -$5 trillion in 2008, before reversing back to -$2 trillion in 2009. In the cross
section, we find that banks with more liquidity mismatch (i) experience more negative stock
returns during the crisis, but more positive returns in non-crisis periods; (ii) experience
more negative stock returns on events corresponding to a liquidity run, and more positive
returns on events corresponding to a government liquidity injection.
The fourth essay, "Optimal Eurobond Design", explores joint-liability issuance by a group
of countries. We show that issuing jointly decreases welfare because of a non-cooperative
game that leads to over-borrowing. Joint liabilities at best implement a transfer across
asymmetric countries. However, if safe assets are scarce in the economy, pooling and
tranching sovereign debt cater to a safety premium and then lead to a Pareto improvement.
iv
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Introduction
Even if banks have been extensively analyzed over the course of their longstanding history,
the question of their usefulness to society has always led to passionate debates. The mystery
of their economic role is partly explained by the fact that their activities have been evolving
over time, since the 14th century and the birth of modern banking1. From a macroeconomic
perspective, one could expect that developed financial markets would have taken the lead in
channeling funds from borrowers to lenders. Bank would have then been made redundant.
This dissertation argues that the role of modern banks is deeply rooted in their supply of
safe assets. It explores the preeminent interactions between the business model of banks
and the asset supply in the macroeconomy.
Banks are traditionally defined as financial intermediaries that accept deposits and
channel these deposits into lending activities. Nevertheless, classical macroeconomics
has considered that such financial intermediation was a wash for the purpose of General
Equilibrium analysis. Most macroeconomic models take for granted that savings find their
way to investment. They push into the background the mechanics enabling to reach this
equality. As a result, macroeconomics and finance grew as two distinct fields in the academic
literature. On the one hand, macroeconomics focused on the propagation of aggregate
shocks through the development of sophisticated Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
models. These models traditionally assume a representative household, which implies there
is no credit in equilibrium, hence no need for financial intermediation. Only recently, since
the 2007-2009 financial crisis that can be characterized as a purely financial shock, had
1See Kindleberger (1978) for a history of the role played by banks in financial crises.
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macroeconomic models have started to explicitly take into account frictions on financial
markets2.
On the other hand, the field of finance has been concerned with the microeconomic
analysis of financial interactions. It benefited from the development of contract theory for
the analysis of agency and financial frictions3. This partial equilibrium approach typically
focuses on a specific type of friction, i.e. moral hazard, asymmetric information, or limited
enforcement. These models often restrict the timeline to three periods, with no ambition
to be calibrated. Several microeconomic theories of banking have been developed this way.
These models can be allocated in two categories, depending on which side of banks balance
sheets drives their behavior:
• “Asset-side” theories concentrate on the interaction between banks as lenders and
firms that borrow from these banks. For instance, the comparative advantage of banks
in Diamond (1984) comes from their ability to monitor borrowers. These theories
explain what assets banks hold, but are mostly silent about the capital structure of
their liability side.
• “Liability-side” theories emphasize the specific structure of banks liabilities4. Gorton
and Pennacchi (1990) argues that banks provide the economy with “information-
insensitive” securities, i.e. claims that are not sensitive to new information about the
cash flows collateralizing the claim. In contrast, these theories do not develop the asset
side of banks.
This dissertation develops the idea that the special role of banks in the economy arises
2Macroeconomic models concerned with amplification mechanisms arising from financial frictions include
Bernanke et al. (1999), Curdia and Woodford (2009), He and Krishnamurthy (2012a) and Brunnermeier and
Sannikov (2010).
3Seminal references include Townsend (1979), Aghion and Bolton (1992), Shleifer and Vishny (1997). See
Tirole (2006) for a comprehensive theory of corporate finance based on agency frictions
4Bank runs models following Diamond and Dybvig (1983) belong to this category. In particular, Calomiris
and Kahn (1991) and Diamond and Rajan (2001b) argues that the threat of a bank run acts as a disciplining
device on banks. However banks in Diamond and Dybvig (1983) cannot hold marketable securities, a the mere
presence of such market unravels the optimality of the deposit contract (Jacklin (1987)).
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from their ability to simultaneously decide the composition of the asset side and of the
liability side of their balance sheet. In the following essays, both sides are endogenous: the
ability of banks to increase their leverage directly influences the extent to which they lend
to the economy. In turn, the profitability of their investments in assets feeds back on the
level of leverage banks choose in equilibrium.
Banks make these joint decisions about assets and liabilities in a General Equilibrium
environment. As the recent financial crisis has vividly reminded, the variation of bank
leverage has a direct impact on macroeconomic variables. The empirical analysis by Reinhart
and Rogoff (2008) and Jorda et al. (2013) show that the correlation between bank leverage
and economic growth hold in long-time series. Bank leverage often is a predictor of financial
crisis. However the interaction goes in the two ways: the macroeconomic environment
influences bank leverage decisions.
This dissertation develops a credit cycle theory based on the scarcity of asset supply
in the macroeconomy. Banks mitigate the savings glut of anxious money5 by supplying
riskless claims to the economy. Geanakoplos (2009) develops the view that optimist agents
borrow from pessimist agents to invests in the risky assets, and choose optimally their level
of leverage. This approach leads to a leverage cycle theory. The main departure from this
reference consists in introducing a scarcity of safe and liquid assets. The following essays
develop three distinct - but not mutually exclusive - views about how banks mitigate the
shortage of safe assets. They have in common that what makes banks special comes from a
fundamental interaction between assets and liabilities. Banks create value for the economy
by the way they get financed, on their liability side. It can be by issuing safer securities
(Chapter 1), it can be by pledging intangible collateral (Chapter 2), or it can be by issuing
more liquid securities (Chapter 3).
In Chapter 1, Banks as Safety Multipliers: A Theory of Safe Assets Creation, the only
defining feature of banks consists in their lower risk-aversion compared to other agents. This
5The glut of savings have been extensively commented, see Bernanke (2008). This dissertation insists on the
risk-aversion of the investors behind the savings glut.
3
essay is motivated by the observation that banks hold significant volumes of seemingly safe
and well-scrutinized securities, such as government bonds. Theories of banking revolving
around information asymmetries between banks and final investors6 are not suited to
explain such types of holdings. In contrast, the essay argues that the purpose of such assets
holdings by banks is to enhance their leverage ability. Banks bundle public bonds with
risky assets to enable themselves to issue safer debt securities. In a General Equilibrium
environment with endogenous collateral constraints and multiple assets, risk-neutral banks
issue debt securities to cater to the safety demand from risk-averse investors. This essay
shows that defaultable debt is the optimal risk-sharing agreement between the banks and
the final investors. To enhance their ability to create private safe assets (bank debt), banks
decide to hold on their balance sheets public safe assets (government debt), whose returns
are negatively correlated with macroeconomic shocks. These holdings of public debt give
rise to a safety multiplier. Indeed, when heterogeneity in risk aversion between banks and
investors is large enough, lowering the exogenous supply of public debt induces banks to
shrink their balance sheet, which in turn hurts the supply of private debt. According to this
approach, the economic role of banks is to multiply safety.
The positive theory of the business model of banks calls for a normative exploration.
Are banks doing too much or too little of private debt issuance? To investigate this question,
Chapter 1 makes endogenous the negative correlation of public debt with macroeconomic
shocks. In the corresponding dynamic model, both public and private agents are able to
choose the maturity of debt securities they issue. In this environment, the expectation
of a flight-to-safety tomorrow transforms long-term securities into hedging instruments
today. The decentralized equilibrium is constrained inefficient because of an issuance
externality. Private agents do not internalize the benefits of the negative correlation of their
own long-term liabilities with macroeconomic shocks. As a result, the private economy
lacks long-term securities. Public debt is non-neutral, and issuing long-term debt leads to a
6See for instance Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) and Holmstrom and Ordonez
(2013).
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Pareto improvement. Nevertheless the optimal level of public securities is finite, given that
their hedging properties deteriorate as their supply increases.
Chapter 1 interprets the ongoing European debt crisis as a shortage of public safe assets.
In the time series, the correlation between the supply of public debt and the supply of
private debt is positive in Europe, contrary to the behavior of these time series in the United
States. This difference can be rationalized by the assumption that European final investors
are constrained by a more limited participation in risky technologies. As private equity
markets are less developed in Europe than in the United States, the self-diversification of
risk-investors is more restricted in Europe. As a result, these investors rely more on public
debt to find safe vehicles of savings. This amplifies the safety multiplier mechanism in the
case of Europe. Besides, as the essay shows, European banks increased their holdings of safe
public debt during the crisis, in order to guarantee private debt. The model has asset-pricing
implications. Bank leverage can be predicted from the spread between public debt yield
and private debt yield. Thus this spread can be used as a macro-prudential indicator.
The open economy version of the environment illustrates how the damages of sovereign
risk are exacerbated by the safety multiplier mechanism. Indeed, the risk of default of the
sovereign authority deteriorates the safety properties of public debt. Given that the latter
is used as a key input in the process of private safety creation, aggregate private leverage
sharply decreases in the presence of sovereign risk. At the same time, domestic banks
become the natural holders of domestic public debt. Therefore the essay provides a theory
establishing an interconnection between sovereign risk and bank risk, but as an endogenous
response, and not a cause, to a public debt crisis7.
Chapter 2, Leverage and Reputational Fragility in Credit Markets), develops a comple-
mentary theory of banking in the macroeconomy. In this essay, the comparative advantage
of banks relies in their ability to use the reputation of their franchise to obtain better refi-
7The European debt crisis that started in 2010 has led policymakers to point the vicious circle between
sovereign risk and bank risk as the main culprit of the difficulties of the Eurozone. It is conventionally assumed
that this vicious circle is implied by implicit guarantees provided by sovereign authorities to their bank. This
conviction has supported the policy impetus towards the creation of a Banking union, featuring a common
supervision and a single resolution mechanism for all European banks.
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nancing terms. In Chapter 1, banks borrow through unsecured debt contracts, in chapter 2
their borrowing uses secured debt, which is collateralized by an asset the lender can seize if
the borrower defaults. Chapter 1 describes commercial banks, whereas Chapter 2 is more
suited to describe the behavior of financial intermediaries composing the "shadow banking
system".
Specifically, the essay analyzes the equilibrium on secured debt markets where borrowers
differ in the strength of their reputation and of their financing relationships. It develops a
bargaining model to characterize the leverage chosen by borrows in equilibrium. In this
model, debt capacity depends not only on the nature of collateral but also on the reputation
of the borrower. Agents with higher reputation secure both more and cheaper credit, i.e.
lower haircuts and lower rates. As a result, haircuts and rates are positively correlated in
the cross-section of borrowers, a prediction that cannot be delivered in a model where the
heterogeneity among borrowers is solely about collateral8. The dynamic model endogenizes
reputation by identifying it to the continuation value of the borrower in a repeated game of
borrower-lender relationships on the market for secured debt. Due to the endogeneity or
reputation, leverage is procyclical in this environment: leverage is high and stable when
agents are sufficiently capitalized. Nevertheless, as the net worth of a given borrower
gets depleted, reputation vanishes in a non-linear way, and leverage becomes restricted
and more volatile. Reputation acts as a stabilization mechanism in good times but as an
amplification mechanism in bad times. In this dynamic environment, long-term contracts
stabilize leverage by avoiding margin calls (i.e. increases in haircuts) in the states in which
the borrower has low net worth. Reputation also provides an economic rationale for long
intermediation chains, as observed for instance through the rehypothecation of collateral. A
long intermediation chain enables to monetize all the franchises of the successive financial
intermediaries.
The empirical analysis on a dataset of repo transactions from money market funds
confirms the predictions of the model. The repo market has been the main source of
8For instance, borrowers can differ in their beliefs about the uncertain realization of collateral.
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financing for US banks. Its market freeze it experienced has been pointed as one of the
main transmission channel of the credit crunch during the 2007-2009 financial crisis. In
this dataset, financial intermediaries with high reputation indeed write repo contracts with
lower haircuts and lower rates. Furthermore, haircuts are more sensitive to borrower’s
reputation when borrower’s net worth is low. Finally, long-term relationships stabilize
funding especially in times of liquidity stress. It provides evidence that reputation and
bilateral relationships matter even in secured funding markets.
Chapter 3,Measuring Liquidity Mismatch in the Banking Sector (joint with Jennie Bai
and Arvind Krishnamurthy), emphasizes the role of banks as liquidity providers. It argues
that banks also create value by running a liquidity mismatch between their illiquid assets
and their liquid liabilities. This chapter proposes a theoretical framework to analyze how
banks choose the amount of liquidity they provide to the market. When a bank runs a
liquidity mismatch between its assets and its liabilities, it earns a liquidity premium, as it is
able to refinance cheaply. However, increasing the liquidity mismatch also increases the cost
incurred by the bank if a liquidity stress event occurs. This cost function, which summarizes
the liquidity need, is assumed to have a recursive structure. The cost function summarizes
the liquidity need. By solving for the bank’s liquidity choice and for the equilibrium value
of this cost function, the essay proposes an analytical expression to the “Liquidity Mismatch
Index (LMI)” envisioned by Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2011). The LMI
measures the mismatch between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity
of liabilities. Chapter 3 then constructs this LMI for 2870 bank holding companies during
2002 – 2013, and investigates its time-series and cross-sectional patterns. The aggregate LMI
worsens from around -$2 trillion in 2004 to -$5 trillion in 2008, before reversing back to
-$2 trillion in 2009. In the cross section, we find that banks with more liquidity mismatch
(i) experience more negative stock returns during the crisis, but more positive returns in
non-crisis periods; (ii) experience more negative stock returns on events corresponding to a
liquidity run, and more positive returns on events corresponding to government liquidity
injection. The LMI proves to be a useful a macro-prudential indicator, as its sensitivity to
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aggregate liquidity shocks can be measured, and can be used to run liquidity stress tests.
Finally, Chapter 4, Optimal Eurobond Design (joint with Eduardo Davila), investigates
if sovereign authorities can supply safe assets to the economy by applying the same
diversification mechanism as banks. It explores the optimal design of a joint-liability
arrangement across a group of countries. One of the policy proposals recently discussed to
alleviate the ongoing European sovereign debt crisis is the issuance of “Eurobonds”. Such
joint-liability scheme consists of bundling together a predetermined share of individual
sovereign bonds issued by several countries. Chapter 4 shows that higher levels of pooling
leads to higher borrowing by the risky countries and lower borrowing by the safe countries.
Thus it actually reduces the supply of safe assets to the economy. Indeed with Eurobonds,
issuance of sovereign debt becomes a non-cooperative Cournot game between the countries
participating in such joint-liability scheme. A negative free-riding externality induces risky
countries to over-borrow. Nevertheless, if there is an exogenous demand for safe assets in
the economy and if the joint liability can be tranched9, then this joint-liability scheme can
be welfare improving. Chapter 4 explores the conditions to achieve a Pareto improvement
with this instrument. The optimal pooling and tranching thresholds are derived from the
trade-off the social planner faced between the free-riding externality (cost of the joint-liability
scheme) and the safety premium earned on the safe part of the Eurobond (benefit of the
joint-liability scheme).
9Pooling and tranching sovereign debt is the essence of the European Safe Bonds (“ESBies”) policy proposal
by Brunnermeier and al. (2011).
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Chapter 1
Banks as Safety Multipliers:
A Theory of Safe Assets Creation1
1.1 Introduction
Why do banks hold so much public debt that yields so little? Banks hold 15% of their assets
in safe securities on their balance sheet (Figure 1.1). This paper is motivated by banks’
holdings of large quantities of mundane securities, even at an accounting loss.
Traditional theories of banking usually revolve around the idea that banks are able to
mitigate some type of agency frictions. In the Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) tradition, there
is asymmetric information about the quality of the projects undertaken by entrepreneurs,
and banks exhibit a comparative advantage in screening and monitoring loans to these
projects. For instance, Holmstrom and Ordonez (2013) argues that banks business is
all about being able to ’keep secret’ about these loans, i.e. issue information-insensitive
securities against these loans. It is hard to apply this line of argument to universal banks,
1First draft: September 2013. I thank Emmanuel Farhi, Andrei Shleifer, Philippe Aghion and Jeremy Stein
for invaluable guidance. For helpful comments and insightful discussions, I thank Eduardo Davila, Oliver Hart,
John Campbell, Adi Sunderam, Adrien Auclert, Erik Loualiche, Luis Viceira, Greg Mankiw, Robert Barro, Gita
Gopinath, Alberto Alesina, Pol Antras, Vania Stavrakeva, Vivien Lévy-Garboua and especially Alp Simsek, as
well as seminar participants at Harvard, HBS, MIT Sloan, NYU Stern and the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York. JEL Classification: G12, G23, G32, D8, L14. Keywords: financial intermediation, risk sharing, safe assets,
public debt, sovereign risk.
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which hold substantial amounts of highly liquid, marketed and researched securities such
as government bonds. For these holdings, banks do not have an intrinsic comparative
informational advantage on the market.
In this paper I develop a view of banks as insurers against aggregate shocks. Banks are
in the business of producing safe liabilities, and they use public debt as an input to their
safety production function. Public debt has two desirable features: a safe terminal payoff,
and an interim value that is negatively correlated with aggregate shocks. The output of
banking arises on their liability side, whereas their asset side is merely the juxtaposition of
inputs that maximize the safety output. This interaction between public debt and private
debt, the former being an input to the production of the latter, has crucial positive and
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Figure 1.1: First stylized fact: European banks’ portfolio composition, holdings divided according to their b.
The model of endogenous leverage laid down in this paper aims at capturing three
novel stylized facts. The first one concerns banks’ balance sheets. Figure 1.1 splits the
aggregate balance sheet of the Eurozone financial sector in two categories of assets: loans
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and fixed assets that are mainly positive beta with the stock market, and securities and
holdings such as gold that are mainly negative beta with the stock market (’safe assets’).
The figure illustrates that negative beta holdings by European banks are substantial, but also
that these holdings did increase with the ongoing Eurozone crisis. This is puzzling, as one
could think that in stress times, safe assets ownership gets more concentrated in risk-averse
hands, i.e. moves away from banks’ balance sheets to household portfolios. Figure 1.2
computes the beta of German and Italian 10 year government bonds with the European
stock market index DJ EUROSTOXX 50. As both countries belong to the same monetary
union, it controls for expectations about the monetary policy stance, i.e. the Neo-Keynesian
channel emphasized in Campbell et al. (2013b). And still, the two assets exhibit radically
different behavior during the Eurozone crisis: German public debt exhibits now an even
more negative beta, whereas Italian public debt has turned sharply positive. I interpret this
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Figure 1.2: What is a safe asset? Daily betas of government bonds with DJ EUROSTOXX 50, Germany (top)
and Italy (bottom).
2Section 4 of this paper microfounds the beta of public debt in an open economy model, and rationalizes
these patterns along with the redomestication of public debt currently at play in Europe.
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The second stylized fact is concerned with the pricing of safe assets. I take the view in
this paper that no asset is entirely riskless, but that there is an inelastic supply of quasi-safe
assets. Critically I draw the distinction between public safety (public debt) and private safety
(private bank debt). This leads me to consider two distinct safe prices and safety premia:
one on public debt and one on bank debt. Figure 1.3 computes the spread between these
two yields. This figure illustrates that this spread progressively decreased during the run
up to the crisis, even turning negative, before sharply bouncing back in the midst of the
crisis. This spread is exactly the carry trade banks are doing when they hold public debt
and finance these holdings by bank debt. A micro investigation of the same carry trade is
shown by Figure 1.20 in the Appendix. In this figure, I additionally subtract from the carry
trade the operating expenses of running the bank pro rata the safe asset holdings. This
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Figure 1.3: Second stylized fact: negative carry trade by banks on safe public debt: SMI = rsa f e   rbank.
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The third and last stylized fact the model captures is a macroeconomic one. I compute
two aggregates measures: one is the stock of safe Eurozone public debt, the other is the
stock of Eurozone bank short-term debt. Figure 1.4 shows these two time-series, scaled by
GDP. This figure eyeballs a positive comovement of private debt with public debt in Europe.
This stands in contrast with the result obtained by Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen
(2013a) for the United States, in which they show there is a negative comovement between
these two aggregates. This stylized fact motivates the intuition that in Europe, for limited
participation reasons, the creation of private safe assets is even more needed. This leads to a
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Figure 1.4: Third stylized fact: comovement of public safe assets and private safe assets in Europe.
The three stylized facts, respectively related to the financial sector balance sheet, the
financial sector income statement and to monetary aggregates, are rationalized in the model
of private safety creation developed in this paper. Banks produce private safe assets in a
general equilibrium environment. The macro inspiration comes from Caballero and Farhi
(2013), which emphasizes the shortage of safe assets as a key macroeconomic imbalance.
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The authors make the point that public debt, being a bearish asset, plays a central role
in mitigating this shortage by a mechanism that they call safety multiplier. The present
paper microfounds this mechanism by putting banks at the heart of the creation of private
safe assets: increasing the supply of public debt enables banks to lever up more, and
this increases the endogenous supply of private debt. The dynamic version of the model
also microfounds why public debt has a negative beta. In my environment, a shortage of
public safe assets triggers a recession, not through a New-Keynesian demand channel as in
Caballero and Farhi (2013), but through a supply channel caused by bank deleveraging. The
diversification motive has some commonality with Gennaioli et al. (2013b) model of shadow
banking, but applied to banks in general. In Gennaioli et al. (2013b), by diversifying away
idiosyncratic risk, securitized debt is made entirely riskless. In my macro environment,
there are only two assets, so the law of large numbers is ineffective to create safety. It is the
endogenous correlation properties of public debt that enable banks to produce safe assets.
The safety multiplier mechanism critically relies on two ingredients: risk-aversion
heterogeneity and incomplete markets. Risk-aversion heterogeneity is a parsimonious way
to capture the distinction between active wealth (risk-neutral banks) and passive wealth
(risk-averse investors). Only with incomplete markets banks’ leverage is determinate and
depends on the supply of public debt. If markets were complete, risk-neutral banks would
be able to fully insure risk-averse investors, so equilibrium leverage would always be equal
to the net worth of risk-averse investors. There would be no safety multiplier.
Putting banks at the heart of the creation of safe assets has two key normative implica-
tions. The private competitive equilibrium without public debt is constrained inefficient.
Banks under-provide insurance when the economy lacks long-dated securities. The issuance
of long-term public debt improves welfare by facilitating intragenerational risk-sharing.
Thanks to their negative beta properties, long-term securities exert a positive externality.
They are an attractive input for safety production, but potential issuers of long-term debt
do not internalize it. Nevertheless, issuing too much public debt destroys its own hedging
properties, and this can eventually hurt welfare. As a result, there exists a finite optimal
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level of public safe assets in the economy.
The second normative implication of the model relates to the economic role of universal
banks. Narrow banking regulations such as Glass-Steagall, which call for a split between
banks’ securities arm and retail arm, are harmful from a safety-creation standpoint. Indeed,
such a split prevents banks from leveraging the hedging properties of public debt, implying
a lower level of bank debt, and a lower level of private safe assets in the economy. Under
Glass-Steagall, banks under-provide insurance to the risk-averse investors.
Finally, an open-economy version of the model introduces heterogeneity in sovereign risk.
Public debt is then priced according to its relative sovereign risk compared to other public
debts. This open economy environment rationalizes Figure 1.2, in which the relatively safer
public debt exhibits a negative beta whereas the relatively riskier public debt has positive
beta. This environment proposes a pure asset pricing, moral-suasion and moral-hazard free,
perspective for why domestic debt gets redomesticated on domestic banks’ balance sheets
in sovereign crises. The leveraging ability of domestic banks is determined at the margin
by the flight to safety of domestic investors. This implies that domestic banks become the
natural holders of domestic debt under sovereign risk heterogeneity.
Model and theoretical results I develop a model of endogenous leverage based on risk
aversion heterogeneity and endogenously incomplete markets. I do not resort to hetero-
geneity in beliefs disagreement as Geanakoplos (2009), as I explicitly introduce multiple
assets than can be used as collateral for recourse debt. It is hard to discipline the beliefs of
different agents on different assets.3 Compared to asset pricing models with heterogeneity,
such as Dumas (1989), I introduce equilibrium default through a limited liability constraint.4
Risk-neutral banks then partially insure risk-averse lenders against macroeconomic shocks.
I embed this rationale for endogenous leverage in a general equilibrium environment in
3It is unclear whether optimists on the stock market should also be optimists on negative beta assets.
4Without limited liability, risk-neutral banks would fully insure risk-averse investors and the safety multiplier
disappears. This could be seen as a particular case of the generic result of Krishnamurthy (2003) of irrelevance
of balance sheet recession under complete contracting (see Di Tella (2013) for a continuous-time formulation).
In my environment, limited liability is key to endow banks with a role in portfolio construction.
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which the supply of public debt is perfectly inelastic and there are no deep pockets investors.
In this economy, too many savings are chasing too few safe assets On the other hand, the
supply of risky assets is perfectly elastic. Through their leverage decision, banks control
the endogenous supply of private safe assets. The partial equilibrium effects of the agents’
portfolio choices interact with the general equilibrium channel of a Walrasian market for
public debt.
Under low supply of public safe assets and high heterogeneity in risk-aversion, the
economy features a safety multiplier mechanism. It is optimal for risk-neutral banks to hold
public safe assets and bundle them with risky assets. Doing so creates more safety in the
economy than the endowment of public debt would do alone. When public safe assets
become scarce, they can become so expensive that banks prefer to delever. This impairs the
supply of private safe assets, as well as less investment in the real economy. This credit
crunch is caused by a shortage of public debt. In such situation, the proportion of safe assets
on banks’ balance sheets rise, as they are best used in risk-neutral hands to trigger the safety
multiplier. Hence there is a pecking order in public debt ownership: having them on the
balance sheets of banks not only hedges risky investment, but at same time enables private
safety creation. When the risk averse agents have limited access to the risky technology
(Europe), equilibrium leverage is higher and the parameter region under which the economy
features a safety multiplier is wider.
The welfare analysis is carried out in a stochastic environment of overlapping long-lived
generations. The negative beta of long-term securities is microfounded be the expectations of
a flight-to-safety in low aggregate states. The government and private agents are facing the
exact same maturity choice between short-term debt and long-term debt. The decentralized
equilibrium is constrained inefficient because private agents do not issue enough long-term
securities. The reason is that they do not fully internalize the positive effects of having a high
supply of negative beta assets in the economy in order to crowd-in aggregate investment.
Asset pricing implication: the Safety Mismatch Index The model delivers endogenous
closed-form solutions for two safety premia: one on public debt and one on private debt.
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The spread between the two is the carry trade made by the banks on public debt. I show
this carry trade increases with public debt beta and decreases with leverage. I argue that
this spread is a relevant welfare and financial stability indicator. It reveals the fragility of
banks’ balance sheets, as well as the extent to which the economy is exposed to a sovereign
debt crisis that feeds into a banking crisis. I call this spread the Safety Mismatch Index and
show its predictive power on the Eurozone sovereign crisis. The empirical analysis confirms
the key predictions of the model on monetary aggregates. I interpret the European crisis as
a shortage of public safe assets, which deprives banks of their leveraging ability.
Key related literature My paper connects two strands of literature: models of endogenous
leverage a la Geanakoplos (1997) and general equilibrium macro models a la Caballero and
Farhi (2013). The latter also studies the effect of a fixed supply of safe assets, but does not
feature optimizing banks. Taking into account the inelastic supply of risk free assets is a
key departure from the standard asset pricing approach of Campbell and Viceira (2002),
which focuses on exogenous changes of risk preferences to pin down the risk free rate. My
paper also contributes to the banking literature about what banks do. It suggest a view of
banks as private safety creators, alternative to the agency view of the firm: e.g. Diamond
(1984), Diamond and Rajan (2001b), and Tirole (2003) for a unified theory of banking relying
on agency frictions. Furthermore, I argue that treating bank debt holders as risk-neutral
is counterfactual with the vision that these holders are ’passive money.’ As a result, I
focus on the main heterogeneity between active money and passive money emphasized in
Caballero and Farhi (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2013b), and I introduce it in an asset-pricing
model with endogenous leverage. Kashyap et al. (2002) sees banks as liquidity economizers,
whereas I see them as safety multipliers. Diamond (1984) banks engage in idiosyncratic
diversification, whereas my financial intermediaries engage in diversification of aggregate
shocks. My model can also be seen as providing microfoundation to the view in Philippon
(2012) of banks as service providers to households.5 On the creation of safe assets, all the
5In his empirical investigation, Philippon (2012) uses exogenous weights to value the services provided by
banks to households. Similarly, DeAngelo and Stulz (2013) have in mind a liquidity premium on bank debt. My
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previous theoretical models are assuming substitutability between public safe assets and
private safe assets: Gorton and Metrick (2012), Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012), Sunderam
(2012) and Greenwood et al. (2010). On the contrary, my model exhibits crowding-in.
Empirically, I document the stylized fact of a positive comovement between US Treasuries
and bank debt supplies in Europe, whereas Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013a)
shows there is substitutability in the US. Compared to Campbell et al. (2013b), I do not
emphasize the nominal properties of bonds, but their relative safety properties, in order to
analyze their negative beta. On the normative side, contrary to Stein 2010 who argues
there is too much private safe assets, my model hints at a lack of public safe assets. The
stochastic OLG model used for the normative analysis is reminiscent of Ball and Mankiw
(2007), but allows for within-generations heterogeneity and maturity choices. Compared
to Woodford (1990) and Gale (1990), my environment features both intergenerational risk
sharing (between generations) and intra-generational risk-sharing (within a generation). The
interplay between the two is at the core of the constrained inefficiency result.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the environment in which banks
create safe assets. Section 3 solves for the decentralized equilibrium, taking the supply of
public debt as given. Section 4 carries out the normative analysis: it shows the private
equilibrium is constrained inefficient, and how public debt issuance can achieve a Pareto
improvement. Section 5 analyzes the open economy extension. Section 6 turns to the
empirical analysis. Section 7 discusses the results in light of the literature and concludes.
1.2 A Model of Private Safety Creation
I develop a model of endogenous leverage in an environment of risk aversion heterogeneity,
multiple assets and limited liability. Even if it shares some flavors with models of beliefs
disagreement (Geanakoplos 1997, Simsek (2013)), I choose to work with risk aversion
heterogeneity. This is motivated by the focus of this paper on asset multiplicity, and the
model provides rigorous microfoundations to their insights, by pinning down banks production function of
safety to their portfolio choice.
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view of banks as macro insurers.6
1.2.1 The safety multiplier argument in a nutshell
Before developing the dynamic CARA-normal environment, I start by a static four-states
example to illustrate the safety multiplier argument. Why would banks ever hold the public
safe assets on their own balance sheets instead of letting these safe assets being held in
risk-averse hands?
Consider only two dates: t = 0, 1, four equally plausible states. Assume that a t = 1
risky payoff for the technology and consider a public security that is imperfectly negatively
correlated with the technology:





















The mean of this payoff is 7.25 and its volatility is 2.19. But actually, a risk-neutral bank
can help improving the Sharpe ratio effectively faced by the risk-averse investor. Assume
the risk-neutral bank and the risk-averse investor enter 7 units of a financial contract that
promises s¯ = 1 at t = 1, and that the risk-neutral agent holds both assets on its balance
sheet. The state-contingent value of the risk-neutral agent portfolio is aggregate. Thus
6Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008) argue that a reasonable assumption consists in treating optimists for one
asset as also optimists for the other assets, and this is how they obtain contagion. On the contrary, I do not want
to take a stand on who is more optimistic on a given class of assets, so I claim that risk-aversion heterogeneity is
a more parsimonious modeling device.
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he defaults on its contract if and only if one of the two lowest states realize. As a result,
the state-contingent payoff faced by the investor, by the means of the financial contract








This state-contingent payoff has a mean of 6.5 and its volatility is 0.75. By bundling the
two assets and issuing risky debt against it, the bank has been able to significantly improve
the Sharpe ratio faced by the risk-averse agent. This asset will be traded in equilibrium.
Formally, the equilibrium is defined by the risk-neutral maximization of the bank and the
mean-variance maximization of the investor, under their respective budget constraints, as
well as two market clearing conditions, where B is the exogenous supply of public debt
(price qB) and D is the endogenous supply of private debt (price qD):
xABˆ + x
P















, and the two prices qB and qD are the endoge-
nous variables. Denoting D = qDyA the value of private debt, Appendix B.1 shows that this




This example shows that the only ingredients needed are limited liability and risk-
aversion heterogeneity. From a situation of market incompleteness (2 assets and 4 states),
agents endogenously decide to partially complete the markets. Defaultable debt is a 3rd
asset that enables to attain the constrained efficient allocation. The net worth nA of the
risk-neutral bank gives an additional rationale for leverage (i.e. cross-subsidization), but
does not play a role in the safety multiplier mechanism.
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What critically misses on this example is the endogeneity of the default threshold, which
is actually a choice variable for the bank. The full-fledged model below captures it. This
makes the price pB depend on the supply B. The safety multiplier result carries through, as
long as the supply B is small enough.
1.2.2 General environment
The model is a stochastic overlapping generations model under aggregate technology risk.
Contrary to the canonical OLG, risk is not on endowments, but on the technology in perfectly
elastic supply. It is cast in a discrete infinite horizon framework, each period is indexed by
t.7
Agents’ preferences Each generation is populated by a continuum of agents of two types.
There is a mass 1 of banks (type A: active) and a mass 1 of investors (type P: passive).
Banks are risk-neutral whereas investors are risk-averse, with a coefficient of absolute risk
aversion of gP.8 For banks, the risk-neutrality assumption captures enhanced sophistication,
diversification opportunities or bailout expectations.9 Risk-neutrality should be seen as a
normalization, as what matters is the differential of risk aversion between the two populations
of agents. The CARA parameter of investors captures this differential. CARA preferences
are more constraining than HARA or Epstein-Zin, often used to shed light on the risk-free
rate puzzle. Agents’ types are common knowledge. At birth, the mass of risk-neutral agents
A is endowed with nA of numeraire, whereas the mass of risk-averse investors P is endowed
7The purpose of the dynamic model is to endogenize the beta of safe assets. Microfounding the beta of
public debt paves the way to the welfare analysis. The model is the exact repeated sequence of the static game
considered in the example above, with a broader set of available contracts to allow for a maturity choice of
agents.
8I have also solved a version of the model with risk-averse banks, with CARA coefficient gA. The results of
this paper are robust to this extension, as long as gA < gP. The model generalizes to a continuum of types gi,
and then features assortative matching in the competitive equilibrium: the surplus of each bilateral match is
endogenous to agents outside options. Therefore the least risk averse agent is matched with the least risk-averse
agent above the endogenous cutoff g¯ that decides who the lenders are: [g¯;gmax].
9All these reasons point towards value maximization by banks. For the latter microfoundation, it will
amplify the destructive effects of sovereign risk shown in the model extension, as arguably sovereign risk would
in this case hurt bailout ability of the sovereign, hence increasing banks’ risk aversion.
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with nP.
Demographics There are overlapping generations of such agents. Each generation lives
three periods.10 The heterogeneity within generations is kept constant over time. Every new
born of type A is endowed with nA of numeraire, agents of type P with nP.11 Not having
the wealth distribution as a state variable makes the model bloc-recursive. The notation Git
with i 2 {A, P} refers to an agent of type i that belongs to the generation that was born in
period t  2 and dies in period t.
Technology There is only one exogenous asset to invest in: a risky linear technology. This
technology is short-term: investing one unit at t yields an uncertain dividend at t + 1:
st+1. I assume that this payoff follows a random walk:12 st+1 ⇠ N (st, s1). Thus st is the
aggregate state of the economy. All agents have the same beliefs of the shock distribution.
The technology is in perfectly elastic supply, so it has an exogenous linear cost pK in
numeraire.13 The ratio pK/st should be thought as the time-varying Tobin-q of the model.
There is no riskless storage technology.
Government A government Bˆ finances public spending by raising taxes and issuing public
debt. The latter plays the role of a second asset from private agents’ perspective, albeit
endogenous and in fixed supply.
Public debt securities are non state-contingent assets, which promise to one unit of
numeraire at maturity. Public debt can be long-term: it can be issued at period t and pay
10Beyond breaking the First Welfare Theorem, the OLG structure then mutes undesirable discounting and
long-run wealth effects.
11It is within-generation heterogeneity in preferences, not in endowments as Sargent-Wallace (1982) and
Smith (1988).
12Qualitative results apply to general Markov chains.
13The price f can be normalized to 1. Results are robust to decreasing return to scale technology, i.e. a
partially elastic offer curve. On the other hand, having an inelastic supply of capital (supply of one Luca’s tree)
renders the quantity of aggregate risk in the economy constant, and this shuts down the crowding-in effects of
public debt. A weaker version of the safety multiplier and constrained inefficiency results can be recovered in
the latter case when allowing for young consumption.
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back only at period t+ 2. The government then issues public debt at different maturities
h = 1, ...,H. Taking H = 2 exactly matches the horizon of private agents, and therefore do
not endow the government with undue advantage on agents.14 Denote Bht the outstanding
stock, at date t, of public debt maturing at date t + h. Government consumption gt is
exogenous. To avoid asymmetric tax treatment across generations, only the old are taxed.15
There can be asymmetric tax treatment within generation, but I assume the tax schedule 
tA, tP
 
is not optimized upon by the government, perhaps because of informational
frictions on the types (A, P), which renders fiscal policy less agile than public debt issuance
policy. Fiscal policy then merely tracks the public debt issuance policy by balancing the
government budget.
For each residual maturity of public debt h = 1, ...,H, a Walrasian market opens at each
period t. All agent of all generations have access to these markets, and primary debt and
secondary debt is fungible: a government promise for date t+ h has the same price, because




h. As a h period promise at t







 tAt + tPt (1.1)








that satisfies the government
budget constraint at each history st. Nevertheless, I also allow for the possibility of
endogenous government default.16 To see this, consider the case of an extremely bad
aggregate shock (or an extremely high public spending shock). Given the fiscal policy choice
14I restrict the government ability to issue long-term debt to only two periods in order to respect the spirit of
constrained efficiency. In the theory of the 2nd-Best, the government has the same instruments as private agents.
In my environment, this means allowing the government for the exact same maturity choice as the agents.
15Whether to tax the young, the middle or the old generation is innocuous, as wealth effects do not play a
role in the safety multiplier.
16The technical motivation is to rule out a trivial strategy for the social planner to issue unlimited level of
public short-term debt. The economic motivation is to analyze in Section 5 the interplay between sovereign
credit risk and bank credit risk in an open economy environment.
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of only taxing the old, the proceeds the government can raise in this case is null. Moreover,
as will become clear through the safety multiplier mechanism elicited in this paper, the
economy is in a Laffer regime for public debt, hence the government cannot raise additional
revenue by issuing more public bonds. The government is then forced into default. On
other words, the government has endogenously limited fiscal capacity.
When a long-term public debt is issued at t, it carries interest rate risk: at period t+ 1, its
price will be determined mark-to-market, and this price is uncertain from t perspective.17
An investor with a one-period ahead horizon faces a portfolio choice in three stochastic
potentially correlated assets: the technology, the short-term public debt and the long-term
public debt.18
In a second-moments approximation, the prices at t+ 1 of the technology and long-term












where sK is the exogenous volatility of technology, sB is the endogenous volatility of
interim price of long-term debt, and r is their correlation. One should think of the long-term
debt volatility as low (sB < sK) and its correlation with the technology as negative (r < 0),
as is shown in the recursive equilibrium. The expectation on technology is the aggregate
state: µK = st, whereas the expectation on long-term debt is the expectation of its market
price tomorrow: µB = Et [q(st+1)].
Private financial contracts At the same time, agents can borrow or lend to each other by
trading on securities markets. One unit of security is a promise to pay s¯ of numeraire at
maturity t+ h. To rule out Ponzi schemes, private agents can issue promises only at the
17Contrary to the safe asset literature (Gourinchas and Jeanne (2012), Gorton and Ordonez (2013)), and in
line with Caballero and Farhi (2013), my paper insists on a defining characteristics of public debt: its negative
beta with macroeconomic shocks.
18As a consequence of potential sovereign default, short-term public debt is not fully riskless.
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horizon of their life span: one- or two-period ahead when young, and only one-period
ahead when middle-aged. Contrary to Geanakoplos and Zame (2013), this contract does
not specify a given level of collateral. This intends to capture risky recourse debt. Risky
implies that agents can default on their contract, and they will do so as long as the payoff
on their portfolio (their asset side) is realized below the sum of all the promises contracted
by the agent. Recourse implies that a borrower cannot pledge only a part of its balance sheet.
When the borrower defaults, the lender has recourse to seize the entire balance sheet assets
of the borrower. This matches the empirical fact that, in practice, most short-term debt is
recourse.19
Each security s¯ is traded on a Walrasian market, which clears at a price qs¯. An agent
selling y units of such contract is therefore able to raise D = qs¯ ⇤ y at t = 0, against the
promise of paying back S¯ = s¯ ⇤ y at t = 1. Define the rate of return on bank debt as the
ratio of the promise to its price: rs¯ = s¯qs¯ =
S¯
D .
20 Primary and secondary debt are fungible,
i.e. any promise issued by a given agent Gqt+j at a given maturity t+ h trades on the same








. y denotes a short-term promise (issued
one period before maturity), whereas yprimary denotes a long-term promise (issued two
periods before maturity).
Timeline The sequence of actions is as follows.
• At each period t, the government rolls over its debt according to its financial policy.
The government issues Bht 1  Bht units of new public bonds with the residual maturity
19Geanakoplos (2009) features secured non-recourse debt. In practice, most of the so-called secured debt
such as repurchase agreement contracts (repo) includes an additional claim to the balance sheet of the issuer in
case of collateral shortfall, which makes them in effect recourse. In case of default, the lenders seize the whole
balance sheet of the agent in default. See Weymuller (2013b) for an analysis of the idiosyncratic drivers of the
market for secured debt.
20This General Equilibrium approach is not equivalent to the Principal-Agent approach where the borrower
and the lender bargain over the loan contract. Theorem 1 of (Simsek, 2013) (equivalence with full bargaining
to the borrower) does not apply due to the absence of a riskless technology. Nevertheless, appealing to the
first theorem of welfare, both environment are constrained efficient, so they trace the same Pareto frontier. The
Walrasian equilibrium is therefore equivalent to a Principal-Agent economy with a specific bargaining power.
The Walrasian treatment is more transparent, as it restricts the space of ex-ante transfers that could be achieved
through the terms of the contract.
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t+ h.





. The young generation make portfolio choice decisions by
investing in the technology: agents of type q 2 {A, P} invest iGqt+2t in the technology.
At the same time they trade on the Walrasian markets for legacy promises: public debt
and claims on former generation balance sheets, as well in the primary markets for
new promises issued at t, whether within or between generations. We denote s¯
Gqt+j
t+h the
number of units of promise they buy on market for a given promise s¯
Gqt+j
t+h . They also
create primary markets for promises on their own balance sheets by issuing long-term










• At the following period t + 1, the same agents becomes middle-aged. The risky
technology then pays off st+1, and their portfolio of promises (long and short) can
be mark-to-market with the Walrasian markets that open at period t + 1. Matur-
ing promises are settled by the actual payment of the promise or by the issuer
defaulting. In the latter case, any holder of a promise seizes the total balance sheet
{technology payo f f + residual promises} of the agent in default, pro-rata the promise.
Subsequently, these middle-aged agents make new decisions of investment in the
short-term risky technology iG
q
t+2
t+1 and rebalance their portfolio of promises, and can
open primary markets for promises by issuing short-term debt.
• Finally, at period t+ 2, the agents of this generation Gq2{A,P}t+2 become old. Before their
death, they receive the payoff st+2 of the technology and they liquidate their portfolio
of promises, and consumes these proceeds.
Markets At any period t, there are 3 markets open for private promises.21
21The identity of the issuer generation has to kept track of, due to the recourse feature of the promises. A
priori it would be 3 ⇤ card (q) potential markets, but given the one dimensional heterogeneity within-generation,
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Figure 1.5: Environment: demographics and timeline.









































































On the other hand, for government promises, there are only two markets, as the primary
market for short-term public debt and the secondary market for long-term public debt are
fungible. Despite being called the market for short-term public debt, it includes the legacy
promises are traded only in one direction, hence only 3 markets are actively traded.















is held at the beginning of the period by the old generation Gt. They are selling
in order to consume before dying.
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long-term public debt that matures next period.
• Market for short-term public debt, i.e. for public promise of 1Gˆt+1 at t + 1, which






















I first analyze on the environment abstracting from any government optimization. In this








is taken as exogenous.23 I define all the Walrasian
recursive equilibria of this economy. I focus on stationary Markov equilibria. Given the
bloc-recursive structure of the environment, these equilibria can be defined with a unique
state variable: the aggregate shock st  (st 1, st).












































i) All agents of all generations optimize.
iii) Markets for private promises clear at each residual maturity.
iv) Markets for public promises clear at each residual maturity.
These equilibria have the flavor of the collateral-constrained equilibria of Geanakoplos
23I allow for irresponsible financial policies: the financial policy does not have to be riskless in the sense of
satisfying the government flow of funds at each history st. Hence the equilibrium features non-zero probability
of government default.
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and Zame (2013),24 but the financial assets traded are different, as borrowers’ debt here is
recourse. Another difference is that there is a priori a continuum of contracts that could be
traded: one for each state s of the continuum. Markets therefore are complete.25 Although a
priori, an infinite set of securities (qs¯, s¯) is available to agents, only one will be traded in the
equilibrium of interest given the low level of heterogeneity (only two types of agents).26 The
economy features endogenous market incompleteness: despite having a complete spanning
of financial assets, agents’ positions are restricted by their endogenous collateral constraints
arising from limited liability. However, due to the recourse feature of unsecured debt, my
economy is ’more complete’ than the Geanakoplos one. As a result, this environment can be
seen as an intermediate case between the Arrow-Debreu and the Geanakoplos economies,
less complete than the former but more complete than the latter.
The full equilibrium is solved by backward induction. First I characterize the solution of
the portfolio choices of the middle-aged generation, taking the supply of legacy long-term
debt as given. Then I move backward to characterize the joint decision of portfolios and
maturity choices by the young generation.
1.3.1 Middle-aged agents portfolio choice
I consider here the generation Gt+1: the middle-aged at period t. Its agents do not face any
maturity choice: they only can issue short-term debt. However they can invest in all 3 active
markets beyond the technology: within-generation short-term promise27, next-generation
short-term promise and next-generation long-term promises. Without loss of generality, I
analyze a decentralized equilibrium with zero supply of public debt.
24It is closer to the liquidity-constrained equilibrium than the debt-constrained equilibrium of Kehoe and
Levine (2001). In the latter, as in Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), default is strategic and the existence of
equilibrium hinges on the self-enforcement of debt. These two papers do not feature equilibrium default.
25As markets are complete, there is no need to engage in market design as Athanasoulis and Shiller (2001).
26This is fortunate, as it circumvents the possibility of a discontinuity in agents budget sets as in Hart (1975).
Restricting agents from consuming at t = 0 mutes down consumption smoothing and conveniently avoids
difficulties on equilibrium existence.
27It is the same as buying back long-term promises if this investment is negative.
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I conjecture a contract equilibrium in which, within each generation, risk-neutral banks
borrow from risk-averse investors, and all agents have non-degenerate portfolio holdings
in all assets that are not internal to the generation (the technology and the next-generation
short-term and long-term promises). The CARA-normal environment enables to derive the
equilibrium closed-form, even with equilibrium default.
Figure 1.6: Contract equilibrium representation. Within-generation agents are in green and assets are in blue.
Red bullets indicate, from left to right: bank portfolio choice, bank leverage choice and lender portfolio choice.
The net worth of middle-aged agents is the result of their young portfolio decisions
and of the realization of the aggregate state t. Middle-aged agents can be thought as
liquidating their entire portfolios, including of long-term debt, at period t market prices,




of the middle-aged is the state variable that encodes all the previous decisions of the
generation.
Program of middle-aged risk-neutral agents Denote S¯ the sum of all promises and its

































The bank pre-default portfolio realization ut+1 is:
ut+1 = XA
0
mSt+1   S¯  tAt+1 (1.7)






































Out-of-generation trades are with a representative agent of the other generation as
counterpart: Gt+2. Indeed, the equilibrium can be broken down into two sequential
(but interacting) problems: risk-sharing between generations, then risk-sharing within
the generation. The legacy stock of long-term promise becomes fungible with short-term
promises. P denotes the price vector at t of assets and S their t+ 1 realization. For the
technology, price is f and realization st+1. For securities, ’prices’ are Walrasian prices at
t and ’realizations’ are prices at t + 1 in history st+1. The realization of the short-term













key feature of the full equilibrium is that long-term promises issued by generation Gt+2 are
negative beta, thus appealing in the portfolio choice of generation Gt+1 agents.
In the multivariate normal approximation, u verifies:
u ⇠ N  µu, s2u 
with µu = X0µ  S¯  tAt+1 and s2u = X0SX. The objective function of the bank writes:
WG
Am










Banks expected utility increases in a convex fashion with the mean of the pre-default
payoff mean, and it increases with its variance: this risk-shifting motive arises from the
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limited liability friction.
Program of middle-aged risk-averse investors Due to the recourse feature of the debt
contract, the investor seizes the entire balance sheet of the bank when the bank is in default.
Such banks can belong to generation Gt+1 (within generation) or generation Gt+2 (cross-
generation). Denote by S¯Gt+2 the sum of promises by banks of generation Gt+2, it is seen







is captured by S¯.




















The investor pre any-default portfolio realization vt+1 is:
vt+1 = XP
0
mSt+1 + S¯  tPt+1



























In the multivariate normal approximation, this objective function can be written:
WG
Pm



















1.3.2 Young agents portfolio and maturity choices
We now turn to generation Gt+2. Agents optimize twice over the course of their life: when
young and when middle-aged. When young, they face a meaningful maturity choice. The
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analysis in section 3.1. enables to derive the indirect utilities of the two middle-aged agents
























These give the marginal values of wealth for each agent of the generation Gt+1 at t in history
st. But when young, agents optimize their expected utility over payoff two periods ahead, at
t+ 2.29 The middle-aged optimization is not a sideshow as, at period t, the market clearings
jointly involve the portfolio choices of the two generations.
Program of young risk-neutral agents Denote S¯ST the sum of all short-term promises,















The only assets they can invest in are the technology and the short-term promises of the
















The portfolio choice XA
0
y and the short-term promises only impact the value function




t+1 (st+1) = X
A0ySt+1   S¯ST (1.11)
Whereas the long-term promises S¯LT only impact the value function through the long-run
payoff ut+2.
28The problem is not stationary in nB and nBmid: the first is exogenous, the second is state-contingent (st 1, st)
by bloc-recursivity.
29Allowing for consumption even when young and middle-aged beyond when old is innocuous. It then
suffices to collapse the time and state dimensions in one same dimension. With CARA preferences, intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution and risk-aversion are equal, hence result about state-smoothing generalizes to
consumption-smoothing. Epstein-Zin relaxation is left for further research.
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Program of young risk-averse investors The only assets they can invest in outside the
generation also are the technology and the short-term promises of the middle-aged Gt+1
















The out-generation portfolio choice XP
0
y and the long positions in both the short-term
and long-term promises only impact the value function through the interim net worth of



















































Comparing the programs of the young banks and the young investors, we observe that
the choice variables S¯ST and S¯LT are not redundant: even if they are part of the same debt
raising at t, given that their payoff happen at different times (t and t+ 1) and that agents
30Due to the presence of Walrasian markets, the investors sell all their long-term promises before reinvesting
at t+ 1 (mark-to-market).
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have heterogeneous marginal values of wealth, the maturity choice is well defined.
1.3.3 Existence of a contract equilibrium
I now prove the existence of a recursive (i.e. time-homogeneous) Markov equilibrium. Such
stationary equilibrium satisfies the following properties: ergodicity, conditional spotlessness,
and compatibility with arbitrary initial conditions.





Proof. The proof is a direct application of Duffie et al. (1994).
Despite the existence of the equilibrium, the above lemma does not ensure a non-
degenerate equilibrium in which assets that pay no dividends have non-zero value. As a
matter of fact, Duffie et al. (1994) notes that “we do not know whether coexistence of with- and
without-dividend assets is possible in a stochastic economy without population growth, either with or
without ergodicity”.31 The following proves that there exists an equilibrium with coexistence
of risky and safe assets in the stochastic economy. In such equilibrium risk-averse agents
lend to risk-neutral agents and in which long-term debt has non-zero value.
To show existence of such contract equilibrium, I proceed in two steps. First I take the
portfolio and maturity choices of young as given, and solve for the equilibrium leverage
(risk-sharing agreement ) within the middle-aged generation. Second, I use this portfolio
choice to compute middle-aged value functions, before fully solving for the young portfolio
and maturity choice.
Benchmark case: no long-term debt
I start by solving for the equilibrium when the technology is the only potential investment:
the supply B of next generation promises (as well as public debt) is set to zero. This is the
31Scheinkman (1980) shows there does not exist such equilibrium in deterministic economies. Spear and
Srivastava (1986) and Spear et al. (1990) entirely characterize the structure of equilibrium in stochastic OLG
models.
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case if there is no maturity choice. The following lemma shows that the optimal contract is
risky debt.
Lemma 2. When there is no outside asset in the economy beyond the technology, the risk-averse
investors lend all their wealth to the risk-neutral banks through one financial contract: risky debt.
The proof in Appendix B.1 makes use of the first theorem of welfare. The problem can
be broken on one hand on optimal level of aggregate investment and on the other hand
on the optimal risk-sharing between risk-neutral and risk-averse agents. For aggregate
investment, the resource constraint pins it down, as, in this benchmark, there are no other







 nA + nP
As for risk-sharing, the constrained efficient allocations are such that risk-averse agents
enjoy a constant consumption as long as the technology shock realizes above this consump-
tion level. When the shock realizes below this threshold, the risk-averse agents consume all
the t = 1 wealth of the economy. Any of such allocations is implemented by a risky debt
contract, with face value the desired constant consumption level.
Equilibrium within the middle-aged generation
I first characterize the solution of the two above program and the market clearings taking the
next generation issuance quantities as given. The latter act as an out-of-generation supply
of assets, from generation Gt+1 perspective. I am interested in the equilibrium leverage (i.e.
within-generation risk-sharing), and how it varies with the supply of negative beta assets
(i.e. the supply of long-term promises by generation Gt+2). There is a safety multiplier when
the two quantities covary positively.
Introducing out-of-the generation long-term debt, taken for now as an exogenous fixed
supply B,32 breaks the proof of Lemma 1. Indeed, the ex ante investment depends now on


















+ qB,tB  nA + nP
Thus the endogenous total value of the public safe asset (qB,tB) crowds out private
investment in the technology. If there is a Laffer effect, i.e. if the value (qB,tB) decreases
with respect to the supply B, then issuing more long-term debt B actually crowds in
investment.
The within-generation equilibrium is defined by 8 endogenous variables: for each of the
two agents, their investment in the technology iqt , their investment in the long-term debt xqB,t
and their position in the intrageneration risk-sharing contract S¯qt , as well as the endogenous
price for long term-debt qB,t and the endogenous price of the risk-sharing contract qs¯,t. And
the equilibrium is characterized by the 8 independent equations: for each of the two agents,
one portfolio choice and one leverage choice, as well as two budget constraints and the two
market clearings for long-term debt and for the risk-sharing contract. Appendix B.2 solves
for the equilibrium fully closed-form.
As banks are risk-neutral, the equilibrium price qs¯,t of the risk-sharing contract (bank
debt) does not directly depend on the quantity traded in this contract S¯t. It is illustrated in
Figure 1.7, where the slope of bank supply curve is constant and equal to this equilibrium
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where X is an endogenous measure of bank balance sheet correlation: X
⇣





















< 1. In this case,
X increases with r from  1 to 1. The ratio sBxAB,t
sKiAt
controls the concavity: when it tends to
zero, the mapping X (r) is linear.
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Figure 1.7: Equilibrium on the market for bank debt: leverage D w.r.t. promise s¯.
Appendix B.2 characterizes the equilibrium in terms of only two endogenous variables
(µu, su): the mean and the volatility of the pre-default bank payoff. The solution strategy
is as follows. The bank budget constraint and optimality conditions form a quadratic




B ) as non-linear
functions of (µu, su). The definition of su then delivers a functional FMVF (µu, su) = 0: a
bank mean-variance frontier. In parallel, the equilibrium on the debt market delivers a
debt-pricing functional Fdebt (µu, su) = 0.
From bank’s perspective, its risk-shifting motive deters from holding any negative beta
assets. However there is a countervailing force: holding negative beta asset makes its balance
sheet less risky, which relaxes its endogenous collateral constraint, hence enabling to lever































As long as the endogenous the long-term debt rate rsa f e =
µB
pB,t is lower than the risky
rate rK =
µK
pK , the right-hand side is positive. It implies that
sBxAB
sKxAK
< 1 can be satisfied only if
38







The right hand side decreases with r: a low correlation restricts more the portfolio choice
due to the risk-shifting motive. Having p = cKs2pBs1 > 1 does not prevent sB < sK, as long as
assets expectations are chosen such that rK > rsa f e but pK > qB.









It puts a range on the safe asset price qB, which translates on bounds on the supply of
public safe asset B in general equilibrium.
Lemma 3. Partial Equilibrium existence
There exists a contract equilibrium if and only if the safe asset volatility sB verifies Assumption
1. In this equilibrium, risky debt is the optimal contract and is the only traded financial contract.
Leverage then is determinate: Modigliani-Miller fails without resorting to any agency
frictions. Despite complete markets, the limited liability frictions shapes the optimal contract
to be risky debt. Hence equilibrium features limited risk-sharing and equilibrium default.33
The volatility of long-term debt must be high enough for the contract equilibrium to
exist. If sB = 0 (i.e. a riskless storage technology such as money), passive agents all fly to
money, and do not find attractive to lend to banks. In the full equilibrium, long-term debt
volatility comes from interest rate risk.34
The mean-variance frontier of the bank FMVF (µu, su) = 0 is non-degenerate despite
banks being risk-neutral. The MVF implicit mapping su
MVF7! µu is concave, whereas the
debt implicit mapping su
debt7! µu (from Fdebt (µu, su) = 0) is an increasing first-order linear
33Default happens in the low aggregate states, and not in high-income states, a counterfactual feature of
Alvarez and Jermann (2000).
34Equilibrium is then unique: there are not two equilibria, one with cheap debt, high leverage and good
diversification, and another one with expensive debt, low leverage and poor diversification.
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borrower MVF higher p2
lender debt−pricing higher p2


















borrower MVF higher rho
lender debt−pricing higher rho
Figure 1.8: Long-term debt as a hedge: impact of its price and its correlation on bank leverage.
function. Endogenous default makes the banks effectively risk-averse. The equilibrium
















Lemma 4. A lower safe asset price and lower beta increases the probability default of the bank.
That is, when the safe asset is a cheaper and better hedge, banks choose to lever up more
and to take more risk. Lower r make bank lever up and take more risk, whereas lower qB
make bank lever up more and take less risk.
Effect of a negative correlation r Banks have enhanced leverage ability when r is low. The
safe asset holdings of banks are thus pinned down by the trade-off between the traditional
risk-shifting motive (dislikes low r) and the debt pricing by investors (likes low r). Hedging
properties of public debt help the within-generation risk-sharing agreement.





Combining the market clearing condition with the two budget constraint eliminates
equilibrium leverage D and recovers the resource constraint:
qBB+ pK
n




= nA + nP (1.16)
Thus the safe asset price qB depends on the equilibrium only through the level of
aggregate investment xAK + x
P
K. This is the heart of the safety multiplier: more expensive
long-term debt can deter investment through a GE effect that overcomes the portfolio choice.
Assumption 1 and the resource constraint imply a general equilibrium parameter restriction






























The closed-form expression for safe asset price qB enables to prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Existence in General Equilibrium
There exists a within-generation contract equilibrium if and only if the out-generation safe asset
supply B is low enough with respect to aggregate wealth nA + nP.
The existence does not need any short sale constraints. Limited liability implies an
endogenous collateral constraint. Only under a contract equilibrium the aggregate wealth
nA + nP and the wealth distribution nA/nP are priced in the safe asset qB. A ’safe asset
shortage’ should qualify a situation in which long-term debt supply is very low with respect
to passive wealth nP: a savings glut of anxious wealth.
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Full equilibrium characterization
I move now backward to the program of the young and the inter-generational full equi-
librium at period t. The interaction between the young and the middle aged generations
adds two features to the model: endogenous t+ 1 price functional for long-term debt, and
endogenous long-term debt supply through the maturity choice of the young. I analyze
these two equilibrium features sequentially.
Long-term debt endogenous price functional In the time-homogeneous Markov equi-







of long-term debt is fully endogenous. This key feature
of the model enables to derived a formula for the endogenous correlation of long-term
debt with aggregate risk (its ’beta’). I solve for the fixed point in the long-term debt price
functional, using a heuristic approach drawing on the ’static’ pricing by the middle-aged
derived in the above section 3.3.2. I still take here the supply of long-term debt as exogenous




+ Bˆ (private and public long-term debt).
By fungibility, the realized marked-to-market price at t+ 1 of long-term is the same as
one of a short-term promise issued by the same risk-neutrals, the ones of generation Gt+2.
At t+ 1, such promise can be bought by the middle-aged Gt+2 risk-averse agents, or by the
young Gt+3 young risk-averse agents. Let first focus on the first type of buyers, the within
generation risk-averse agents. In this case, the t+ 1 price on the market for this promise is
















So in effect we have to mappings that relate the long-term debt functional with the
short-term debt functional: the one that gives the price of long-term debt at t as a function
of the price of short-term debt at t+ 1 (equation 1.17), and the one that gives the price of
short-term debt at t as a function of the price of short-term debt at t+ 1 (equation 1.15),





















The heuristic solution goes as follows. I take the bank debt price functional qs¯ (µK) that
solves the static model, and develop it in two orders of µK. I then analytically compute
the multivariate second moments of this functional with respect to the underlying shock
st ⌘ µK: its mean µˆB, its volatility sˆB and its correlation rˆ. This leads to three equations in








. This is tantamount to working locally to make the following








   ⇠ N([µKµˆB], [sKsˆBrˆ])
This heuristic approach uses the implicit characterization of the safe asset price functional
































is aggregate investment. A second-order expansion in
st of the equilibrium value of investment in the static model leads to an implicit expression
of the endogenous beta:
rˆ =  1+ 4  st 2
0@ ∂µK xK
B




  2 ∂µK pB xKB
pK + ∂pB xK
1A2
Appendix B.3 shows the existence of a triplet (µˆB, sˆB, rˆ) satisfying the fixed point of this
equation that defines correlation, as well two additional equations from the definition of
long-term debt mean and volatility: µˆB and sˆB . It leads to the solution in the second-order






















This expression for the endogenous beta of public debt is interesting in many respects.
First, the beta is indeed negative for low levels of B. In the recursive equilibrium, the
flight to safety enjoyed by public debt endogenously endows this security with an hedging
property. It is the expectation of a flight to safety in the low states of tomorrow that endows
public debt with negative beta. Ex ante, this enables (within-generation) safety creation. In
the canonical Samuelsonian treatment, money is valued today if people expect it to have
value tomorrow. This is a deterministic argument. In contrast, public debt has value in my
environment because of its endogenous hedging properties.
This flight to safety is amplified by the safety multiplier. A higher level of bank net
worth nA commands a stronger safety multiplier effect. In this regime of high nA, in the
states st of low technology productivity, not only the bank does rebalance aggressively away
from technology towards the public debt and at the same time delevers. Private safe assets
supply then dwindles and investors also rebalance towards the public debt. Thus when nA
is high, the two portfolio rebalance compounds towards a flight to the public debt. Beta of
public debt thus decreases with bank net worth.
Second, the following lemma characterizes the dependence of the negative beta to the
supply of public debt. This result is key for the normative analysis.
Lemma 5. In the stationary Markov equilibrium, the beta of public debt increases with the supply of
long-term debt B.
A scarce supply of public debt makes the flight to safety it enjoys more aggressive.
Subsequently, the hedging properties of public debt are enhanced by its scarcity. The
candidate heuristic equilibrium derived above is shown to be an equilibrium, using this
property of public debt beta. It leads to the dynamic counterpart of the static contract
equilibrium.
Lemma 6. A stationary Markov equilibrium in which risk-averse agents lend to risk-neutral agents
(contract equilibrium) exists only if B is low enough with respect to aggregate wealth.
Proof. The sketch goes as follows. A low enough B creates imply a highly negative beta
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rendo through the flight to safety. It also implies volatility on the safe asset sˆB. We then
appeal to Lemma 3.
A corollary of this lemma is that, in the dynamic case, the comovement of private debt
supply with public debt supply is ambiguous. On the one hand, increasing public debt
supply triggers the safety multiplier mechanism described in the static model, and this
creates a positive comovement force. On the other hand, the increase of public debt supply
also destroys its hedging properties. The latter leads banks to choose a lower equilibrium
leverage, thus a lower endogenous supply of private debt. This trade-off is characterized
below, in the context of the normative analysis.
Private maturity choice: endogenous supply of long-term debt The last element of the
environment to endogeneize is B: the supply of long-term debt. This is carried out by
considering the maturity choice at t of the young generation. The following lemma shows
that when facing their maturity choice, risk-neutrals agents (banks) choose more short term
debt than long term debt. The inefficiency (’too much’ short term) is only shown in Section
4.
Lemma 7. Banks face a meaningful maturity choice: both short-term debt and long-term debt are
issued.
The basic intuition goes as follows. The banks of Gt+2 will issue the two types of
securities at t, as there always is an endogenous price for the two. However, the two
securities cater two different types of lenders. Short-term debt is sold within the generation,
to cater to the risk-averse of this generation. Long-term debt is sold to the other generation
active in trading, the middle-aged one Gt+1, as an outside-generation hedging asset. Young
investors and middle-aged agents do not have the same one-period ahead risk-sharing needs,
therefore the two contracts are not redundant.35 As a middle-aged bank, a negative beta








asset is of particular interest, as the only out-of-the-generation security is short-term debt,
which is entirely bought up by the young risk-averse investors (they outbid the middle-aged
bank).
The maturity choice is driven in the current environment by the design of two different
risk-sharing contracts and the catering to two distinct populations of lenders. It is a
different mechanism from He and Xiong (2011) and Diamond and He (2013), in which
the maturity choice is driven by the non-stationarity of the exogenous shock. In He and
Xiong (2011) long-term debt then is always dominated by either short-term debt or cash
hoarding. If optimists are very optimistic, they use short-term debt because leverage
incentives overwhelm rollover risk. If optimists are not that optimistic, they prefer to hoard
cash in order to wait for a degradation of the state. This behavior strongly hinges on a
mean-reversion assumption, engineered through the beliefs structure. On the contrary, my
environment features persistent shocks. In this case, the cash hoarding strategy is always
dominated by leverage, and both short-term and long-term debt are issued.
1.3.4 Results
The safety multiplier
The model explains why risk-neutral banks would ever hold negative beta assets: they have
an endogenous collateral value, which depends on their correlation with the rest of bank’s
balance sheet. Long-term debt holdings on bank balance sheet makes bank short-term debt
less risky through their hedging property. It decreases the equilibrium default threshold,
and this is efficient given the risk aversion of investors. By bundling long-term safe assets
with risky assets, banks are able to create more private short-term safe assets. Doing so,
it satisfies the risk-averse demand for safety. The first comparative statics captures the
macroeconomic puzzle highlighted on Figure 1.4: a positive comovement of long-term
(public) safe assets B and private short-term safe assets D.
Proposition 1. Complementarity between private safe assets and public safe assets
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When the safe asset supply B is low enough, the supply of private short-term debt D comoves
with the supply of long-term debt: 9B⇤|8B < B⇤, ∂D∂B > 0.




















Figure 1.9: The safety multiplier: positive comovement of public and private debt, in partial equilibrium.
There is a safety multiplier when public debt supply B is low enough. In that case,
a shortage of public debt leads banks to delever, because the input ’government debt’ is
too expensive for the safety production function of banks. Proposition 1 shows there is
crowding-in of private safety by public safety.
The intuition goes as follows. Banks leverage decision trades off the benefit of leverage
with its cost. The latter is determined by the lender’s outside option, which itself depends
on the price of the safe asset. When the latter is high, the lender prefers to lend to the bank.
This is a crowding-out effect: lower supply of public debt calls for higher supply of private
debt. However, when B is low enough, this effect is overturned by a crowding-in effect.
From banks perspective, an expensive public debt input makes them scale down safety
production, i.e. less leverage. They decide to lever less as soon as the increase in input price
(public debt) swamps the increase in output price (private debt).
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A more expensive public debt induces banks to diversify less. Bank debt is then made
riskier, which makes it more expensive from banks view. In turn, it leads banks to issue
less promises S¯. If the latter endogenous response is strong enough, the combination of
the two effects leads to less equilibrium t = 0 leverage D. Finally, the safety multiplier
can be seen coming from the role of volatility dampener of banks. The ratio of volatilities
s (bank debt) /sB is less than one. However, when public debt is expensive, this ratio
increases. Banks are hindered in their volatility transformation function.
Effect of risk aversion heterogeneity This safety multiplier mechanism is stronger for a
high degree risk aversion heterogeneity.
Corollary 2. Higher investors risk-aversion leads to higher equilibrium leverage and a safety






The first part is counter-intuitive, as it seems to say that risk-averse agents invest in
a bank debt that is riskier when they are more risk averse. The reason is that the risk-
aversion parameter gP captures the differential of risk attitudes among agents. The optimal
risk-sharing agreement features a larger flat part when this differential is higher.
The second part of the corollary comes from the fact that, given that equilibrium
leverage is high under high risk aversion, the economy is then more responsive to the safety
multiplier mechanism. The scarcity of public safe assets activates more the crowding-in than
the crowding-out forces.




The safety multiplier is also stronger when banks
are badly capitalized: nA/nP low. This comes from the fact that leverage is slightly procyclical
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in the present model:
∂(D/nA)
∂nA > 0. The first order is linear but second order terms of D
are convex in nA. In economic terms, the bank caters even more the safety demand of
risk-averse investors when they relatively less capitalized. Similarly, the cutoff B⇤ broadens





. The safety multiplier mechanism is
stronger when there is an anxious-savings glut.
Real economy implication: a safe-asset driven credit crunch
The second and third comparative statics are related to the portfolio composition of banks:
real investment in the technology vs. holdings of safe assets. In this economy with
endogenous leverage, banks do not risk shift in stress times. In these stress times of low
supply of public safe assets, the latter are so expensive for banks that they decide to lever
up less. Total risk-bearing capacity is hindered. The collateral damage on their asset side is
an overall crunch of investment in the technology.
Proposition 2. Non-conventional credit crunch due to a shortage of public debt
Lowering the supply of public debt decreases aggregate investment in the risky technology:
∂(xAK+xPK)
∂B > 0.
That a lower level of public debt in the system triggers a credit crunch is not a priori
straightforward.36 Indeed, it makes the public debt more expensive and induces the banks
to rebalance their portfolio toward the other asset, the risky asset. Crowding-in arises when
the need of the hedging properties of public debt for leverage purposes dominates the
portfolio rebalancing force. Appendix B.3 also shows that the mapping x1 (B) is increasing
concave: the crunch is exacerbated when B shrinks close to 0.
Proposition 2 can be seen as a beneficial Laffer effect of public debt issuance. In the
regime of interest, increasing public debt supply B decreases its ex ante value pBB, and
the resource constraint (1.16) then implies crowding-in of aggregate investment. The credit
crunch has a counterpart on bank safe assets holdings.
36My channel of a credit supply crunch is complementary to Caballero and Farhi (2013) safety trap, in which
the recession is engineered through a New-Keynesian demand channel.
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Proposition 3. Bank safe asset holdings
Lowering the supply of public debt increases bank holdings of safe assets: ∂xB∂B < 0.
This might be the most surprising result: an increase in the price of the public safe asset
leads banks to increase their holdings in this asset. This comes from a General Equilibrium
effect. An exogenous decrease in B makes it a scarce and sought-after asset with desirable
hedging properties. Proposition 3 shows that the marginal buyers for such asset actually
are banks, who needs it for a double purpose: hedge their risky investment and relax their
collateral constraints. Hence, in times of safe assets shortage, public safe assets are more
valuable on banks balance sheets than on passive balance sheets.
Proposition 3 puts forward a pull theory of banks holdings of public debt: banks are
asking for this public debt, as an input in their safety production function. It is alternative
to the push theory of financial repression, in which banks are forced to hold public debt by
moral suasion from the Treasury. The negative comovement of banks holdings of public
safe assets with their aggregate supply is confounded by the two theories. However, the
pull theory I develop also predicts a positive comovement of banks holdings of public
debt with banks leverage, whereas the push theory of financial repression predicts the
contrary. Stylized facts documented in section 6 provide support to the former. In basic
supply-demand framework, the fact that both price qB and quantity xAB increased in the
safe-asset credit crunch shows that the demand curve did move up.37
Finally, the ratio x
A
B
D captures the bank role in the safety multiplier. Contrary to conven-
tional wisdom about the Liquidity Coverage Ratio, banks should not see holdings of safe
assets as a constraint, but as an economic force that constitutes an integral input in their
37Zhang (2013) uses households risky assets ratio to predict returns in the US. Theoretically, we can formulate
a ’Jacklin critique’ to the financial repression argument. With anonymous trading of public debt, the financial
repression argument does not hold: optimists will always find it profitable to sell this public debt to risk-averse
agents. Contrary to the Jacklin argument, it is not between patient and impatient households shortcutting
the bank, but between the bank and the investor shortcutting the government. Here is a profitable deviation
which is to circumvent the bank (HH lending directly to the government). So financial repression cannot
explain government holdings for sovereigns with deep secondary markets. Now, a long-term contract between
sovereign and private agents is sustainable. As the value of this security increases when the value of the risky
asset decreases, the optimists will now find it profitable to hold to it in its portfolio, so no more profitable
deviation. It is an interesting case of contagion of commitments: the government endogenously do not default,
preserving a high price for safe debt, diminishing the default threshold of banks.
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macroeconomic role of safety producer.
Asset pricing implications: the two safety premia
As there is not an elastic supply of riskless asset in the environment, a safe rate can only be
defined in relative terms. There are two endogenous safe rates: the yield on public debt
and the yield on bank debt. I define safety premia taking as reference the exogenous rate of
return rK on the risky technology. The public safety premium and the private safety premium
are:
Spublic = rK   µBpB and Sprivate = rK   S¯D
I define the Safety Mismatch Index as the spread between the two premia:
SMI = rsa f e   rbank = Sprivate   Spublic
The SMI is the opposite of the endogenous credit spread on banks. It can also be seen as
the spread between the Liquidity Value and the Collateral Value in this collateral constrained
economy, using the language of Geanakoplos and Zame (2013).
Proposition 4. The Safety Mismatch Index.
Under Assumption 1, the Safety Mismatch carry trade decreases with public debt supply B and
increases with public debt beta r. Furthermore:




The model delivers a negative carry trade on public safe asset: the collateral value
dominates the liquidity value. As long as the correlation of public debt with the stock
market is low enough, reach for yield is stronger on public safe assets than on private safe
assets, despite lower payoff volatility of the latter. This is due to the double role played by
the public safe asset when held by banks: hedge the risky investment and back private debt.
The carry trade SMI depends on equilibrium balance sheet quantities only through
the correlation metrics X that captures the diversification of banks balance sheets. Under
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are low, hence X is a sufficient statistics that captures
high equilibrium leverage and higher default probability when low. This translates into
low SMI. The latter therefore is a macroprudential market-based tool that reveals aggregate
leverage. It is the default risk counterpart of LMI for liquidity risk. It can also be used to
track the effect of public debt supply experiments on private bank leverage D.
Relation to bank profitability Banks expected profits increases both in µu and su. In times
of low SMI, banks’ expected profits are higher.
Corollary 3. Bank profits are higher for a higher supply of public safe assets.
This is a direct implication of the safety multiplier mechanism. The same force, higher
public safe asset price, that leads to a lower equilibrium leverage in safe asset shortage also
leads to lower equilibrium bank expected profits.
1.3.5 Discussion
Limited liability required for a safety multiplier The very parsimonious friction of non-
negative consumption at t = 1 leads to an economy featuring a safety multiplier. There
is no need of any market incompleteness a la Allen and Gale (1994).38 Agents can trade
in a full set of Arrow-Debreu securities, but in equilibrium, only one contract is traded,
risky debt: markets are endogenously incomplete, but are a priori complete. Without the
limited liability friction, private would be riskless and public debt issuance would therefore
have no traction on private debt issuance39. As banks are essentially doing pooling and
tranching in my model (pooling public safe and risky asset, and tranching to issue the
38Their chapter in Gale (1990) investigates the efficient design of public debt. Early contributions that
risk-sharing could be facilitated by public debt trace back to Weiss (1979). However, all these papers do not
entertain the mechanism of public debt as an input to private debt, which is at the core of the present paper.
39Full insurance can never be attained under the limited commitment friction as long as r >  1 and nB < •.
In that case, bank debt is never entirely riskless, even with the promise s¯ arbitrarily close to 0. Therefore, private
bank debt can never dominate public debt.
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private safe asset), a natural question is to ask whether the asset pricing implications are
just an application of Modigliani-Miller. This intuition is incorrect because of the limited
liability friction (non-negative consumption), which breaks full insurance. Compared to the
standard Arrow-Debreu economy, the Inada condition is relaxed by assuming risk neutrality
on bankers.
Compared to Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), the CARA-normal environment discards
the need of a 3-period timing with a liquidity shock at t = 1. In their environment, public
debt is purely a store of value. Therefore, with an exogenous liquidity shock, it is intuitive
that ’public debt’ (i.e. cash) should be held by active wealth (entrepreneurs/banks). What
my model shows is that when public debt is at tension between two needs: production
insurance and safety consumption, there exists a pecking order of public debt ownership:
first bank-entrepreneurs should hold it on their balance sheet, before being held directly in
passive hands. By holding public debt on their balance sheets, bank-entrepreneurs fulfill
two roles: they are able to insure their technology (the macro shock) and at the same time
their private debt then synthetically provides safety and therefore can act as an (imperfect)
substitute to public safety. Counter-intuitively, this arrangement strictly dominates having
the public debt owned directly by passive hands.
Finally, I differ from Diamond and Dybvig (1983) by focusing on aggregate shocks and
not idiosyncratic liquidity shocks. In the latter, banks and depositors enter an optimal
contract. Intermediaries both have a liquidity pooling and liquidity insurance role. But the
intertemporal liquidity insurance role is not robust to asset spot markets (Jacklin critique,
as formulated in Farhi et al. (2009)): as long as there is a spot market for the long-term
asset, depositors prefer to invest directly in the risky long-term technology than entering the
deposit contract (bank ’long-term’ debt). It completely unravels the role of intermediaries in
liquidity provision: financial intermediaries would not exist, and all the assets, including
the risky long-term ones, would be in the hands of households. In my environment of
safety provision and not liquidity provision, the spot market does not unravel the role of
intermediaries: it is robust to the Jacklin critique.
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Why a safety multiplier in Europe and not in the US: limited participation The model
is solved with full participation of all agents in all markets. Risk-averse agents can carry
out some diversification themselves, by directly bundling in their own hands public debt
and the risky technology. However, as long as the public debt beta r >  1, they cannot
perfectly hedge the macro shock through their own portfolio choice of the technology and
public debt. As a consequence the flat part of bank debt still has its appeal. The three assets:
public debt, private bank debt and the technology are jointly held by risk-averse investors.
Bank leverage is therefore determinate.
In the case of limited participation, i.e. when the risk-averse agents are prevented from
investing directly in the risky technology, the safety multiplier mechanism is strenghtened.
Having the risk-averse investors doing directly some diversification dampens the safety
multiplier. The cutoff B⇤ in Proposition 1 is determined by the tension between two forces:
lender portfolio choice which tilts towards crowding-out, and debt safety creation which
tilts towards crowding-in. Relaxing the limited participation constraint strengthens the
portfolio choice force, as now, the synthetic asset {technology+public debt} can exist and
is a better substitute to {private debt} than {public debt} alone. The debt safety creation
motive, which is entirely driven by bank portfolio and leverage choice, is not affected by
limited participation. As a consequence the cutoff with direct access of passive wealth to
the technology is lower than the cutoff in the limited participation environment, i.e. there is
a larger parameter region with a safety multiplier under limited participation than under
full participation:
B⇤ f ull participation < B⇤ limited participation
This comparative statics helps rationalize why Europe behaves differently than the
US, i.e. why there is empirically a safety multiplier in Europe and not in the US. As a
consequence, it reconciles my empirical stylized fact of positive comovement of private
debt with public debt in Europe, whereas Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013a)
shows that private debt and public debt negatively comove in the United States. I argue
that this can be explained by applying my limited participation environment to Europe and
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applying the full participation environment just described to US. Indeed, it is extremely well
documented that disintermediated instruments such as Private Equity and Venture Capital
are much more developed in the US than in Europe. As a consequence, Europe is much
more of the limited participation environment, and I just showed that in this environment
there is a safety multiplier for a larger parameter region: crowding-in of private debt by
public debt. The higher equilibrium leverage in that case is consistent with the pervasive
role played by European banks in the financing of the real economy: 80% of the financing is
intermediated by banks and not the corporate bond market (instead of 20% in the US).








The first comparative statics rationalizes the time series: public and private debt comove
more when public debt is actually negative beta (it is a recent phenomenon). The second
comparative statics also helps to rationalize the cross-country Europe vs. US: public debt
and private debt comove more when the risky technology is riskier.
Figure 1.10: Contract equilibrium representation under limited participation. Agents are in green and assets
in blue. Red bullets indicate, from left to right: bank portfolio choice, bank leverage choice and lender portfolio
choice.
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Maturity of bank debt In practice, banks create safety on their liability side at different
maturities. The model endogenously endows banks with a maturity transformation role. In
equilibrium they decide to issue liabilities of shorter maturity than the one of their asset
holdings.
One could argue that deposits exhibit long-term liability aspects, given their stickiness.
However, the overall cost of funding is weighted average of deposits costs and wholesale
funding costs.40 The marginal cost of funding is pinned down in the latter. On this wholesale
funding it is clear that empirically, banks are in the business of creating short-horizon safety.
Furthermore, it can be argued that a bulk of securities holdings by banks is not mark-to-
market in practice. This is not an issue for the relevance of the model, as, as long as there is
some short-term debt to be repaid, banks will in effect mark to market their balance sheet
by getting out and rolling over their holdings. As these debt instruments are unsecured as
argued in the static model, negative beta holdings have an input role on the asset side of
banks.
The dynamic model predicts that risk-neutral agents hold the long-end of public debt
and risk-averse agents hold the short-end. Indeed, in line with the view of a scarcity of
public safe assets (i.e. their inelastic supply), the model delivers a pecking order in the
ownership of public debt. Risk-neutral and risk-averse agents compete for public debt
ownership on Walrasian markets. Short-term public debt (T-bills) is the dominating safe
asset in the economy. The risk-averse agents value it the most. Therefore in equilibrium,
T-bills are owned by risk-averse investors and they yield the lowest. What comes next on
the safety ladder is long-term public debt (T-bonds). As these ones are endowed with the
negative beta property, they enjoy a ’double coincidence of will’ when put on the balance
sheet of the risk-neutral agents. At the same time this hedges their investment in the risky
technology, and, by relaxing the endogenous collateral constraint, this enables the creation
40Figure 1.15 shows that, for the Eurozone, the deposit base is 10trnBC and the debt from wholesale funding
is 2trnBC.
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of private short-term debt. Banks do reach for yield in the sense that, contrary to the
risk-averse investors, they prefer T-bonds (with higher yield) on T-bills.
Wealth effects The recent macro-finance literature analyzes the non-linearities due to
financial frictions: Krishnamurthy and He (2013) and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010)
using an agency friction, Mendoza (2010) using an exogenous collateral constraint, and
Cao (2013) using beliefs disagreements. Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012) is the only model
solved closed-form, using a VaR friction. All these papers feature the wealth distribution as
states variables. Thus they are all after the interaction of wealth effects with the financial
constraint. On the contrary, my environment analyzes how safe asset shortage interacts with
limited liability constraints. Their interaction jointly explains the negative beta of public
debt and high bank leverage. Amplifying mechanisms arising with wealth effects do not
make any normative case as they are constrained efficient environments (no market failure),
whereas my environment does make a normative point, as fleshed out in the next section.
Even if wealth effects are not a key ingredient of the interesting dynamics, the endoge-
nous beta formula 1.19 shows that the flight to safety is more aggressive when nB increases
faster than nL, which implies lower beta and higher bank leverage. Thus, when keeping
track of wealth effects, the dynamic model would be able to generate leverage cycles at
business cycle frequencies.
1.4 Optimal supply of public debt
In this normative analysis, I explore if issuing public debt can lead to a Pareto improvement
compared to the decentralized equilibrium without public debt. In order to endow public
debt with a welfare role, the competitive equilibrium needs to be shown constrained
inefficient.41




Constrained efficient allocations As the environment features only two types of agents
(risk-neutral A and risk-averse P), constrained efficient allocations trace a Pareto frontier in








. Under constrained efficiency, the planner
directly chooses consumption allocations. In the spirit of Rawls and Ball and Mankiw (2007),
I consider a Social Planner that treats all the future generations, as of period t = 0, under
the veil of ignorance. I also assume it weights all generations uniformly. However, the
within-generation heterogeneity is known to the planner, and let denote bA the weight on
risk-neutral agents and bP the weight on risk-averse agents. Therefore the Social Planner
chooses the state-contingent history of consumptions and history of aggregate investment
to maximize the following welfare function under the resource constraints at each history st





























Appendix proves the following lemma.
Lemma 8. Constrained efficient allocations are characterized by efficient risk-sharing within genera-
tion and a level of aggregate investment i⇤t = a st where the optimal rule a is defined.
The Pareto frontier is then traced by deriving the indirect utilities, as of date 0 of the two
agents of the first generation G2. The ratio bP/bA controls the risk aversion of the Social
Planner. As long as it is not zero the planner has some willingness to redistribute wealth
across states.
42Recall that agents only consume when old. In the private equilibrium, consumption depends on the three
aggregate shocks endured by the agent over its lifespan: cG
q
t+2 (st, st+1, st+2).
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Undeprovision of long-term securities in the decentralized equilibrium The stochastic
OLG structure of the model brings in the classic violation of the First Welfare Theorem,
caused by the infinite value of the aggregate endowment. What is novel in the present
environment is a constrained inefficiency when agents face a maturity choice. Even when
allowed to share risk with one period-ahead generation, they do not issue the same securities
the planner would.
To see this, first observe that the planner is able to engineer Pareto improvement by
manipulating the level of investment. This opens the avenue to increase both the expected
returns and the level of within-generation risk-sharing, hence weakly enhancing the indirect
utility of the two agents.
There is some long-term debt issuance in the decentralized equilibrium. It cannot be
zero, as there must be the market 1.4 for this debt. But there is not enough of it. This is due
to the fact the issuance of long-term debt exhibit strategic complementarities: an issuance
externality. In terms of allocations, beyond the intragenerational risk-sharing analyzed in
the static model, there is willingness to share risk inter-generationally: generation Gt is
exposed to shocks st 1 and st, generation Gt is exposed to shocks st and st+1 and generation
Gt is exposed to shocks st+1 and st+2. So there is some willingness to smooth risk across
these periods, beyond smoothing across states. The first market, the secondary market 1.2
for long-term debt, is used to share risk between Gt+1 and Gt+2 of their risk at the t+ 2
horizon, whereas the two other markets, the primary market 1.4 for long-term debt and the
market 1.3 for short-term debt issued by young, are used to share risk between Gt+1 and
Gt+2 of their risk at t+ 1 horizon.
The externality arises from the fact that Gt+1 and Gt+2 share too much t+ 1 risk but









. When they do so they do not internalize the fact that their own
decision on the primary market at t  1 will impact the market clearing 1.2 on the secondary
market of its own public debt (the same as its new issuance). The market clearing on
the primary market 1.4 for long-term debt takes care of its Walrasian role, but does not
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internalize at the subsequent market clearing on the secondary market 1.2 for long-term

















, but not in a retroactive way.
All 3 markets clear, so there will be a bit of all debt, but not enough long-term debt, due







> 0. This what the




it does plug in the market clearing
condition 1.2.
Proposition 5. The private competitive equilibrium is constrained inefficient: the decentralized












Proof. By inspection of the f.o.c.: the planner would like to have more investment: both
xiGt+1t 1 and xi
Gt+1
t (i.e. at the two periods t  1 and t). Especially at t, investment is crowded-in








































The basic intuition is that the planner can engineer a Pareto improvement by crowding-in
investment in the current period by borrowing from two periods ahead. Compared to the
competitive equilibrium, he makes risk-neutrals happier by increasing levered returns and
risk-agents happier by lowering the state of default. Banks prefer to issue short-term debt
than long-term debt, and doing so they starve the economy from negative-beta assets. Banks
do not internalize the hedging properties of long-term debt, which could have been used
as an input by another agent to create more safety. In other words, the appealing risk
characteristics of its own long-term liabilities are not internalized by the bank.
Discussion: the source of the issuance inefficiency The inefficiency rises not from an
overinvestment in the risky asset (Lorenzoni (2008)), nor from an overinvestment in the safe
asset (Hart and Zingales (2011)), but from a too short maturity structure of private claims. I
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coin this externality an issuance externality, which is a bit different from the terms-of-trade
vs. collateral externalities in Davila (2011) topography of pecuniary externalities.43 It is akin
to the latter, except that the externality does not arise from a direct ’price in the contraint’
kind of effect: my model therefore does not feature direct pecuniary externalities. Indeed,
the only friction, limited liabilty c   0, does not feature any ’price in the constraint’. The
effective endogenous collateral constraint is the result of the combination of limited liability
and bank portfolio. The issuance externality I uncover here also comes from a pecuniary
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legacy long-term debt, the
primary issuers of generation Gt+1 do not take internalize the crowding-in role that their own















by the Laffer effect analyzed in the static model.








, leading to a Pareto improvement, but private agents
do not take this aggregate channel into account in their private maturity choice.
The government then becomes the natural provider of long-term securities. This is
not just driven by the superior taxation power of the government. It is driven by the fact
that, in a competitive equilibrium, long-term securities are used as input in the production
of short-term securities. This leads to the pecking order: government issues long-term,
private sector issues short-term. Public debt improves welfare because its supply impacts the
creation of private safe assets. The government is able to manipulate bank leverage through
its public debt issuance policy. Constrained inefficiency means that welfare improvement
can be achieved by endowing the social planner with the exact same issuance capability than
43Eduardo initially coined his terms-of-trade externality ’risk-sharing’, but the mechanism he has in mind
is non-equality of MRS, which can hold even in a deterministic environment. On the contrary, my issuance
externality entirely hinges on the stochastic environment and equilibrium default, so it can be seen as a
risk-sharing externality.
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the private agents: the available maturities are the same for public debt as for private debt44.
Market incompleteness is the feature of the economy that breaks the Scheinkman
(1980) generic efficiency result. Indeed, when there is no public debt, the risk-neutral
banks underprovide insurance to the risk-averse investors. This is due to a lack of well-
diversified collateral on their balance sheet. Having endogenous leverage arising from
limited commitment breaks his Modigliani-Miller-like neutrality theorem.45
This intragenerational inefficiency has nothing to do with the intergenerational inefficiency
due to overaccumulation of capital (dynamic inefficiency) of Diamond (1965) or Gale (1990).46
The intergenerational inefficiency arises from intergenerational limited participation: all
generations cannot trade with each other. Whereas in my setup, generations do trade with
each other on the secondary market for public debt. In my model of limited commitment,
public debt enhances intragenerational risk-sharing.
1.4.2 Implementation: optimal issuance of public debt
As the positive part of the dynamic model just showed, by playing around with the supply





, hence the leverage i.e. the risk-sharing decision between the two agents.
Public debt enables the planner to move aggregate wealth across states, and not only across







+ qB,tB  nA + nP
By issuing more long-term public debt B, through the Laffer effect it decreases the
44Allowing the government to issue state-contingent debt would obviously lead to even greater welfare
improvements.
45Modiglina-Miller-like neutrality results all comes from a redundancy in the linear space spanned by the
assets.
46A key difference with Gale (1990) is that his budget constraints at the time of trade already involve the
returns on the securities. In effect, he rules out limited commitment and default. On the contrary, I make clear
that, at the trading period, the budget sets are bounded by net worth, whereas the securities promises arrive
only at the ex post period. Compared to Fischer (1983) and Peled (1985), I do not have risk on the endowments,
but on the assets.
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value qB,tB, hence crowding in aggregate investment. The dynamic model tells us that
E
⇥ 
rsa f e (st)  rK (st)
 ⇤




rsa f e (st)  r1 (st)
 ⇤
< 0. So issuing public
debt can improve the risk profile, but there is a cost which is to crowd out investment. The
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of the government, and show how it
can implement a welfare improvement. The welfare criterion I use here is the indirect utility
of the risk-averse investors (the ’grandmas’).47 Puuting all the Pareto weight on risk-averse
agents enables to focus on the safety creation role of banks. The government maximizes

























The government takes as a constraint its own budget constraint (flow of funds). In a
stationary recursive equilibrium we have the identity: Bˆht 1 = Bˆ
h 1
t . Appendix B.7 derives
the indirect utility and investigates its comparative statics in the supply of long-term public
debt SK. The following expression signs the welfare criterion with respect to an increase in
public debt supply, taking the beta as given:
47I do not take into account distributional concerns and mutes any active role of the tax scheme. Bhandari et
al. (2013) solves for the optimal policy trading-off redistribution and tax distortions. Their Ramsey problem
exhibits a Ricardian irrelevance of the level of public debt. My stance for public debt is even stronger, as I show
that the optimal policy features high levels of public debt. This said, I share with them the emphasis on who
holds the public debt. The safety multiplier makes it more valuable in risk-neutral hands.
48Lorenzoni and Werning (2013), in the tradition of Calvo (1988), claims that the government policy choice is
the ex ante value of debt (qˆhB) and not the ex post value (B). However, in practice, auctions ran by treasuries



























The effect of increasing public debt supply is broken down in different channels. The
beneficial effect on the first term rsa f et nL is a purely net worth effect. It is a wealth channel.
This benefit is entirely muted by the necessary tax adjustments it implies. Satisfying the
government flow of funds with a lower price qˆh of public debt forces to increase taxes. I shut
down any redistributional role of taxes. This is tantamount to not allowing for any ex-ante
transfers between agents. I choose tA = 0 by consistency with the welfare criterion. I shut
down any role of fiscal policy: monetary dominance, the fiscal policy is here only to balance
government flow of funds. In this case, the tax burden exactly undoes the wealth effect of
the increase in public debt supply.49 This is tantamount to the Woodford neutrality critique
of the portfolio rebalance theory.
Nevertheless, public debt still is able to improve welfare through its indirect effect on the
creation of private safe assets. This effect is captured by the second term of 1.21: a safety
multiplier channel. In the language of Weitzman (1974), public debt supply has a price
effect on the SMI spread and a quantity effect on bank leverage. The latter is beneficial due
to the safety multiplier result (Proposition 1). The former price effect comes from the result
that SMI decreases with public debt supply (Proposition 4), and that investor welfare 1.21
features the opposite of SMI (i.e. bank credit spread). The last two terms are adjustment
terms that capture the cost of bank default from the investor perspective. They penalize the
private debt, which traces back to public debt through the safety multiplier. This default
channel is not inocuous, and is reminiscent of the traditional fire-sale externality which
49This Ramsey problem of public debt issuance implicitly takes into account the cost for the sovereign of
having a lower price for the public debt: from this perspective, having low public debt price qˆh is harmful.
Shutting down the redistritibutional effects of taxation mutes Krueger and Perri (2010) mechanism of using
taxation (public risk sharing) to overcome imperfect private risk sharing. The latter finds it hard to obtain
crowding-in of private insurance by public insurance, whereas my model does feature such crowding-in for a
large parameter region.
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leads to cost of overborrowing. But here, they are only the third channel happening in
conjunction with the wealth channel and the safety multiplier channel. The latter completely
overturns the case of overborrowing by the private economy. That public debt leads to a
Pareto improvement shows that the private equilibrium features a marginal inefficiency, in
the sense that it does not rely on Pareto ranked multiple equilibria. The Pareto improvement
can be thought as: public debt does crowd in real investment (Proposition 2). This makes
both banks and investors happier, the first for an expected return reason, the second for a
safety supply reason. This is how ex-post Pareto improvements can be achieved, a much
more demanding task than not ex-ante ones (from the sum of utilities, but this then leaves
room to arguing about the Pareto weights).
Figure 1.11: Pareto-improving issuance of public debt.
Finally, there is a countervailing negative effect of public debt arising in the endogeneity
of public debt beta. This force goes on the exact opposite direction than the static effect
just described: increasing public debt supply increases its beta, hence it decreases bank
leverage D, and also increases SMI, hence decreases bank credit spread
n
rbankt   rsa f et
o
. In
economic terms, flooding the economy with public debt hurts its hedging property. The
final proposition of the paper qualifies the exact dependence of welfare with respect to the
supply of long-term public debt.
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Proposition 6. Optimal level of long-term public debt
In the dynamic model, there exists an interior optimal level of public debt Boptimal.
Proposition 7 endows public debt with a powerful role in regulating leverage. As pointed
out by Davila (2011), when no transfers are allowed, capital regulation does not lead to a
Pareto improvement (the traditional discussion misses accounting for agents heterogeneity).
In contrast, public debt issuance is shown here to lead to a Pareto improvement, by
manipulating leverage.
However, the dynamic harmful effect of issuance ends up by overwhelming this static
beneficial effect. Intuitively, the static effect is bounded upper. The safety multiplier
mechanism is concave: the resource constraint 1.16 imposes that private leverage cannot
grow as fast as public debt supply. Hence the static beneficial effects of public debt will
start to fade away. On the other hand, the dynamic negative effects of issuance do not fade
away, as the beta of public debt increases monotically with its supply.
The beneficial role of public debt works through amarket mechanism, in which banks freely
decide how much to issue of private safety (bank debt). This is different from Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998) in which the government has the taxation power of circumventing the
exogenous collateral constraints of private agents (not a constrained inefficiency). The
decomposition 1.21 also helps to distinguish the beneficial role of public debt from what
Gale (1990) has in mind for intergenerational risk-sharing. In my model public debt leads
to welfare improvement not only when real rates are negative (safe price above 1). Finally,
the Pareto improvement relies on the investment of private agents. The government is
able to manipulate the level of investment merely by issuing long-term debt. Therefore,
it can be argued that the Pareto improvement engineered this way requires less public
intervention than the social security system designed in Ball and Mankiw (2007), in which
the government engages himself in investment, or even than their lighter implementation,
which involves safe debt holdings by the government and time-varying social benefits.50
50They conclude that “negative indexation and government ownership of capital seem to be the only
mechanisms that allow current capital risk to be shared optimally with future generations.” Long-term public
debt issuance should be thought as an effective third avenue to enhance risk allocation.
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The present argument in favor of public long-term debt is novel. Indeed, the strategy of
Angeletos (2002) is inoperational here given the continuum of states. It is also an interesting
counterpart to the Aguiar and Amador (2013) argument for short-term debt for incentive
reasons. Taken together, the two results makes clear that long-term debt is beneficial for
hedging purposes, but at the expense of government repayment incentives. Arellano and
Ramanarayanan (2012b) also features a hedging-incentive trade-off in the issuance of long-
term debt. However, their hedging motive is partial equilibrium in nature as they do not
consider a closed economy. On the contrary, my hedging motive is desirable even in GE as
it crowds-in investment.
Compared to Greenwood et al. (2010) gap-filling theory (which stresses the crowding
out), my theory advocates for the issuance of long-dated public securities. This normative
recommendation on public debt maturity choice is in line with the empirical supply of
Eurozone public debt. The short-end of public debt is quantitatively much smaller than the
long end (1trnBC vs. 7.5trnBC). If agents were long-lived, they would reach for short-term
public debt to avoid interim volatility. They would still underprovide long-term negative
beta securities.
As Corollary 3 informs us that bank expected utility also increases with the supply of
public debt (due to an increase in equilibrium expected returns), the public debt financial
policy of Proposition 5 does lead to a Pareto improvement. Everyone takes advantage of
a higher supply of public debt in the economy. The model does point towards a positive
externality of long-term securities, which private agents do not internalize. Issuing long-term
public debt is a constrained efficient way to achieve Pareto improvements.
This dynamic model with endogenous leverage leads to policy recommendations in line
with Caballero and Farhi (2013), but more nuanced. The present model helps to qualify their
prescriptions. First, Proposition 5 can be interpreted as Quantitative Easing being good only
up to a certain extent.51 That SMI also reveals the welfare impact of public debt enables the
51Long-term government bonds can also help on the monetary side (see Sheedy (2013)). So the two objectives,
debt to GDP stabilization and safety creation are not orthogonal.
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Treasury to conduct experiments of debt issuance and by tracking the response on SMI, can
calibrate the effective level of optimal public debt. Second, Operation Twist (i.e. removing
long-duration assets from the economy to prop down long-term real rates) has negative
welfare effects through the safety multiplier by starving the economy from long-term public
debt. This is contrary to Stein (2010), where there is an exogenous collateral constraint
which gives room to a pecuniary externality due to exogenous credit constraints and this
implies too much private safe asset creation. In the safety multiplier mechanism, the private
equilibrium does not produce enough private safe assets.52
Finally, public debt is not as any other asset. It is not collateralized, so it can be seen
as the ultimate collateral, the very starting point of any collateral chain. This is why the
government should not take over the banking sector, and to the private safety creation itself:
for the model to be efficient, there needs to be two distinct sectors (government and banks),
for the liabilities of the former to be used as a hedge by the latter. As such, even if the
economy is exposed as a whole to only one univariate shock, having the government sector
and banking sector enables the synthetic second asset, public debt, to be used as a hedge by
the banks in their safety production.
1.4.3 Financial regulation: the cost of narrow banking
The safety multiplier beneficial effect uncovered in the previous section critically needs
risk-neutral banks to be able to issue unsecured debt. The interesting comparative statics
here is with respect to the size of the banking sector.
In the model it is captured by net worth of banks nA. In the limit of no banks: nA = 0
the safety multiplier is entirely muted, and risk-averse investors invest all their wealth in
the aggregate portfolio. It is straightforward to see that the welfare of the risk-averse agents
increases with the size of the risk-neutral sector. Even without accounting for the welfare
52This result is also different from Barro (1974) and Angeletos (2002), in which the benefits of public debt are
traded off against the costs of distortionary taxation. My perspective is pure asset pricing, in which the value of
public debt relies in its hedging property. It also complements Cochrane’s view that Treasury should go long to
hedge its interest rate risk: insurance property of long maturities. My model takes the perspective of the private
agents, and argues they need long-term Treasuries to produce safety.
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of banks, the economy benefits from the presence of banks for their private safety creation
role.53 The welfare improvement coming from the presence of risk-neutral banks is equal to:
DWP =
⇣








D  (0.4su   0.5µu)






This corollary isolates the beneficial role of private safety creation of banks. It echoes
Gennaioli et al. (2013a) finance as preservation of wealth. With asset pricing and endogenous
leverage, my model describes how the financial system is able to create private money by
transforming risk. A natural implication of Corollary 4 is that Glass-Steagall act type
regulations have a cost. By breaking up the banks and splitting their positive beta from
their negative beta part of the balance sheet, these regulations prevent the bank to create
private safe asset by taking advantage of the hedging property of public safe assets54. Thus,
according to this theoretical treatment, the universal banking model is welfare improving55.
As a result, for safety creation, narrow banking and bank structural reforms56 can harm
social welfare in the exact same way as the Glass-Steagall act. It prevents banks from issuing
safe bank debt. Empirically, Berger et al. (2013) show that capital injections and regulatory
interventions have a costly persistent negative effect on liquidity creation, in line with the
theory developed here.
53My model offers a more benign view of leverage than recent macroprudential academic and policy. The ex
ante macroprudential regulation literature insists on the negative pecuniary externality of leverage (fire sales),
so concludes to the necessity to curb leverage. This is an artefact of having an exogenous collateral constraint.
This argument misses that bank leverage does fulfill an economic role of safe asset supply. This is made clear
with the present environment, in which the only friction is limited liability.
54This bright side of universal banking must be traded off against the moral hazard cost of too big to fail.
55A reminiscent intuition is present in the Jacques de Larosiere report on financial stability. An easy
complement normative investigation should quantify the cost of market incompleteness. If markets were
complete, banks would never default and therefore their debt would be riskless and risk-averse investors would
fully invest in it. This is the first-best. It is the other limiting case, opposite to the world without banks nB = 0.
56Volcker and Vickers proposals, as well as a number of bank reforms such as the French bank law voted in
July 2013, aim at separating market-based activities from bank deposits. However different banking structural
reforms have different levels of restrictions on market activities. If the ring-fencing is too constraining, it can
prevent universal banks from playing their economic role of diversification and supplier of private safe assets.
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A final argument to consider is why the government would not take over the whole
banking system and private public and former private safety by doing the tranching itself.
The answer is negative and the argument relies in the endogenous hedging properties of
government debt. From the government perspective, if it merges its own balance sheet
with the balance sheet of the financial sector, it faces only one univariate shock: the
macroeconomic shock. The government is therefore unable to effectively hedge this shock,
as it does not have access to any other asset. Whereas as long as the financial sector balance
sheet is different from the government balance sheet, government liabilities become the
support of the next period flight to safety. By combining this endogenous claim with the
risky technology, an autonomous financial sector is able to create synthetic safety.
1.5 Extension: open economy
The goal of this extension is two-fold. First, it investigates the impact of sovereign risk on
the safety multiplier mechanism elicited in the main model. That is, I investigate the supply
side of public safe assets, after having analyzed in detail its demand side in the previous
section. Second, it opens the avenue to analyze the open economy environment counterpart
of the closed economy model, in which two countries only differ by their fiscal capacity (i.e.
sovereign risk).
The key insight of this section is that sovereign risk hurts the safety multiplier by
introducing a force towards higher endogenous beta r. The following qualifies this intuition.
The dynamic model with endogenous beta is therefore critically required to address this
issue.
1.5.1 Introducing sovereign risk
I model sovereign default through a notion of fiscal capacity, and not through strategic
default: default is suffered, not strategic. This is a realistic assumption, having the Eurozone
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debt crisis in mind57. As a result, there is now in the economy private and public equilibrium
defaults.
Precisely, I extend the dynamic infinite horizon model in the following way. I model
fiscal capacity as default threshold ¯¯s on the macro TFP shock below which the country
defaults. At each period t > 0, there is sovereign default if and only if:
public default at period t i.if. st < ¯¯s
In the states of the world in which of public default, the consol becomes worthless. To
compensate the holders of public debt, the troika manages to secure to them an amount
that is linear to the macro TFP shock: kst. k is a measure of troika efficiency. The payoff of
the public debt is, and illustrated on Figure 1.12:
p˜tB = ks
t 1{st< ¯¯s} + ptB 1{st  ¯¯s}
Figure 1.12: Payoff of public debt with respect the aggregate state st.
Until now, fiscal capacity was taken as fixed and very high. In the general case, Appendix
B.8. derives that in this extension, the endogenous beta of public debt is equal in a second-
order approximation, not to Equation 1.19 anymore, but to:
57The shutdown drama of fall 2013 in the US is another illustration that sovereign defaults are driven by
non-strategic factors in developed countries. The fact that it made public debt long-term yields go up and
short-term public debt go down reinforces the safety pecking order exhibited in the previous section: sovereign















































The increasing dependence of r˜ to sovereign risk ¯¯s and the comparative statics of the
main model with respect to r yield the following lemma.
Lemma 9. Fragility of the safety multiplier to sovereign risk
In the closed economy, leverage (private safety D) and real economy lending (xK) decrease with
sovereign risk ¯¯s.
The intuition is that sovereign risk not only increases the volatility of public debt (and
lowers its expected return), but more interestingly increases the endogenous correlation of
public debt with the macro TFP shock. As a result, it destroys the hedging properties of
public debt, and doing so it hinders the safety multiplier mechanism. Sovereign risk also
alters the Safety Mismatch Index.
An interesting aspect of introducing sovereign risk in an endogenous leverage model is
that it goes against the expropriation channel of contagion from sovereign risk to corporate
risk. Bai and Wei show that the expropriation contagion channel holds for the general
corporate sector. My model shows that, as far as the banking sector is concerned, the
contagion can go the other way: higher sovereign risk can lead banks to delever so much
that they become less risky.
1.5.2 Environment
There are two countries: North and South. I introduce one unique source of heterogeneity
between the two: their fiscal capacity. North has a larger fiscal capacity: ¯¯sSouth > ¯¯sNorth. The
risky technology is the same for both countries. As a result, there are three assets: the risky
technology, North public debt and South public debt. Due to sovereign risk we have in
equilibrium: sSouthB > s
North
B , r
South > rNorth, pSouthB < p
North
B . The agents are homogeneous
in both countries: same endowments and same preferences. The only degree of specificity
72
is the limited participation assumptions: risk-averse investors have access only to their local
bank debt and to their local bond market58. This local investor base will endogenously
drive heterogeneous behavior between North bank and South bank in terms of leverage and
portfolio choice.
Figure 1.13: Open economy environment.
1.5.3 Equilibrium
Consider a South bank. Label Asset 2 the South bond and Asset 3 the North bond: we have
r3 < r2. The balance sheet correlation metric X (r2, r3) is now:
XOE =
(x2s2 + r2x1s1)
(x1s1 + r2x2s2 + r3x3s3)
58This is empirically relevant despite a slight quiet run on Greek banks from Greek investors. The assumption
of special access to the local base can be relaxed. What matters is that banks have better access to the risky
technology and the other bond market. It is empirically verified that cross-border holdings of sovereign debt
are mainly owned by foreign banks, not final investors.
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This balance sheet correlation measure is generically higher than in the closed-no
sovereign economy. As a result the carry trade on South sovereign bond:







1  cKpB sBsK XOE
  1
!
can now turn positive for the South bank, as long as r2 high enough such that the carry
trade increases with XOE (therefore with r). This positive carry trade for South banks is at the
source of the following proposition.
Proposition 7. Redomestication of public debt.
In the open economy, South banks hold more South bonds: xSouthB > x
North
B . The heterogeneity
increases with sovereign risk differential.
Proof. See Appendix B.8.
We can interpret this proposition as sovereign risk strengthening the risk shifting
channel and weakening the safety multiplier channel (debt pricing channel). What is really
interesting is that sovereign risk strengthens the risk shifting motive and weakens the
endogenous leverage mechanism: i.e. higher sovereign risk, due to the outside option of
investor local base makes bank debt cheaper so that bank decides to lever up more, and they
do so using the risky public debt (which is cheaper than the North public debt): a version
of risk shifting. The economic intuition can be grasped with a perturbation argument. Start
with a symmetric equilibrium, with same level of sovereign risk and increase by e the
sovereign risk of the South country. South bond has worse hedging properties, banks should
fly to North bond. But: South bond has higher volatility, disliked by the local investors.
Thus South investors have higher need of bank debt. Thus South banks have access to cheap
credit; they lever up. As South bond is marginally cheap compared to North bond, they use
the South bond to hedge its additional risky investment.
As a result, my model captures redomestication of South sovereign debt in Eurozone.
The stylized fact is document in the open economy section of the appendix, which also
shows that bank leverage is more stable for banks of the periphery than for bank of the core
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countries. The redomestication of sovereign debt is also documented by Acharya and Steffen
(2013), although they do not explain why South banks are better positioned to do this greatest
carry trade). Uhlig (2013) is a moral hazard model of the South free-riding on bailout
expectations from the North (through the ECB). The present model is a pure Asset Pricing
perspective with endogenous leverage, in which, due to the General Equilibrium, South
banks are the natural marginal holders of South public debt. I do not need any financial
repression type of argument. The domestication is an efficient asset pricing outcome. The
fragmentation of government bond markets is aligned with fragmentation of bank debt
markets. Global banks are also portfolio choosers between domestic debt and foreign debt.
So foreign banks have a key role in the safety multiplier applied to domestic debt. There is
an eviction effect due to foreign debt in the safety creation. I thus microfound a home bias
in government bond holdings: domestic debt is actually a better hedge of domestic equity
than foreign debt.59 Redomestication is due to the apparition of sovereign risk heterogeneity
which made Eurozone switch from the closed economy model to the open economy model.
My model of private safety creation rationalizes why banks hold public debt on their balance
sheet, and as a result it microfounds the diabolic loop: the increased sensitivity of bank
default risk to sovereign risk.60 In normal times, banks help the sovereigns to refinance
cheaply (high public debt price). However, due to the contagion of default risks from public
to private (a contagion of commitments), this financing pact did break up.
1.5.4 Normative implications in open economy
A narrative of the Eurozone crisis as a closed economy can treat sovereign risk as a neglected
risk on which investors did load and which, when it did come to mind, destroyed the safety
59Maybe also perhaps because of a relational contract between domestic banks and domestic sovereign, the
outside option being to invest in foreign debt and accepting foreign investors as debt holders (this would be in
a model of strategic default).
60It is from sovereign risk to bank risk (Greek crisis), so my model is alternative toGennaioli et al. (forthcom-
ing). It does not feature the reverse causality, from bank risk to sovereign risk (Ireland crisis) through bailout
expectations (Acharya et al. (2011b), Broner et al. (2013)). I stick to a pure asset pricing model without resorting
to any moral hazard friction and shows how it can rationalize all the stylized facts of the Eurozone crisis.
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multiplier mechanism and triggered deleverage and credit crunch. Figure A.3 illustrates
how the beta of South public debt did turn sharply positive during the Eurozone crisis.
This sheds light on a dark side of the safety multiplier: private safety creation incentivizes
investors to neglect sovereign risk.
Make public debt cheap or expensive? The last step is to keep in mind that, through
bailout expectations, there exists a feedback loop from banks to sovereigns: i.e. an increasing
causality from bank leverage D to sovereign risk ¯¯s. In a recent tribune in the Financial Times
(October 1, 2013), Jens Weidmann (Bundesbank) argues that the banks holdings of public
debt are dangerous should be ’taxed’ through increased capital requirements or a large
counterparty exposure regulation. His normative thinking is concerned with this feedback
loop and its crowding out effect on real investment. On the contrary, I argue that there are
benefits of these relatively safer holdings by banks, through the crowding-in mechanism of
this paper. As an implication, Weidmann argues for expensive public debt (low yields). On
the contrary, the model developed here, based on a scarcity of safe assets, argues for a cheap
public debt.
Also, as described in the positive model, the safety multiplier mechanism increases the
interconnection between banks and sovereigns (diabolic loop). The full-fledged normative
analysis should also keep in mind that there is another cost to public debt issuance due
to the safety multiplier: exposure to the sovereign neglected risk. The normative analysis
in the Open Economy model raises a flag at the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT)61:
they have the undesirable effect of propping up the price of public debt pSouthB , which in
consequence hurts private leverage.
Eurobonds In the open economy environment, Eurobonds is a beneficial policy, as this
increases the supply of low sovereign risk public debt disproportionately more than it
increases the sovereign risk of the junior part of the South bond. Contrary to Hellwig and
Philippon (2011) who advocate for Eurobills and not Eurobonds, the present environment
61http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130902.en.html
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argues for issuance of long-term maturities. See Davila and Weymuller (2013) for a security
design approach to the optimal amount of Eurobond issuance. EFSF and ESM are doing
exactly the same from an economic standpoint. They wash away the idiosyncratic sovereign
risk in order to enhance the supply of public safe assets B. Furthermore, splitting the
Eurozone has negative consequence on the welfare of risk-averse investors as long that this
break up implies a hindered access of banks to foreign public debt.
1.6 Empirical analysis
I investigate in this section how far my simple theory of private safety creation brings us to
rationalize the main monetary aggregates in Europe an in the US. The essential insight of
the model is that private debt quantities are driven by the risk characteristics (i.e. the beta)
of public debt. A calibrated version of the model captures the aggregate patterns of private
money in Europe.
The theory has rich empirical predictions regarding the balance sheet of the financial
sector. I focus on how safe asset holdings and leverage comove with the supply of public
safe assets in the economy, and argue these comovements are consistent with the safety
multiplier mechanism and not with alternative theories of financial repression, bailout
expectations and term premium trades.
1.6.1 Calibration of the safety multiplier on the Eurozone
Measure of the supply of public safe assets Sb
Among all assets available to investors, only the ones that are negative beta are included in
the measure of supply of safe assets. The candidates for assets with such property are public
debt and gold. Within public debt, I apply the negative beta criterion: as soon as the public
debt beta turns positive, it is excluded from the Sb measure. Conceptually, a positive beta
asset joins back the risky technology status: it is close to being just one more risk asset as
any other. I measure the supply of safe assets by accounting for all the Eurozone public debt
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that is negative beta with the DJ EUROSTOXX 50 (proxy for the common risky technology).
The daily betas of 10-year government bonds of all 17 Eurozone countries with the




Daily betas are graphed in the Appendix (Figures A.2 and A.3) for the public debt of
four Eurozone countries. These stylized facts illustrate a divergence of behavior between
North and South public debt that goes beyond the divergence in the yields (Figure 1.18).
The betas figures show that North betas became even more negative over the crisis, whereas
South betas turned sharply positive, in accordance with the open economy version of the
model.
In the spirit of the model, I then construct a composite measure of public safe asset





where Sk is the nominal stock of public debt of country k. A smoother version of
the measure penalizes the positive beta public debts without completely excluding them:





Measure of the balance sheet of the European financial sector
Similarly on the demand side of assets, I split the assets side of the financial sector balance
sheet in two categories: the positive beta asset (the risky technology) and the negative beta
assets (the safe assets holdings). Data come from the Monetary ECB reports, which enable to
construct an aggregate balance sheet for the financial sector of the Eurozone. The universe I
am considering are all Monetary and Financial Institutions of the Euro area (17 countries),
62I rely on daily quoted yields for the 17 MU countries. The daily returns of stock and bonds are computed
as rt = ln( PtPt 1 ) where Pt is the price of the stock index or the price implied by the yield on 10 year government
bond. Source: Global Financial Database.
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excluding the Central Banks of the Eurosystem. In the case of Europe, as the central bank
does not implement its monetary policy through open market operations63 but through
reverse repo operations, ECB balance sheet works as the negative of a bank balance sheet. I
therefore subtract its balance sheet from the European financial sector balance sheet.
The typology of assets is carried out with respect to their beta: loans, shares and other
equity are positive beta, whereas securities and remaining assets (such as gold) are negative
beta. Fixed assets are zero beta.
Assets side All loans except loans to governments are treated as risky assets. For securities,
I only have the breakdown between securities to government and to other euro area residents.
I treat both categories as safe assets, keeping in mind it is an approximation for securities to
non-government (but even for the latter category, beta would be overall negative). Also for
government securities, there is a split between b < 0 and b > 064. Loans and securities and
shares to MFIs are contracts internal to the financial sector, therefore I do not take them into
account to avoid double counting. External assets/liabilities are net assets and are therefore
included on the asset side, as a risky asset.
In the end, the risky asset holdings measure includes:
x1 = Loans to euro area residents (excluding MFI and gvt) + shares and other equity
+securities to gvt whose b > 0+ net external assets
Whereas, the safe assets holdings measure includes:
63In this case, as for the FED, its balance sheet should be subtracted from the public safe asset supply.
64As a robustness test, I also use data from stress tests ran by the European Banking Authority, which
annually disclosed sovereign debt holdings of the 91 largest European banks. This enables to compute an
alternative time-series for x2.
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x2 = Loans to gvt+ securities to gvt whose b < 0
 deposits o f gvt in MFIs+ securities to euro area residents (excluding MFI and gvt)
The measures of x1 and x2 constructed are given by Figure 1.14. These measures





















































Loans to gvt Securities to gvt (−gvt deposits)
Securities not to gvt
Figure 1.14: Composition of assets holdings of Eurozone banks: risky assets holdings (b > 0) on the left, and
safe assets holdings (b < 0) on the right. Data in trillion BC.
Liabilities side On the liabilities side, all deposits count as private money (M1) and is
therefore included in the private money measure D. From deposits I only exclude MFIs
deposits (which is double counting) and central government deposits (which are negative
position of the financial sector in central government liabilities). MMF shares are net
liabilities and are therefore included in D. Remaining assets/liabilities are slightly net
liabilities, so are also counted as D. Finally, debt securities65 up to 2 years are counted in D,
whereas debt securities issued over 2 years are counted as bank net worth (sticky liabilities).
Debt securities include Commercial Paper (CP). Capital and reserves are naturally counted
65There should not be double-counting of debt securities held by other MFIs.
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also as bank net worth nB (bank equity). Compared to KVJ, I do not distinguish between
backed (M1) and unbacked (M3-M1) bank debt, as I argue that given the recourse feature of
most secured funding (e.g. repo), the two types of securities are more substitutes than what
is thought. I treat fixed assets as negative bank net worth.
D = Deposits o f euro area residents (excluding MFI and gvt) + net MMF shares
+debt securities and CP up to 2 years+ net remaining liabilities
Whereas bank net worth (’risk-neutral wealth’) is:
nB = Capital and reserves+ debt securities and CP over 2 years  f ixed assets
euros and collection is end of period. All quantities will be scaled by Eurozone GDP


























Deposits (not from gvt) Liabilities to MMF
Debt < 2Y Net remaining liabilities
Figure 1.15: Short-term debt issuance of Eurozone banks. Amounts in trillion BC.
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Calibration
This section presents a calibration of the theoretical model based on the European aggregates
just calculated. All quantities in trillions of euros66. A complication arises from the treatment
of the corporate sector balance sheet. The asset side of the corporate balance sheet is a
juxtaposition of cash holdings and actual risky b > 0 investments. I net out the former by
carving out the cash part, and merge it with risk-averse net worth.
Table 1.1 gives the exogenous parameters estimated from available sources, and the
equilibrium variables delivered by the calibrated model. The success of the calibration to fit
observable portfolios provides support for the safety multiplier view of banking developed
in this paper.
1.6.2 Time-series tests
In this subsection I provide suggestive evidence for the empirical prediction of the model:
when the supply of safe assets shrinks, bank leverage shrinks, real lending shrinks and bank
holdings of safe assets increases. As a motivating evidence that banks act as insurers to
risk-averse investors, the mark-to-market value (p1x1 + p2x2) of the overall EU bank balance
sheet is remarkably stable.
Positive comovement of safe public and private debt
I argue here that the European banking crisis (deleveraging) has been caused by a shortage of
public safe debt, following the loss of safe asset status of Southern Europe government bonds.
This tests for the safety multiplier comparative statics of Proposition 1: ∂D
∂Sb > 0, with public
safe assets Sb and private debt D computed as just described.
66Estimations for the wealth of Monetary and Financial Institutions and of households wealth are computed
from the ECB dataset (http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/reports.do?node=100000161).
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Table 1.1: Calibration of the static model on the Eurozone economy.
All quantity variables are given in trillion BC. Price variables for public debt are from German
10 year bond. The probability of bank default is inferred from the CDS of the 90 largest
Eurozone banks.
Parameters
Bankers wealth nB = 5
Investors wealth nL = 15
Investors risk-aversion gL = 2
Risky technology volatility s1 = 0.4
Risky technology return r1 = 0.12
Public debt beta b =  0.3
Public debt volatility s2 = 0.2
Public debt supply Sb = 3.5
Equilibrium variables
Bank portfolio expectation µu = 0.3
Bank portfolio volatility su = 0.2
Observable quantity variables
Model Data
Bank risky assets holdings x1 = 13 x1 = 15
Bank safe assets holdings x2 = 2 x2 = 4
Bank debt D = 13.5 D = 14
Bank leverage D/nB = 2.7 D/nB = 2.8
Investors direct risky assets holdings y1 = 0 y1 = 0.5
Investors direct safe assets holdings y2 = 1.5 y2 = 2
Observable price variables
Public debt yield rsa f e = 2% rsa f e = 1.8%
Bank debt yield rbank = 5% rbank = 4%
Bank probability of default Pde f = 6.7% Pde f = 4.5%
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This test aims at answering the following question: when the supply of public safe
assets in Europe shrank, did privately safe asset creation stepped in, as an equilibrium
outcome, in order to satiate the demand for safety, as hinted by Gorton and Metrick (2012)?
Or in the contrary, did it even more crunch private safety, according to my safety multiplier
mechanism?
I provide suggestive evidence of the quantity comovement between public safety and
private safety in Europe, hence putting forward the safe asset shortage as a key cause of the
Eurozone current recession. The empirical tests of the model revolve around the impact of
public debt beta on private leverage. Not only more public debt, but also ’better’ hedging
qualities of public debt under the form of lower beta, enables the financial sector to sustain
high leverage. I use sovereign risk as an instrument to identify this negative beta channel of
public debt on private debt.
It replicates what happened in Europe over the last decade: a decrease in the supply of
safe public debt. It triggers a non-conventional deleveraging of banks and a credit crunch
due to the safety multiplier. There are three regimes in the time period: increase in safe
asset supply (2001-2007), even more so with Keynesian stimulus plans (2008-2010). Then for
2010-2013, there is a split: the total amount of Euro public debt increases, but the amount of
it which is safe (no-GIPSI) actually decreased. On a longer time horizon, my model could
also shed light the double leverage cycle: public debt and private debt (both domestic and
external) documented in Reinhart and Rogoff 2008 and Jorda et al. 2013. One is used as an
input to the production of the other, this is why they comove positively.
Beyond the suggestive evidence of positive comovement from 1.16, the model calls the
following specification:
Dt = d+ g1 Sbt + g2 bt + et
and the new empirical predictions are: g1 > 0 and g2 < 0. All quantities variables are
scaled by GDP. Results of this specification are given in Table 1.2 and illustrated in Figure
1.16. I always include a trend regressor to absorb the economy growth effect.
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Table 1.2: Quantities tests: regression of leverage D and risky holdings x1 on the supply Sb, the beta b of
public safe assets and the interaction between the two Sb ⇤Max ( b, 0). All quantities are scaled by EU GDP.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
D D D x1 x1 x1
b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se
Sb/GDP 1.749*** 1.889***
(0.16) (0.17)
Germany b -0.404 -0.265
(0.87) (0.94)
Sb bGER 0.275 0.203
(0.35) (0.38)
Constant -0.464 4.763*** 4.641*** -0.593 5.098*** 4.981***
(0.48) (0.25) (0.26) (0.51) (0.27) (0.28)
N 42 42 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.76 0.01 0.01 0.76 0.00 0.01
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Figure 1.16: Public and Private safety positive comovement. The one on the left uses the rigorous measure of
public safe asset supply: Sb = ÂEurozone country k 1{bk<0} S
k. Whereas the one on the right uses a smoother






Sovereign risk as an instrument to the causality of beta on private leverage Naturally,
the above specification is plagued with reverse causality and omitted variable issues,
especially on g267. To mitigate these concerns, I instrument public debt beta with sovereign
CDS. This empirical strategy is inspired by the new result of the model: sovereign risk
should impact private leverage only through public debt beta68.
Therefore the IV regression I run is, on a first stage, public debt beta on sovereign CDS
(as a measure of sovereign risk):
bt = d+ gˆ1 sov CDSt + et
And then use the resulting bˆt = gˆ1 sov CDSt in the second stage:
Dt = d+ g2 bˆt + et
The model predicts gˆ1 > 0 and g2 < 0. Sovereign CDS is obtained from Markit. These
results help to distinguish my theory from moral hazard theories of the sovereign-bank
diabolic loop, who have no predictions on bank leverage. The IV strategy takes advantage
of the exogenous variations in the supply of safe assets in Europe69 in order to identify
the impact of public debt beta on bank leverage. It could also be used, in an IO approach,
to trace down the demand curve for safe assets. Here a key issue is the sovereign risk
heterogeneity within Europe. This calls to refine the IV specification, taking into account
the open economy. It is tantamount to a test of the open economy model.
67For g1, causality of Sb on D is more reasonable, as long as stay in a Greek style crisis and not an Irish style
crisis.
68This is a test of the fragility of the safety multiplier to sovereign CDS. I abstract from the reverse feedback
loop of implicit guarantees (the Irish style sovereign crisis) to focus on Greek style sovereign crisis: sovereign
risk is causal to bank risk.
69cf. "Global pool of triple A status shrinks 60% (Financial Times, March 26 2013).
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Effect of public debt supply on the composition of banks portfolios
Credit crunch Proposition 3 says that lending to the real economy decreases when the
supply of safe assets Sb shrinks and its hedging properties get worse (higher b). I therefore
compute x1 from ECB data as the sum of all Monetary and Financial Institutions loans to
the real sector (and HH – should be fixed) as described above, and then run the following
specification:
x1,t = d+ g1 Sbt + g2 bt + e
where the model predicts: g1 > 0 and g2 < 0. Results are given in Table 1.2.
Banks safe asset holdings The last quantity test concerns Corollary 3: banks safe asset
holdings increase when safe asset supply shrinks. I compute a measure of safe asset holdings
x2 by banks as the sum of bank holdings of public debt. I also do the same for risk-averse
investors (money market funds) to compute y2. I then run the following specification70:
x2,t = d+ g1 Sbt + g2 bt + g3 bt ⇤ Sbt + e
where the model predicts: g1 < 0 and g2 > 0. The coefficient g2 > 0 on beta indicates
that having better hedging properties (low b) make banks to need less of public debt in
order to ensure the safety of their debt, hence levering up. This is a defining test of my
theory against other diabolic loop theories (financial repression, bailout expectations). asset
pricing properties of public debt drive these holdings, not preferences from investors. Uhlig
(2013) and Acharya-Drechsler-Schnabl (2013)’s Irish style bank to sovereign crisis do not
have prediction relating asset pricing properties of public debt to asset holdings. Similarly, I
reject the financial repression hypothesis for France and Germany71.
70Another specification could focus on safe asset holdings by risk-averse investors (i.e. non banks): y2 in the
model. E.g. insurance companies are large holders of government debt for anti-transformation purposes.
71Deep secondary markets exist for these government bonds. Moral hazard and bailout expectations by
banks do not seem to hold.
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I also test the additional predictions of the model on banks asset holdings. When public
debt beta is low enough, banks are able to ensure the safety of their private debt even with a
small amount of safe assets on their balance sheet. Therefore the banks safe assets holdings
negatively comove with the hedging properties of public debt. I test this prediction, along
with the safe asset driven credit crunch prediction: real lending positively comoves with the
hedging properties of public debt. The model predicts that in crises times, banks become the
natural holders of government debt. The empirical analysis identifies this reconcentration
from risk-averse agents (insurance companies, pension funds) to risk-neutral agents (banks)
in Europe.
A confounding explanation could be that safe asset holdings are just liquidity hoarding
by banks, driven by a precautionary motive, or requirements coming from regulation72.
Indeed the regulation of liquidity that is progressively introduced requires banks to hold
High Quality Liquid Assets (HQLA) in order to satisfy a Liquidity Coverage Ratio. However,
negative beta assets holdings substantially exceed these requirements, which are therefore
not binding. These holdings could also be induced by capital requirements, which weight
each type of assets according to its risk. Nevertheless, capital requirements would be
innocuous, as banks would anyway be willing to hold safe assets to hedge the positive beta
part of their balance sheet.
1.6.3 Cross-sectional test: safe assets holdings and refinancing costs
This section tests in the cross-section of banks the mechanism of the paper, i.e. that
government debt is used as an input in safety creation. It aims at proving that South
banks did redomesticate due to moral suasion, whereas North banks played their role of
diversification. To do this, I run cross-sectional tests of banks easiness to refinance (bank
CDS) on a measure of the quality of the diversification of their balance sheet: s2x2s1x1 .
For these cross-sectional tests, I use data on sovereign debt holdings by banks from the
72It should be noted that the safe asset holdings of banks are much more important than the cash holdings
of the corporate sector.
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European Banking Authority. They provide granular snapshots of the balance sheet of the
90 largest European banks. In these cross-sectional tests, in order to compute x1 and x2
from EBA data, I use Exposure at Default (EAD). For on-balance-sheet transactions, EAD is
identical to the nominal amount of exposure. For off balance sheet, it is modeled by the
bank itself. This is the relevant measure of p1x1 and p2x2.
I explore here how the holdings of sovereign debt impacts funding costs in the cross-
section of banks. For examplle, the French bank BNP holds 15% of its total EAD in its
portfolio of sovereign debt. I want to show that the more diversified this one is, the better





Figure 1.17 explores the explanatory power in the cross-section of bank CDS of either
risky public debt holdings and safe public debt holdings. It illustrates that safe asset holdings
have far more explanatory power in the cross-section than risky asset holdings. Table ??
provides the results of the corresponding regression:
CDSi = d+ g1 x2,i + et
The results show that the cross-section of bank CDS is primarily driven by safe public
debt holdings (i.e. the object of interest of this paper), and not the risky debt holdings . This
result is not inconsistent with the narrative developed in Acharya and Steffen (2013) that
banks did engage in a carry trade on risky debt. Nevertheless, it shows the cross-section of
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Figure 1.17: CDS quotes vs. bank holdings of risky (top) and safe (bottom) public debt: x2,i =
ÂEurozone country k 1{bk<0} xk,i. Public debt is assigned in the risky and safe categories according to their
beta at the stress test date, 2011q3. Risky public debt (b > 0) are: Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal,
Spain. Safe public debt (b < 0) are: Austria, Cyprus, Finland, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta,
Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia.
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Table 1.3: Regression of bank CDS on safe public debt holdings.
Explanatory power of public debt holdings x2,i = ÂEurozone country k 1{bk<0} xk,i in the bank CDS
cross-section. Safe_debt_all and Risky_debt_all includes all the countries listed in the former figure,
whereas Safe_debt_core is only France and Germany, and Risky_debt_core is only Spain and Italy.
All quantities are in billion BC and CDS in basis points.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CDS CDS CDS CDS









Constant 273.331*** 265.650*** 222.775*** 215.866***
(28.43) (28.05) (33.65) (31.89)
N 33 33 33 33
R-squared 0.21 0.18 0.00 0.00
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
1.6.4 Asset pricing tests
The model has sharp empirical predictions on the price of the public safe asset (government
debt) and private safe asset (bank debt). This focus on the safe asset price is a departure
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from the literature, which mainly focus on the risky asset price, i.e. the equity premium (see
Zhang (2013) for a recent example).
Public safety premium
The model predicts that the price of the public safe asset should increase with its hedging
properties on the risky asset, and the more so the more the safety mechanism D is at work.
As a result I run the following specification on German government yields:
rsa f et = d+ g1 bt + g2 bt ⇤ Dt + e
where the model predicts: g1 < 0 and g2 < 0. Results of this specification are given in
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Figure 1.18: 10-year government bond yields in the Eurozone.
This specification enables to estimate the safety premium on Euro public debt. The
interaction term g2 bt ⇤ Dt helps to capture the complementarity effect of public safe assets,
through the safety multiplier mechanism. It also implies that the safety premium is even
more important in countries where the safety multiplier is at work, such as in Europe.
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I can also test how this safety premium depends on who owns the debt, banks or
households, i.e. run the specification:
rsa f et = d+ g1 n
B + g2 nL + e
where nB is bank net worth and nL is risk-averse net worth. Results of this specification
are also given in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4: Determinants of the public safety premium: rsa f e.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
rsafe rsafe rsafe rsafe rsafe rsafe





Germany ⇤ b 0.763 1.171
(0.92) (0.83)




Constant 2.388*** 8.362*** 3.683*** 3.370*** 2.709*** 7.126***
(0.59) (0.44) (0.24) (0.08) (0.62) (0.54)
N 41 41 42 42 41 42
R-squared 0.10 0.76 0.02 0.67 0.14 0.53
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Safety spread and predictive regression
An insight of this paper is that is not one but two safety premia to consider: one on public
debt and one on private debt. I focus here on the spread between the public safety premium
and the private safety premium, which is equal to rsa f e   rbank and which can be called a
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Figure 1.19: Private and public safety premia.
I use for rsa f e the weighted yield on all the public debt that is deemed as safe according
in the definition employed in section 5.1.1. of construction of the stock of public safety. Here
again, I emphasize that the focus of this study is safe public debt holdings, and not risky public
debt holdings (which is Acharya-Steffen focus).
The empirical counterpart of rbank is computed as the weighted average of the deposit
rate (source: ECB) and the wholesale funding rate (computed as the sum of the deposit rate
and the CDS spread). Weights are notional amounts of deposits and wholesale funding of
the Eurozone banking balance sheet.
The model derives an analytical expression for the SMI, which shows that SMI decreases
with public debt beta b, and the more so the more the bank balance sheet is initially
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diversified: s2x2s1x1 high. I consequently run the following specification:













where the model predicts: g1 > 0, g2 < 0 and g3 < 0. Results of this specification are
given in Table 1.5 and are consistent with the model.
Table 1.5: Determinants of the safety spread (SMI):  SMI = rbank   rsa f e
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SMI SMI SMI SMI SMI SMI SMI














Constant -0.165 4.921*** 0.888*** 0.355*** 0.443 0.830 4.058
(0.74) (0.81) (0.27) (0.13) (0.75) (1.80) (4.82)
N 41 41 42 42 41 42 42
R-squared 0.02 0.44 0.08 0.28 0.13 0.00 0.10
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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g1 > 0 says that better hedging properties of the public safe asset (low b) induces banks
to lever up more, hence a low SMI. g2 > 0 says that a improperly diversified bank balanced
sheet (s2x2s1x1 closer to 0 than 1) also implies a low SMI. g3 > 0 says that these two effects
reinforce each other. The g2 effect can also be interpreted as saying that the concentrated
ownership of public debt is priced in SMI: low bank safe asset holdings implies improperly
diversified bank balance sheets, hence low SMI.
Finally, I run the predictive regression:
Dt = d+ g1 SMIt 1 + e
According to the model, the safety spread SMI should be a strong predictor of leverage.
Table 1.6 gives the results of the regression and confirms that SMI predicts leverage.
Figure 1.3 suggested this property, and it is confirmed in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: Predictive regression of the safety spread (SMI): rsa f e   rbank for bank leverage D.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
DGDP DGDP x1GDP x1GDP
b/se b/se b/se b/se
SMI 0.564*** 0.658***
(0.08) (0.08)
rsa f e -0.497*** -0.578***
(0.11) (0.12)
Constant 5.156*** 6.643*** 5.506*** 7.232***
(0.08) (0.41) (0.08) (0.42)
N 42 42 42 42
R-squared 0.54 0.32 0.65 0.38
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Impact on bank profitability
Finally, low SMI hits negatively banks expected profitability. It is in the spirit of the Fed
board paper about bank profitability to interest rate innovations. I therefore run as final
specification, where the model predicts: g1 > 0:
PBt = d+ g1 SMIt + e
Banks profitability is computed from Bankscope data as the recurrent income:
PB = interest income  re f inancing cost  operating expenses
Refinancing costs are using data from Bankscope (’interest expense’ entry) and banks’
CDS (in bps) as a better measure of refinancing cost. I am matching dividend gains and not
capital gains. I also explicitly take into account the operating costs of running a bank. The
model is able to handle constant returns to banking, i.e. I do not need to rely on a convex
cost of banking to pin down endogenous leverage. Therefore adding operating costs is
innocuous in the model.
These assumptions enable to estimate the part of banks profits that comes from safe
asset holdings:
PB|sa f e assets = yield ⇤ securities holdings
 re f inancing cost ⇤ securities holdings/total assets
 operating expenses ⇤ securities holdings/total assets
Figure 1.20 illustrates the distribution of profits from safe assets holdings. It shows that
most banks are loosing money on these holdings, consistent with the fact that the carry
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Profits from safe assets computed as: yield * securities holdings - (refinancing costs+operating expenses) *
securities holding/total assets (source: Bankscope). The shade area gives the 25th and 75th percentiles.
Figure 1.20: Distribution of profits from safe assets holdings.
1.7 Discussion
1.7.1 Comparison with existing literature
Role of banks
The traditional banking literature sees the role of banks as mitigating agency frictions:
Diamond 1984, Diamond and Rajan 2001b, or more recently as mitigating the adverse
selection due to information acquisition: Holmstrom and Ordonez 2013. This literature
is not suited to explain the large holdings of liquid, publicly traded and ’safe’ securities
by banks.73 Theories of banking on information asymmetry and banks superior ability to
“keep secrets” do not apply to bank holdings of highly liquid and scrutinized assets such as
73The large holdings of government securities also challenge the view that financial integration helped global
banks economize on their liquid assets holdings (Castiglionesi et al. forthcoming).
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government debt.
DeAngelo and Stulz 2013 and Philippon 2012 insist on the liquidity/safety creation
role of banks. However they do not model for it, even though Philippon 2012 features
production function in reduced-form for the supply of safe assets74). These articles do not
consider public debt as an already safe asset and its role in safety creation, and do not
feature risk-aversion. More generally, macroeconomic models take the cost of financial
intermediation (the spread between lending and borrowing rates) as exogenous75. Landier
et al. 2012 and Begenau et al. 2012 insist on the interest rate exposure as the key feature of
banks business. However they do not have a model of banks optimizing behavior, the action
still comes from the asset side and not the liability side of banks. They do not explain why
banks have this interest rate exposure, and what the implications are for monetary policy. In
my model interest rates are equilibrium outcomes, not causal variables. Bianchi and Bigio
(2013) takes the role of banks as granted (loan supply) and do not model a safety mismatch.
The literature on liquidity hoarding views cash as a commitment device. Most recently,
Calomiris et al. (2013), following Calomiris and Kahn (1991), lays down a theory of cash
holdings of banks as a discipline device against a moral hazard friction. The present model
does not rely on an agency friction to explain ’safe asset’ holdings by banks. Generally, the
theoretical literature has found it puzzling to explain why banks would hold assets yielding
lower returns than the deposit rate.
In the present model, the role of banks is to create safety by portfolio construction.
They choose their asset holdings as inputs to safety creation. Therefore the key engine of
banking is diversification. The role of banks is pooling and tranching in a General Equilibrium
environment, with an enforcement friction: banks cannot commit to repay debt. Contrary to
Gennaioli et al. 2013b, I analyze banks in general and not shadow banking, and I consider
macro shocks and not only micro idiosyncratic shocks that are washed away by a law of large
numbers. In my model, bundling a bearish asset with a bullish asset enhances the value of
74He exogenously posits an intermediation requirement for government bonds of 1/10.
75Such as in Curdia and Woodford (2009).
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bank collateral. When the safe asset is government securities holdings, sovereign risk acts
the neglected risk. It is also reminiscent of Gennaioli et al. (2013a): finance helps to preserve
wealth. My model does microfound how banks are able to preserve wealth by issuing
securities with quasi-flat payoff, which caters to risk-averse investors. This role of banks as
safety creators is alternative to Kashyap et al. 2002 model of banks as liquidity providers. It has
the distinctive prediction of positive comovement of public and private safety. It insists not
on the immediacy of government debt holdings but on its hedging value. Similarly, it insists on
safety transformation by banks, less on their liquidity transformation. Liquidity (deposits,
repo, MMF) is a bit different as safety: liquidity is immediacy (promise of cash redemption),
as in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). Similarly, Gale and Ozgur (2005) studies capital structure
when banks insure against liquidity shocks, which is different from the role they have in
my environment of insuring against macro shocks. I do not need to resort to preference
shocks, which are hard to map to a primitive. On the contrary it has similarities with Gorton
and Pennacchi 1990 whose purpose of banking is liquidity creation, but the latter is in
an asymmetric information partial equilibrium environment. I share with Geanakoplos
1997 and Simsek 201376 the focus on General Equilibrium effects of heterogeneity and the
analysis of the determinants of leverageintroduce a second asset, which I call ’safe asset’,
in exogenous fixed supply. I also depart from beliefs heterogeneity, and I use instead
risk-aversion heterogeneity to obtain endogenous leverage. Such environment is more
tractable to handle multiple assets.
Sovereign debt
Tradiional literature on sovereign debt focuses on issues such as sustainability, reputation
and default (Hellwig-Lorenzoni (2012), Cole-Kehoe (2002), Krueger-Perri (2010) and Aguiar
et al. (2013)). It mostly ignores the key role of banks portfolio choice in their pricing. I argue
that banks are key players that decide of the price of domestic debt by pinning down the
76Cao (2013) is a dynamic version of the original Geanakoplos environment. However the equilibrium is
solved numerically.
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price of safety. Moreover, in an international environment, global banks adds an additional
layer of endogeneity through their portfolio choice between domestic debt and foreign debt.
On the other hand, the recent literature on global banks (Schnabl (2009), Ivashina et al. 2012,
Bruno and Shin 2012) does not focus on the role of their sovereign debt holdings.
Recent literature linking sovereign debt and bank debt focuses on bailout expectations
to microfound the interconnection between bank risk and sovereign risk. Sovereign debt
is solely treated as a store of value: Acharya et al. (2011b), Mengus (2012) and Gennaioli
et al. (forthcoming). These papers feature a 3-period model in which real investment is
prohibited in the first period and sovereign debt is used to transfer wealth from the first to
the second period. On the contrary, I do not introduce bailout expectations but I simply treat
public debt as a given asset class. I circumvent the ad hoc 3-period timeline of public debt
models, as my agents’ simultaneous hold government debt and risky projects. Furthermore,
in Gennaioli et al. (forthcoming), government debt features procyclical returns, which is
counterfactual with the negative beta of public debt. Bolton and Jeanne (2011) exogenously
posits the collateral value of government debt, whereas I microfound from its hedging
properties. Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012a) emphasizes the role of public debt as an
insurance against interest rate fluctuation from the government perspective. Broner et al. (2013)
is a model of crowding out of real investment whose mechanism relies on the presence
of secondary markets for sovereign debt. They assume that foreign investors do not have
investmentaccess to local equity market, whereas I restrict them from funding access in the
local market. Reinhart and Sbrancia 2011 puts forward financial repression as the key reason
of government debt holdings by banks. Angeletos et al. (2013) is a normative analysis of
the liquidity role of public debt for debt issuance, but as in Bolton and Jeanne (2011) they
take the collateral value of public debt as exogenous. Martin and Ventura (2012) construct a
model that has a similar feature to mine, that a bubble emerges for its collateral properties.
However, they do not relate its value to the value of the risky asset and its impact on
leverage. Broner et al. (2010) insists on the role of secondary markets for public debt to
discipline the sovereign, I insist on their role to provide safe assets.
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On the empirical side, Acharya and Steffen (2013) documents that European banks
invested heavily in sovereign bonds of countries of the Eurozone periphery and interpret
this as moral hazard. They also document a redomestication of domestic debt ownership,
and interpret it as an effect ECB funding collateral requirements. However, this last
interpretation does not explain why foreign banks could not do the same type of carry
trade. On the contrary, in my open economy environment, heterogeneity in holdings is
driven by special access to local funding. Bofondi et al. (2013) documents that foreign
banks substituted to the credit crunch of domestic banks in Italy. They do not analyze the
portfolio holdings of securities of these global banks. Uhlig (2013) is a moral hazard model
of the South free-riding on the expectation of a North bailout(through the ECB). Its model
presents however the counterfactual feature that in equilibrium, North banks hold zero
South banks, at odds with Acharya and Steffen (2013) evidence. In contrast, the pure asset
pricing perspective developed here enables to rationalize cross-border holdings of sovereign
debt.
Safe assets
Traditionally, the literature treats safe assets as stores of value. Woodford (1990), Holmstrom
and Tirole (1998), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008), Kocherlakota (2007) and Kocher-
lakota (2009) are all environments in which the government improves welfare by relaxing
through public debt exogenous collateral constraints imposed on the private sector. On the
contrary, exogenous financial frictions are absent from my environment. The government
improves welfare through the safety multiplier. The rational bubble literature insists on the
scarcity of asset supply in general. On the contrary, I insist on the scarcity of safe assets.
My environment endows public debt with an even more crucial liquidity role, through the
safety multiplier. More recently, (Yared, 2013) introduces liquidity shocks in a Woodford
(1990) and obtains substitutability between public debt and private debt. On the contrary, I
obtain complementarity between the two.
In the macroeconomic literature, Caballero and Farhi 2013 emphasizes the shortage of
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safe assets as a key macroeconomic force that can lead to a safety trap. They develop a
valuation framework to assess the policies remedies to this safety trap. In contrast, my model
features optimizing banks with endogenous leverage. Bank leverage is jointly determined at
equilibrium with the safe asset price. Compared to Gorton and Metrick (2012), I emphasize
the negative beta property of safe assets, whereas in the latter safe assets are defined as
keeping a constant value over time. My ’safety’ definition, i.e. assts with negative beta,
is similar to the one used by Maggiori (2013) for the analysis of the dollar currency in
an international context. That the government should issue negative beta securities is an
idea mentioned in Pagano (1988). On the crowding out of private debt by public debt,
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013a), Gorton and Metrick (2012), Gorton and
Ordonez 201377 and Gourinchas and Jeanne 2012 emphasize the substitutability between
private and public safe assets. My crowding-in comes from endogenous leverage and public
debt being used as input to private debt creation. Sunderam 2012 and Greenwood et al. 2010
microfounds safety demand through money in the utility, whereas I stick to parsimonious
risk aversion heterogeneity. Regarding normative implications, Stein 2010 argues there are
too much safe debt due to pecuniary externality, Caballero and Farhi 2013 argues there
are not enough safe assets. I argue there are not enough public safe assets due to a lack of
negative beta assets in the economy.
Asset pricing
I relax the standard assumption in standard portfolio allocation theory of Campbell and
Viceira (2002) that the risk free asset is in perfectly elastic supply. In my environment, the
price of the safe asset results from its scarcity, and in turn it impacts private leverage. In the
field of closed economy asset pricing, Campbell et al. (2013b), Campbell et al. 2013a and
Backus and Wright 2007 explain changing betas of US government bonds by changes in
inflation expectations (monetary policy stance). They develop Neo-Keynesian models to
emphasize the nominal nature of government bonds.
77This paper exogenously assumes that private collateral is more information-sensitive than public collateral.
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In open economy asset pricing, Coeurdacier and Gourinchas 2013 and Bhamra et al.
(2013) insist on the role of bonds to hedge real exchange rate risk. Models in this literature
feature complete markets, hence Modigliani-Miller holds and leverage is not determinate.
1.7.2 Conclusion
In this paper I develop a banking model in which banks’ economic role is to provide
insurance to risk-averse investors against macroeconomics shocks. I analyze a model of safe
assets creation that features risk aversion heterogeneity and incomplete markets. Public
debt has an endogenous negative beta by anticipation of flight to safety in the recursive
equilibrium. As public debt is used as input to private debt issuance, the model delivers a
safety multiplier. The open economy extension introduces heterogeneity in sovereign risk.
Sovereign risk weakens the hedging properties of public debt. The open economy model
captures redomestication of sovereign debt by the interaction of risk-shifting motives with
endogenous leverage. The empirical discussion points towards the shortage of safe public
debt as the key driver of the European debt crisis. Europe is more fragile to the safety
multiplier due to the limited participation of investors in the risky technology. The spread
between public debt and private debt can be used as a financial stability indicator to reveal
the extent of the safety multiplier.
The model has crucial normative implications. The private equilibrium is constrained
inefficient because private agents do not internalize the beneficial effects of negative beta
securities, which makes them issue too much short-term. Issuing public debt is welfare
improving, because it is endogenously endowed with negative beta in the recursive equi-
librium. This leads to a higher level of safe assets overall in the economy. Issuance of
long-term public debt improves welfare as long as it does not flood the economy up to a
point at which its hedging properties are weakened. This provides a well-founded rationale
for monetary dominance: the issuance of public liabilities can be used to manipulate prices.
Public debt can therefore be seen as an instrument of unconventional monetary policy.
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Chapter 2
Leverage and Reputational Fragility in
Credit Markets1
2.1 Introduction
This paper investigates the determinants of the leverage of financial intermediaries through
short-term secured funding markets. The sudden freeze of such markets in 2008 was
one of the most surprising and unexpected developments of the financial crisis.2 Secured
debt markets were thought to be immune from traditional bank runs, as each contract
is collateralized by a distinct pool of assets. I develop a model where the characteristics
of collateral interacts with borrowers’ reputation and with the history of the borrower-
lender relationship. This model rationalizes the cross-section of secured debt contracts, and
provides a narrative for sudden freezes in secured debt markets based on the endogeneity
1A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title: “Haircuts and Relationships”. I would like
to thank Tobias Adrian, Philippe Aghion, Charles Angelucci, Nina Boyarchenko, Adam Copeland, Eduardo
Davila, Emmanuel Farhi, Benjamin Friedman, Paul Goldsmith-Pinkham, Oliver Hart, Antoine Martin, Asani
Sarkar, Andrei Shleifer, Alp Simsek, Adi Sunderam, Jeremy Stein, Michael Woodford and Eric Zwick for helpful
discussions and insightul comments, as well as seminar participants at Harvard, HBS, MIT Sloan, the European
Central Bank and the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. JEL numbers: G12, G23, G32, D8, L14. Keywords:
leverage cycle, beliefs heterogeneity, secured funding, risk sharing, franchise value, long-term contracts, money
market funds.
2See for instance Brunnermeier (2009) and Gorton and Metrick (2010).
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of reputation. Theories of debt capacity are conventionally asset-specific.3 In Shleifer and
Vishny (1992), debt capacity of an asset is its liquidation value. Similarly, in models of
endogenous margins such as Geanakoplos (2003) and Simsek (2013), debt capacity only
depends on beliefs about the asset which collateralizes the debt contract. However, Figures
2.1 and 2.2 suggest that not only the collateral but also broader attributes of the relationship
between the borrower and the lender are priced in. The dataset used in this paper includes all
the tri-party repo transactions between 2006 and 2012 involving one of the 145 largest money
market funds. Repurchase agreements (repo) contracts are secured debt contracts. Their
defining feature is that two pricing terms are contracted upon: not only the compensation
(the interest rate), but also the protection (the haircut). The rate is defined as the ratio of
the ex post promise s¯ on the amount of cash raised ex ante D: 1+ r = s¯D . The haircut is
computed as one minus the ratio of ex ante cash raised D on the ex ante market value of
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Figure 2.1: Haircuts and rates in the cross-section of borrowers; orthogonalized on time, collateral and lender
fixed effects.
3Debt capacity and loan-to-value are equivalent concepts, i.e. the amount that can be borrowed against an
asset or a security. One minus the haircut (or margin) measures debt capacity.
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Figure 2.1 plots haircuts and rates in the cross-section of borrowers. It illustrates that
borrowers whose perceived creditworthiness by the market - i.e. reputation - is better secure
repo contracts that are favorable on the two pricing dimensions: lower rates and lower
haircuts. Figure 2.2 conducts the same type of exercise in the cross-section of lenders. It
illustrates that lenders with more outside options secure repo contracts with more favorable
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Figure 2.2: Haircuts and rates in the cross-section of lenders; orthogonalized on time, collateral and borrower
fixed effects.
I show in this paper that a positive comovement of haircuts and rates in the cross-section
of borrowers can only be rationalized by a dimension of heterogeneity that is not about the
collateral. Models using a continuum of beliefs generically predict that a negative correlation
between haircuts and rates. On the contrary, in an environment that explicitly takes into
account reputation heterogeneity, borrowers with high reputation do enjoy lower haircuts
and lower rates. To make this point, I develop a model of multilateral Nash bargaining
between I optimists and J pessimists, and I consider two cases: one where optimists only
differ according to their beliefs on collateral riskiness, and one where optimists only differ
according to their reputation. Only the equilibrium of the second case features a positive
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comovement of haircuts and rates in the cross-section of borrowers.
I then turn to the dynamic version of the model in order to provide foundations for
reputation. I identify reputation as the continuation value of any agent in the infinitely
repeated version of the static game. In this environment, agents net worth are the only state
variables and reputation can then be solved as a function of net worth. The second result of
the paper is that only with endogenous reputation leverage can be procyclical with respect to
net worth. The intuition is as follows. Reputation is a non-linear function of net worth: it
vanishes at a fast pace when net worth gets close to zero. As reputation supports agents
debt capacity, equilibrium leverage gets slashed for low levels of net worth. Such dynamics
provides an explanation for the ’run on repo’ documented in Gorton and Metrick (2010)
without resorting to any coordination failure narrative. The third result is that long-term
contracts are valuable in this environment, as they insulate borrowers from margin calls
when they have low net worth, precisely the states where they would need to lever up to
replenish their capital.
Finally, the fourth and last theoretical result is delivered by an extension of the model
featuring repo chain. I consider an environment with three types of agents: optimists
without franchise value ’Hedge Funds’, optimists with franchise value ’Broker-Dealer’ and
pessimists ’Money Markets’. I show that Broker Dealers emerge as financial intermediaries:
they rehypothecate collateral, as they are the only ones capable of ’monetizing’ their franchise
value. I show that Broker-Dealer leverage is more stable than Hedge-Fund leverage in this
equilibrium, consistent with the stylized facts.
The empirical analysis of the repo market confirms the first three theoretical results. I
use a hand-collected dataset of repurchase agreement transactions between money market
funds as lenders and broker dealers as borrowers. The dataset is constructed, following
Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2011), by parsing the quarterly SEC filings. The only
difference on data source is that I parse for the 145 largest prime institutional money market
funds but for no securities lenders. This choice is motivated by the focus of the present
paper on the price determinants in the cross-section of borrowers, whereas Krishnamurthy,
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Nagel and Orlov (2011) focuses on the aggregate time-series of repo funding. In the dataset,
borrowers with high reputation, proxied by a low CDS, do secure lower rates and lower
haircuts (prediction 1). I also identify the reputation channel by the exposure to the European
crisis: controlling for collateral, borrowers that were more exposed to Europe did experience
higher haircuts even on US collateral. Moreover, in the time-series, borrowers with low net
worth are the ones that face more volatile haircuts (Prediction 2). Finally, borrowers that
enjoy long-term relationships with money market funds are more insulated from haircut
volatility (Prediction 3). The last two findings can help reconciling Gorton and Metrick
(2010), which document dramatic increases in haircuts (with data coming from bilateral
repos), with, on the other hand, Copeland, Martin and Walker (2010) which show that
haircuts were by and large unresponsive over the crisis (with data coming from tri-party
repos).
Related literature. The corporate finance literature traditionally features agency frictions
to model limited pledgeability, which is tantamount to a leverage constraint. The agency
friction can be moral hazard, such as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) and Adrian and Shin
(2012), or informational asymmetries about the quality of collateral, such as Dang, Gorton
and Holmstrom (2011a). On the contrary, Geanakoplos (2003) and Simsek (2013) rely on
beliefs heterogeneity to derive an optimal level of leverage. As I focus in this paper on the
debt capacity of financial intermediaries, I choose to cast my model in the latter piece of
literature.4 The key feature of my model is that franchise value cannot be seized by the
lenders. It draws from the limited commitment literature, following Hart and Moore (1994)
and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004). However, in my model, parties can commit to the
debt contract; which is priced taking into account the fact that the franchise value relaxes
the default constraint. Due to beliefs heterogeneity, the optimal contracting problem is more
4Given their dispersed lending base, it is hard to think of financial intermediaries as being disciplined
by the lenders from a moral hazard friction, or cash stealing friction a la Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) and
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990). Similarly, Dang, Gorton and Holmstrom (2011a) microfounds the haircut to
prevent information acquisition from a potential lender more sophisticated than the borrower. In the case of
repo markets and bank wholesale funding, the ultimate lenders are money market funds and passive money,
whose key characteristics seem to be their relative pessimism or risk aversion.
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akin to an ex ante risk-sharing agreement, in the spirit of Kocherlakota (1996), Lustig (2000)
and Alvarez and Jermann (2000). Contrary to the latter, my model features equilibrium
default. Beyond beliefs heterogeneity, the only friction in my model is the multilateral Nash
bargaining that arises between borrowers and lenders; contractual externalities arise from
the collateral constraint, which is shared by all the lenders. Multilateral Nash bargaining is
inspired by Stole and Zwiebel (1996),5 and makes the outside options endogenous. This
feature of my model is shared with Krueger and Uhlig (2006), Ghosh and Ray (1996), Phelan
(1995), and Rampini and Viswanathan (2012). The optimal long-term contract I derive is a
long-term risk-sharing agreement, similar to the labor literature as Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), Thomas and Worrall (1988), and not a dynamic contract that helps to mitigate an
agency friction as in Biais et al. (2007).
He and Xiong (2012a) also considers a dynamic environment with beliefs heterogeneity
and rollover risk to analyze the optimal maturity choice. Differing from their set up, I model
rollover risk as being institution-specific and not asset-specific, and I take into account imperfect
competition among lenders. This enables me to capture the idiosyncratic dispersion of repo
contracts for a given type of collateral. Geanakoplos and Fostel (2011) also features pricing
dispersion of repo contracts, at the cost of introducing a continuum of beliefs types. In my
model, two borrowers with the same beliefs but different franchises will have the repo priced
differently. Acharya, Gale and Yorulmazer (2011a) is a model of dynamic debt capacity of a
long-term asset in presence of small but frequent rollover risk.6 Contrary to their set up, the
risky asset I consider can be short-term. Only institution-specific characteristics (franchise
and relationships) are long-term. In my model, impaired debt capacity here arises from the
endogeneity of borrower franchise value. Oehmke (2012) analyzes the disorderly liquidation
5Such friction is also featured in Ausubel and Deneckere (1993), Acemoglu et al. (2007) and Goldberg and
Tille (2012) in the trade context. The alternative would have been a search and matching set up. The latter
makes sense between segmented capital markets as in (Duffie and Strulovici, forthcoming) but is harder to
justify on liquid wholesale funding markets such as repo.
6Other papers analyzing rollover risk are He and Xiong (2012b) and Eisenbach (2011). They usually feature
perfect credit markets on banks’ liability side. My Industrial Organization set up can be seen as a way to
microfound the imperfect credit line, which breaks at a random Poisson random time, in He and Xiong (2012b).
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of illiquid collateral. He focuses on the dynamics conditional on the default, whereas I
analyze the ex ante choice of leverage under imperfect competition. Brunnermeier and
Pedersen (2008) develops a theory of margin spirals based on the feedback loop between
market liquidity and funding liquidity, based on asymmetric information. Their mechanism
relies on margins set by Value-at-Risk constraints and information extraction for volatility
estimates. In my paper, the collateralized debt contract is an optimal contract between
heterogeneous agents.7
Dynamic models of capital structure traditionally take the size of the balance sheet
as exogenous in order to analyze the debt-equity tradeoff.8 On the contrary, I take the
level of net worth (equity) as given and analyze the optimal size of the balance sheet of
financial intermediaries. In the dynamic version of the model, the balance sheet size is a
control variable and equity is the state variable, i.e. the reverse of traditional models of
optimal capital structure. Overall, the present model seems more relevant to analyze the
dynamics of leverage of financial institutions whose choice variable is the size of the balance
sheet, whereas traditional models of endogenous capital structure seem more relevant for
non-financial firms. Finally, the theoretical model developed here implies that high franchise
values take on more risk and leverage. This is the reverse of the traditional literature on
charter value and reputation building, e.g. Stiglitz and Weiss (1983), Diamond (1989), Keeley
(1990), Hellmann et al. (2000), Allen and Gale (2004) and Carletti et al. (2007). In these
models, as franchise is destroyed in default, strong franchises take on less risk. Similarly,
relationship banking usually hinges on asymmetric information whereas in my model it
arises from imperfect competition among lenders.
In the macroeconomics literature, the lender not only cares about the liquidation value he
can extract from collateral as in corporate finance, but also about the fact that the borrower
cares about the loss of collateral, as in the sovereign debt literature. My model features
7In Brunnermeier and Oehmke (forthcoming)language, the two liquidity spirals, the loss spiral and the
haircut spiral, are jointly determined. This model, in its General Equilibrium version (section 6), provides a
framework to analyze their interaction.
8Following Merton (1974), Leland (1994) and Leland and Toft (1996).
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both aspects of collateral. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012) introduces rollover risk in a macro
model, but features unsecured debt (deposits) and their leverage constraint hinges on an
agency friction (cash diversion). The dynamic model developed in this paper delivers
procyclical leverage, contrary to the state-independent leverage of Kiyotaki and Moore
(1997) and in accordance with empirical evidence of Adrian and Shin (2010).9 Compared
to Adrian and Boyarchenko (2012), I only have one shock that commands both the asset
risk and counterparty risk, and the procyclicality of leverage in my model arises from
the endogeneity of franchise value, whereas in their model it arises from a risk-sensitive
Value-at-risk constraint.
On the empirical side, Gorton and Metrick (2010), Copeland et al. (2010) and Krish-
namurthy et al. (2011) document the behavior of repo markets over the crisis.10 They
focus on the aggregate behavior, whereas I analyze the idiosyncratic component of repo
contracts. Duffie and Ashcraft (2007), Afonso et al. (2011), Kuo et al. (2012), Soramaki et
al. (2010) and Chernenko and Sunderam (2012) analyze funding conditions on unsecured
debt markets. My empirical results complement these studies by showing that idiosyncratic
components are priced in secured debt. Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) demonstrates that
money market funds are heterogeneous in their risk-taking behavior, and that concerns for
sponsors’ franchise mitigate their risk-taking. Their study taken together with the present
one suggests an ambiguous effect of franchise along the intermediation chain: intermediaries
closer to the ultimate borrowers use their franchise to lever up more and take on more risk,
whereas intermediaries closer to the ultimate lenders (households) use their franchise as a
commitment device to take on less risk, and thus mitigating agency frictions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a static model of
endogenous leverage with heterogeneous borrowers. Section 3 extends the model to
a dynamic environment by endogeneizing the franchise value. Section 4 analyzes the
9Acharya and Viswanathan (2011) also delivers procyclical leverage, but with a moral hazard friction.
10Compared to Copeland et al. (2010), my dataset has interest rates information, which turn out to be
instrumental for the test of the relationships theory. Compared to Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), I have more
MMF families (45 against 19) and not exactly the same funds.
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rehypothecation chain. Section 5 turns to the empirical analysis and tests the three key
predictions of the model. Section 6 sketches the normative implications and concludes.
2.2 The static model
The goal of this section is to develop a model of repo markets with endogenous prices and
quantities of debt contracts, when there are multiple heterogeneous borrowers that can differ
whether through their beliefs or through their reputation. There are 3 periods: t = 0, 1, 2.
2.2.1 Environment
Agents The economy is populated by two types of agents: there is a discrete number
I of type-B agents and a discrete number J of type-L agents. There is one risky asset:
investing in one unit of the asset costs p at t = 0 and yields a stochastic payoff s 2 S at
t = 1.11 The type-B agents are risk-neutral optimists, each endowed with net worth nB. Their
prior distribution of beliefs on the dividend is of density fB(s) and cumulative distribution
function FB(s). The type-L agents are risk-neutral pessimists, each endowed with net worth
nL. Their prior beliefs are noted fL(s) for the density and FL(s) their cumulative distribution
function. The type-L agents are pessimists in the sense that EL [s] < EB [s].12 I define
the subjective expected returns µB and µL by: EB [s] = p(1+ µB) and EL [s] = p(1+ µL).
Following Simsek (2013), I impose the following parameter restriction on the nature of
beliefs heterogeneity.13






11p is first taken exogenous (perfectly elastic supply). The asset price is endogenized in the General
Equilibrium of section 2.3.
12This beliefs heterogeneity creates a rationale for contracting between the two types of agents. It a state-
dependent utility heterogeneity, isomorphic to heterogeneity in risk aversion when there is only one asset. All
theoretical results therefore transpose to heterogeneity in risk aversion.
13Only under this assumption, the debt contract traded in equilibrium is risky. The interest rate on the
contract is then non-zero as a credit spread, and this enables to carry out the comparative statics on rates.
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Assumption 1 states that optimists are even more optimistic compared to pessimists for
high states of nature. Although most results hold under the general property of Assumption

















µL < µB (Figure 2.3). Such beliefs are tractable and allows for elegant comparative statics
with respect to collateral volatility s.


































Figure 2.3: Heterogeneous beliefs satisfying the hazard rate property.
Financial contracts I restrict the contracting set to collateralized debt: repo contracts. A
repo contract is a non-state-contingent promise to pay s¯ at t = 2, made by the seller of the
contract (the borrower) to its buyer (the lender). This contract is secured, in the sense that if
the borrower does not honor its promise to pay back s¯, the lender can push him into default.
He then recovers a pre-specified amount of the borrower portfolio in the risky asset. Thus a
repo contract has three terms to contract upon: the promise s¯, the amount of cash D that is
lent at t = 0 by the seller to the buyer, and the amount of collateral. By linearity, we can
normalize the contracting set to consider that all the repo contracts are collateralized by one
unit of the risky asset. The two contract terms {s¯,D} are isomorphic to the two observables
prices defined below.
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Definition 2. The repo spread is: r = s¯ DD and the haircut on the risky asset is: m =
p D
p .
The interest rate r on the contract captures the credit spread. Reciprocally, the value D
of the contract can be written: D = (1 m) p and the promise: s¯ = (1+ r) (1 m) p. Given
there is only one risky asset, the haircut m also captures leverage and credit supply.
Timeline The key feature of the model relies in the ability of all agents to pledge long-run
revenues at anytime, but at a non attractive interest rate. Although agents will never use
this possibility at t = 0, they will at t = 1 in some states in order to avoid default and save
the remainder of their long-run revenues. The reputation of an agent is encoded in its ability
to pledge long-term cash flows.14 The exact timing is as follows and is illustrated on Figure
2.4.
• At t = 0, agents write repo contracts among themselves. Each pair of agents (i, j) 2




: a rate, a










are determined jointly through multilateral Nash bargaining.
• At t = 1, the asset shock s realizes and is observed by all agents. Agents i that face
Âj2J xijs < Âj2J xij s¯ij are in situation of distress. In this interim period, any agent can
decide to pledge its long-run revenues VBi , albeit at an exogenous (high) rate r⇤. I
define b = 11+r⇤ .
• At t = 2, contracts are settled, agents receive the share of long-revenues that have not
been pledged at t = 1, and consume.
14It can also be thought as the Present Discounted Value of cash-flow generating divisions of the borrower
which are not levered but heavily relies on the strength of the franchise value, such as M&A advisory. It can
also be thought as the ability to rollover in states of nature.
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Figure 2.4: Timeline of the static model.
2.2.2 Equilibrium with deep pocket lenders
If the number J of lenders is large and deep pockets (J nL >> I nB), they Bertrand-compete
away any surplus for them. This is equivalent to granting full bargaining to the borrowers.
Default decision At t = 1, borrowers have the option whether to default or to pledge part
of their long-run revenues VBi at the rate r⇤. This partitions the states into three regions:
• If Âj2J xij s¯ijÂj2J xij < s, the agent i does not default.
• If Âj2J xij s¯ijÂj2J xij   bVBi 1Âj2J xij < s <
Âj2J xij s¯ij
Âj2J xij
, the agent pledges a part of its long-revenus
and stays afloat.
• If s < Âj2J xij s¯ijÂj2J xij   bVBi 1Âj2J xij , the agent is forced into default.







  bVBi 1Âj2J xij the effective default threshold (’riskiness’
of the contract), and
h
s˜; Âj2J xij s¯ijÂj2J xij
i
the light-distress region. In this region, the borrower is
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under water but can still survive thanks to the strength of its franchise value VBi . This
allows for a region of the state space where the borrower has negative net worth at t = 1.
This does not trigger default as the borrower is in effect able to run a simili-Ponzi scheme
thanks to its franchise value.15
Figure 2.5: Payoff profile of the lender with borrower franchise. value
A key assumption is that VB cannot be seized by the lenders in the states of borrower’s
default. In practice, repurchase agreement contracts are exempt from the automatic stay
thanks to the safe harbor provision,16 but they usually also are recourse: after having seized
the collateral, the lender possesses an unsecured claim to the counterparty. I assume that
the value of this recourse claim is zero:17 the recourse feature does not imply any additional
15This Ponzi-scheme arises rationally in equilibrium as there is a positive probability of recovery. It can be
seen as the symmetric counterpart of rational bubbles of Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003).
16See for instance the bankruptcy court decision reported in Schweitzer et al. (2008).
17This assumption follows Geanakoplos (1997), making repo contracts non-recourse. The effect of reputation
analyzed in this paper are robust to the recourse feature of repo contract (i.e. assuming that lenders have access
to the rest of the balance sheet of the borrower beyond the pre-specified collateral in case of default), as long as
they cannot seize all of it. See for instance Khan (2010). Such treatment of repo as been applied in the case of
Lehman bankruptcy, see Valukas (2012).
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recovery for the lender, and VBi evaporates as soon as the borrower enters bankruptcy. The
payoff profile of the lender under a repo contract with respect to the realization of the
collateral is illustrated in Figure 2.5.
The following definition will prove useful in the derivations and for the economic
interpretation. The wedge in the valuation of the put underpins the rationale for contracting
between borrowers and lenders.
Definition 3. The valuations of the limited liability put with strike s˜, respectively by the














Expected payoffs at t = 0 The expected utility of any borrower is the levered gains from
the carry trade between investing and its borrowing costs. The franchise value introduces a
concern to preserve this franchise value, which works as a continuation term. The expected














xijmij p  nB
If the borrower does not contract at all, it does not lever up and invests only its net worth







On the other hand, lenders expected utility are the returns on its portfolio of repo
contracts and direct investment in the asset. The expected utility of the lender in the






















Under the assumption that lenders are extracting no surplus from the contracting, the
following equality holds: ULI,J = U
L
0 . This implicitly defines a contract curve, plotted on
Figure 2.6 in the haircut-rate space.



















Figure 2.6: Rate (y axis) - Haircut (x axis) contract curve.
Equilibrium repo contract The equilibrium is then solved by the program 2.1 of the
borrowers, taking the contract curve as a constraint. Its first-order condition leads to the
following lemma.














p  ´ s˜smin s fLds  s˜ (1  FL)
⌘2









The effects of franchise VBi on the equilibrium are all embedded in one term. The
environment features a unique and interior solution for the optimal contract thanks to the
continuum of states s, as in Simsek (2013).18 Proposition 1 then follows easily from the
comparative statics.
Proposition 8. Franchise Value Collateral. Under Assumption 1, haircuts and rates covary
positively in the cross-section of borrowers. A higher franchise secures both lower haircuts and lower
rates.
Proof. Appendix proves that higher franchise VBi leads to: higher promise ∂VB s¯ > 0, lower
haircuts ∂VBm < 0, lower riskiness ∂VB s˜ < 0 and lower rates ∂VBr < 0.
It is easy to see that such property cannot be obtained in any model where borrowers
heterogeneity is about collateral, such as beliefs heterogeneity or risk aversion heterogeneity
among borrowers. Indeed, in the latter case, all borrowers face the same contract curve 2.2,
which is univocally downward sloping. On the contrary, Proposition 1 can be interpreted as
Franchise Value being used as intangible collateral in repo borrowing. When endowed with
franchise, the borrower is incentivized to lever up more. Despite higher leverage, Proposition
1 shows that refinancing terms are cheaper for the borrower with higher franchise.
An examination of the first-order condition 2.3 convinces that the effect of franchise on
haircuts and rates is amplified when beliefs disagreement between borrowers and lenders is
higher, and when the collateral is more volatile.
Corollary 5. Franchise value matters more when collateral is more volatile and when beliefs
disagreement is larger.
18On the contrary, in Geanakoplos (2009) and He and Xiong (2012a), the borrower program has a knife-edge
structure, as their value function is monotonic with respect to the promise s¯.
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∂(µB µL) > 0 and
∂|∂VB r|
∂(µB µL) > 0.
This corollary informs us that it is precisely in times of distress and on volatile collateral
that there is more chance of idiosyncratic dispersion in repo prices. The intangible fran-
chise value collateral depends on the volatility of the underlying asset s. Recall that the
equilibrium haircut comes from the wedge in the perceived values of the put option, and
this wedge increase with the volatility of collateral. As a result, haircuts increase with the
collateral volatility. The cross-partial is more interesting, as it is a form of volatility paradox.
As the asset becomes more volatile from the lender’s viewpoint, he values tangible collateral
less relative to the franchise values of the borrower. As a result, the franchise value collateral
channel is magnified, to an extent that can make optimal leverage actually higher with more
volatile collateral.








  ⇣s˜+ (1  Fd(s˜))VB   pd(s˜)⌘
A Taylor expansion in the franchise obtains a closed-form solution of the haircut as a



































This closed-form solution exhibits the different determinants of the equilibrium haircut:
the first term smin is the safe component (present in Geanakoplos (2003)), the second is
risky debt coming from the wedge in the limited liability put valuation (present in Simsek
(2013)). The third new term consists in a direct effect of VB on m from more promise s¯, and
an indirect effect from lower riskiness s˜. In the appendix I show that the first direct effect
dominates. When VB 7! •, debt becomes essentially risk-free (sde f = 0) as in Geanakoplos
(2003). When VB 7! 0, m tends to the equilibrium margin with no franchise value as in
Simsek (2013).
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(p(1+ µd)  s˜  (1  Fd(s˜))VB + pd(s˜))
  1
As can be seen from the expression of the rate as a function of s˜, there are two distinct
effects from VB on r. The promise s¯ = s˜ + bVBi 1Âj2J xij is higher, but D is also higher.
Proposition 1 showed ∂s˜
∂VB < 0 and
∂s¯
∂VB > 0. This means that starting from a situation where
VB = 0, increasing VB de-links s˜ from s¯, in such a way that the riskiness s˜ decreases and the
promise s¯ increases.
The second corollary is concerned with the convexity of the mapping m(VB), a key
element of the procyclical leverage result of the dynamic model below.




This proposition implies that the franchise value collateral channel is more sensitive to
innovation on franchise when franchise is already low. When franchise value VB is high,
the equilibrium margin is low and stable, as most of the lending is done against VB and
not against the risky collateral. When franchise value is low, the margin abruptly adjusts to
high levels, with the limit of the upper bound m (0).
2.2.3 Equilibrium with limited lending wealth
I now turn to the general case in which lenders have limited wealth, and show that the main
result of positive comovement of haircuts and rates still holds. This relaxation is interesting
because Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) has empirically shown that the cross-section of
money market funds as lenders is highly heterogeneous in their risk attitude. I characterize
in this section the equilibrium matching between borrowers with heterogeneous franchise
and lenders with heterogeneous pessimism.
In the matching equilibrium, there is not Bertrand competition among the lenders, and
the multilateral Nash bargaining is non degenerate. In that case, contractual externalities
arise from the co-existence of multiple repo contracts.
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Market structure: Multilateral Nash Bargaining at t = 0 As observed in the data, repo
contracts are highly non-exclusive: in equilibrium, a borrower will contract with several
lenders and, reciprocally, a lender will contract with several borrowers.19 The I optimists
and J pessimists are allowed to write repo contracts with any other agent in the economy,
and can hold multiple contracts at the same time. The borrower agrees with each lender j
on a short-term repo contract, which specifies a value Dj, an interest rate rj and a haircut mj.
Denote X the set of repo contracts. The set of contracts can be represented as a Cartesian
product X = I ⇥ J ⇥ K. For x 2 X, x(i) is the identity of the borrower, x(j) is the identity
of the lender and x(k) are the terms of the bilateral contract: x(k) = {m, r, colclass, T}
where m is the haircut, r is the interest rate, colclass is the type of collateral and T is the
maturity. I assume for now segmented markets in colclass and a unique maturity (overnight),
so x(k) = {m, r}. An allocation is a collection of contracts derived as an outcome of the
multilateral Nash bargaining. The equilibrium concept is as follows.
Definition 4. An allocation is an equilibrium if it is pairwise stable, i.e. if it is not pairwise
blocked by any pair of agents. Pairwise blocking consists in a borrower and a lender that
would like to add a new joint contract or replace a previous joint contract while not canceling
other contracts.
This equilibrium concept draws from Stole and Zwiebel (1996) and the matching lit-
erature.20 The existence of a non-degenerate equilibrium stems from the contractual ex-
ternalities imposed by borrowers’ aggregate collateral constraints: each lender of a given
borrower shares the same collateral constraint. In an equilibrium allocation, the surplus
19This model aims at capturing the decentralized nature of money markets such as repo markets. This also
relaxes the matching structure of the intermediation market of He and Krishnamurthy (2012b), where matches
are identical and exogenously broken at t+ dt. It can also be seen as microfounding the imperfection of capital
markets used by He and Xiong (2012b), which is that borrowers ’have’ to rely on a continuum of small creditors.
In my static model, borrowers endogenously choose to diversify their creditor structure, and this comes from
the endogeneity of the borrowing rate. The multilateral Nash bargaining modelled here captures the pricing of
rollover risk in the borrowing rate, a possibility mentioned in their footnote 10.
20The repo market is modelled here as a two-sided many-to-many matching market with contracts, which
combines matching and contracting (see Roth (1984), Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) and Klaus and Walzl (2009)).
With beliefs heterogeneity and contractual externalities from the collateral constraint, there is a breakdown of
full substitutability. This way to model the intermediation market differs from He and Krishnamurthy (2012b)
where intermediation features a Walrasian equilibrium for risk exposure (equity).
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of the pairwise bilateral relationship is equal to its Shapley value in the corresponding
cooperative game.
Si,j = SI,J = UBI,J  UBI,J 1 +ULI,J  ULI 1,J
Following Stole and Zwiebel (1996), I assume Nash bargaining with the bilateral rela-









As benchmark, I first characterize the unique symmetric stable allocation and the optimal
contract implementing it. Under this allocation, all possible bilateral relationships (i, j) enter
in one contract and each contract feature the same terms x(k). An equilibrium with small
J can be referred as concentrated financing, whereas an equilibrium with large J can be
referred as dispersed financing.
Lemma 11. The expected values of the relationship under any contract (m, r) for the borrower and
for the lender:
































The expression for the borrowers’ expected value tells us that the franchise value has
three distinct direct effects. First, it relaxes the default constraint and as such lowers the
value of the long put held by the borrower (lower pB(s˜)). Second, this is counterbalanced by
the states of nature where the borrower does not have to pay back this additional promise
VB: 1mpV
BFB(s˜). Third, the traditional care about the franchise value also makes expected
utility decrease with franchise:  bVBFB(s˜). These direct effects should make the franchise
imply a lower optimal choice of leverage. This is without taking into account the indirect
effect of franchise through the price of the loan r(m), i.e. the contract curve.
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d is a measure of the effective bargaining power of the lenders: it is increasing in the
bilateral bargaining power w and it is increasing in the lender intensity J/I. Subsequently,
define a weighted average beliefs where each agent is weighted by its effective bargaining
power.
Definition 5. The beliefs Fd are the average beliefs, weighted by d: Fd ⇠ (1  d)FL + dFB




with µd = (1  d)µL + dµB.
The beliefs d and B still satisfy the hazard rate order property, in the same order as L and B.
Lemma 12. The Nash bargaining implies a rate-haircut contract curve:












1 m [SI,J 1   SI 1,J ]
The contract curve tells that the rate is the sum of two components: the weighted-average
of the agents’ means, weighted by their respective bargaining powers, and the weighted-
average of the agents’ perceived values of the limited liability put. The mapping r(m) is
decreasing, which is intuitive: as the borrower picks lower haircuts, the loan becomes riskier,
and this commands higher interest rates in order to compensate the lender for the credit risk.
As in the case with deep picket investors, a higher franchise value shifts the correspondence
leftwards.
Equilibrium The equilibrium can be expressed as follows. At t = 0, the borrower chooses a
haircut m, and thus a size of its balance sheet x (leverage) taking into account the bargaining
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The borrower leverage x, counted as units of risky asset purchased, is the sum of the
J˜ ’micro-leverages’ xj, which is, the number of units of risky assets that can be purchased
on margin through each repo contract j: x = Â
j2 J˜
xj. Rewriting the program with only the































(1  d)PL + dPB
i
 w(1 w) m
1 m [SI,J 1   SI 1,J ]
This program is convex thanks to Assumption 1, and the equilibrium can be solved by
induction on the number of borrowers and lenders. The optimal contract is determined as
a function of the endogenous outside options SI,J 1 and SI 1,J . I formulate the induction
hypotheses: UBI,J 1   UB0 = (1  w)nBSI,J 1 and ULI 1,J   UL0 = wnBSI 1,J . Endogenous

























where the ratio R
IJ(s˜)
RdU(s˜) is greater than 1 and equal to:









({p(1+µB)  IJ p(1+µL)(1 m)} {(1  IJ )(s˜+VB)}+{(FB(s˜)  IJ FL(s˜))VB}+{pB(s˜)  IJpL(s˜)})
p(1+µd) (s˜+VB)+Fd(s˜)VB+pd(s˜)
The closed form solution for the equilibrium haircut is also derived by induction, and
is graphed on Figure 2.7. As in Lemma 1, the characterization of the equilibrium can be
characterized by one first-order condition.
Figure 2.7: Multilateral Nash bargaining: expected levered returns and welfare, as function of the number of
borrowers I and numbers of lenders J.
Lemma 13. The optimal contract in the I-J equilibrium is unique and characterized by riskiness s˜:















1{no de f } (s  s¯)
i⌘2
Lemma 4 characterizes the riskiness of the loans as a function of the primitives of
the model: 0 = F
 
s˜; µd, µB, s,VB, p, µd barg, b
 
. Intuitively, the borrower picks the optimal
promise trading off the gains from levering up with the borrowing costs increasing with
the riskiness. Not only the beliefs about the collateral matter, but also the franchise value
VB and the bargaining structure: the lenders’ ability to extract surplus (d) and the outside
options SI,J 1 and SI 1,J . The next corollary shows that the main result, stated in Proposition
1, is robust to the general case of limited lenders net wealth and lenders heterogeneity.
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Corollary 7. Under multiple Nash bargaining, the Proposition 1 result of positive comovement of
haircuts and rates in the cross-section of borrowers still holds.
Furthermore, the more general environment considered here enables to characterize
the equilibrium matching between borrowers of heterogeneous reputation and lenders of
heterogeneous risk attitude.
Corollary 8. Lenders reach-for-yield: in equilibrium, less pessimistic lenders pick lower haircuts
and higher rates.





< 0 and ∂r
∂µL
> 0. For (1  d) µB µds > 1: ∂s˜∂µL < 0, ∂m∂µL < 0 and ∂r∂µL < 0.
The effect of beliefs disagreement is measured by µB   µL. The relative pessimism of the
lenders about the asset can be interpreted as their ability to actually seize the collateral in
states of nature in which the borrower defaults. A very pessimist lender will ask for higher
promise ceteris paribus, and the promise is more dependent on the franchise value in this
case. At the same time, a very pessimist lender overestimates the probability of default
according to the borrower, which makes the borrower less wary of loosing his continuation
value, thereby mitigating the fear of default. This makes the optimal leverage less dependent
on the franchise value VB. This proposition shows that a borrower will be able to lever
up even more when the lender does not have the capacity to seize the collateral efficiently.
Indeed in this case the lender values much more the promise s¯ in states of no default than
the actual collateral in states of default (franchise value collateral is more important). In
the tri-party repo market µB   µL is higher (more disagreement about the asset) than in the
bilateral repo market, so the franchise value collateral channel matters more in the tri-party
repo market. This intangible collateral channel, through which the franchise value of the
borrower backs the promise of the borrower and enables to achieve lower haircuts (higher
leverage), is magnified when beliefs disagreement is high.22
22This is equivalent to analyze the pricing of the contract with respect to the respective marginal utilities.
When one agent’s beliefs is steeper, this agent’s marginal utility will be more responsive to the aggregate shock,
and as a result will be in less favorable effective bargaining power position against the other agent type.
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Finally, the last corollary demonstrates the impact of imperfect competition among
lenders on the equilibrium haircuts and rates, and on the franchise value collateral channel.
Corollary 9. Imperfect competition among lenders temper leverage, but at the same time makes the
Franchise Value channel more pivotal.













Recall that d captures the effect of imperfect competition among lenders: the higher d is,
the lesser competition there is among lenders. Intuitively, as the competition among lenders
becomes more imperfect (I/J higher) d increases, so the compound beliefs Fd become
closer to FB. As a result, beliefs heterogeneity about the tangible collateral matters less
than franchise value. From the borrower standpoint, having a dispersed creditor structure
enhances its effective bargaining power. A surprising feature of the equilibrium haircut is
that it depends on the bargaining structure of the credit market: the haircut equilibrium
haircut depends on the number I of borrowers and the number J of lenders. As a result, the
total leverage and credit supply in this economy is hindered when the number of lenders
J is small. This is counterintuive, as one might suppose that the total surplus does not
depend on the number of lenders. The wedge arises from the fact that the promise s¯ does
not have the same dependence to m when varying I and J. In economic terms, it is because
the difference of valuation in the borrower put option is spread out between the two lenders,
enabling the borrower to lever up more. The static model captures a type of diversification
benefit from having a dispersed financing. With concentrated financing, the contractual
externalities between borrowers are exacerbated.23
2.2.4 General Equilibrium
I explore here the asset pricing implications of the credit market microstructure. The t = 0
price p of the risky asset is endogeneized by relaxing its perfectly elastic supply. Assume
23Even more so with capacity constraints on lenders, in accordance with concentration limits faced by money
market funds.
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now that its supply is fixed, normalized at 1. Combining the optimality conditions arising
from the above multilateral Nash bargaining and the risky asset market clearing yields the
equilibrium.





contracts, each specifying a number of units, a haircut and a rate, and a t = 0 price p for the
risky asset, such that:
i) the outcome of the Nash bargaining among the I borrowers and the J lenders is
pairwise stable;
ii) the Walrasian market at t = 0 for the risky asset clears: Âi Âj xij = 1.
In general equilibrium, two countervailing forces are at play for the effect of franchise
on haircuts and rates. The partial equilibrium effect of Proposition 1 is still present: higher
franchise imply lower haircuts and rates. However, lower haircuts imply higher leverage,
hence higher demand in the risky asset market. When the latter is in fixed supply the only
margin of adjustment is an inflated asset price p. This in turn tempers leverage, as it makes
it deteriorates the expected levered returns of optimists. Finally, Proposition 1 still holds.
Only the magnitude of the cross-sectional dispersion is weakened.
Corollary 10. Proposition 1 is robust to the General Equilibrium.





It implies that the distribution of franchises VBi is priced in the risky asset through a
parsimonious sufficient statistics, the average haircut m¯. Its effect is graphed on Figure 2.8
and shows that a distribution skewed towards high franchises props up the asset price p.
























asset market clearing VB=0
asset market clearing VB=0.6
Figure 2.8: General equilibrium with franchise value.
In the cross-section of assets, this leads to an endogenous-margin CAPM. With a discrete





introduces the correlation between assets. I write mk and
rk(mk) as the haircuts and repo rates secured by asset k. There is no risk free asset.
Corollary 11. Endogenous-margin CAPM: the franchise distribution correlates asset prices.
The result is not a priori straightforward, as all agents are risk neutrals, hence the




act as pricing kernels, and the more





  rk(mk) = ak + bkVB
with bk =
mkFL(s˜)





k fL(u)du. It is a generalization of the Ashcraft,
Garleanu and Pedersen (2010) margin-CAPM, by endogeneizing the margins and the risk
free rate, and highlight borrowers franchise values as key pricing kernels.25 The key asset
25Jurek and Stafford (2010) also prices the cross-section of assets in presence of collateralized lending. They
feature risk-aversion but leverage and the haircuts are exogenous in their set up.
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pricing prediction of the model is that asset correlation is higher when franchise values of
financial intermediaries are high. This property is consistent with Adrian et al. (2012) which
shows the leverage of financial intermediaries, as a single factor, price the cross-section of
assets with a R2 of 0.77. This prediction is contrary to models of fire-sales in which assets
are more correlated in bad times.
2.3 The dynamic model




, taken as exogenous in the
static model. I identify franchise to the continuation value of borrowers in the dynamic
version of the static model. This section derives two results. First, haircuts are countercyclical
with respect to borrowers’ net worth. Although franchise value acts as stabilization in good
times, it becomes an amplification force in bad times. The ability of the borrower to lever up
today depends on its ability to lever up tomorrow, and this feedback loop creates the high
sensitivity of leverage to borrower net worth. Second, this fragility can be mitigated with
long-term contracts.
2.3.1 Dynamic environment
The horizon is infinite and time t, t+ 1, t+ 2, ... is discrete.
Agents The environment is populated by a number I of borrowers and a number J of
lenders, which are all infinitely-lived.26 The economy is endowed with an infinite supply of
Lucas trees, with price p which pay i.i.d dividends at the next period s(t+ 1). Agents have
the same beliefs about this dividend as in the static model.27 At each period, agents invest
26The equilibrium default feature of the model prevents from the need of beliefs switching or of killing
optimists at an exogenous Poisson rate of optimists. The ergodic distribution of wealth is not explosive.
27The countercyclicality of haircuts is robust to the introduction of persistent shocks. Beliefs can then be
written as st+1 = aB + rst + se and st+1 = aL + rst + se, aL < aB (both perceive the AR(1) for the asset but
with different drifts). In the continuous-time representation of the game, the dividend stream follows a random
walk (Brownian motion with drift µi and volatility s). I rule out learning. The fact that lenders do not learn
about the risky asset could be microfounded by a model of rational inattention. Indeed, Dang et al. (2011b)
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and contract through the credit market that has been analyzed in detail in the above section.
At each period they consume a fixed fraction c of their total wealth. This artifact implies that
agents are simply happy to be rich, and allows to avoid to specify a consumption process
for them. Otherwise the borrower would never consume to save its way out of the financing






rk 1{no de f } c nit+k
#
Timeline Each period is broken down in 3 stages, which are the exact same steps as in the
static model. The stage timing is as follows and illustrated in Figure 2.9.
• Stage 0 ’evening’: All the agents enter into multilateral Nash bargaining, and writes
the resulting contracts. A bilateral contract (i, j) is the combination of a repo contract 
xij,mij, rij
 
(i,j)2I⇥J (specifying a number of units, a haircut and a rate), plus an
unsecured long-term promise. The latter is activated only in the equilibrium with
long-term contracts.
• Stage 1 ’night’: The asset shock is realized overnight. Agents i that face Âj2J xijs <
Âj2J xij s¯ij are in situation of distress. During the night, any agent can decide to pledge
its continuation value VBi , albeit at an exogenous (high) rate r⇤. I define b = 11+r⇤ .
• Stage 2 ’morning’: contracts are settled. If agents default, they exit the market with
outside utility Ude f . In case of default, debt holders seize the tangible collateral. If
agents do not default, they settle both the short-term repo contracts (promises s¯ij) and
pay back a fraction of the emergency borrowing if contracted at any prior stage 1. This
reduces the principal balance on the emergency loan. Next they consume a constant
fraction c of the remaining wealth. Before moving on to the next period, agents decide
to stay or not in the long-term bilateral relationships if long-term contracts have been
written at any prior stage 0.
show that under debt and high information acquisition costs, the lender does not learn about the underlying
asset. Under a flexible technology of information acquisition, Yang (2012) shows the robustness of such result.
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Figure 2.9: Timeline of the dynamic model.
2.3.2 Equilibrium with short-term contracts
In a first step, I rule out long-term contracts. No out-of-the-period promises can be made
to lenders; only short-term repo contracts can be written. The policy choices then are the
number of contracts xjt with each lender j, the haircut m
j
t and the promise s¯
j
t in each of these
contracts. The amount of emergency borrowing is also a choice: borrowers decide which
fraction f of their continuation value to pledge against immediate liquidity.
The distress region Denote s¯ the average level of promises contracted at stage 0: s¯ =
Âj2J xij s¯ij
Âj2J xij
. At stage 1 of the dynamic model, any borrower faces the following partition of the
state space:
• If s¯ < s, the agent i does not default.
• If s˜ < s < s¯, the agent pledges an endogenous share f(s) of its continuation value,
and stays afloat.
• If s < s˜, the agent is forced into default.
The state s˜ is an endogenous default barrier that distinguishes the default region from the
grace region (’light distress’). In the distress region, borrowers decide how much f 2 [0; 1] to
pledge of their continuation value. This share is above what is needed to receive the liquidity
that covers exactly the shortfall on short-term promises. Indeed, even the emergency rate
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r⇤ is prohibitive,28 an agent that stays afloat but with zero net worth enjoys zero utility.29
Hence by choosing f, the distressed borrower also picks a level of net worth nB post gracet+1 > 0:








The policy choice f is determined by this fixed point. Given stage 0 contracting, denote
by D(s) the state-contingent cash shortfall on short-term promises (positive in the distress













s = xs¯  xs
This yields an expression of the state-contingent f(s) as a function of nB post gracet+1 :
f(s) =





For s 2 (s˜; s¯):






Taking the value function UB (n), as well the contracts {x, s¯} of stage 0 as given, the
fixed point implicitly defines nB post gracet+1 (s). For instance, if the value function was linear:
UB (n) = qn and q > 1/b (first-order expansion of the value function), then we obtain:
nB post gracet+1 (s) =
1
bf(s)q   1D(s)
Posit that the policy function f is decreasing and interpolates: f(s˜) = 1 and f(s¯) = 0.
The borrower tries to pledge all its continuation value (f = 1) before entering default.
28The emergency rate r⇤ can be thought as exogenous and high, or endogenous and priced by the most
pessimistic lender.
29Given the consumption process is tied to net worth and agents cannot borrow with zero net worth: as the
lenders are all more pessimistic than the optimists, there is no equilibrium in which a pessimist agree to lend to
a borrower with zero net worth.
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Straightforward algebra on the fixed point yields to:






bq s¯ ss¯ s˜   1
#
We see that this mapping with respect to s increases from nB post gracet+1 (s˜) = x
(s¯ s˜)
bq 1 to the
point at which s = s¯  1bq (s¯  s˜), before reverting monoticity. By value matching at state s˜







bq   1 = U
de f
This boundary condition characterizes the threshold s˜ between the default region and
the grace region:
s˜ = s¯ Ude f bq   1
qx
The default boundary at stage 1 involves not only the value function q, but also the
contracts {x, s¯} written at stage 0.
Recursive formulation The environment has a recursive structure with one state variable:





. Borrowers’ value functions then satisfy the following
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Bellman equation:
UB(nBt ) = Max{xt,mt,s¯t,ft(s)}
EB
h












xijmij p  nB



















In the stationary Markov equilibrium, the optimal short-term repo contracts picked
by borrowers can be characterized by their riskiness s˜ as sufficient statistics. The latter is
uniquely determined by the following lemma.
Lemma 14. The optimal repo contracts picked are characterized by their riskiness s˜, which satisfies:

























This first order condition implicitly defines the riskiness s˜ of the optimal contract:
0 = Fdyn
 
s˜; µd, µB, s,VB, p, µd barg, b
 
The first two terms of the first-order condition are identical to the static model. The third
new term arises from the endogeneity of the franchise value in the dynamic environment.
VB is not constant anymore, and the borrower takes into account the impact of s¯ on the
state-contingent VB(nBt+1). The term brings in two effects: one is concern about long-term
continuation, which tempers leverage. The other one is franchise value collateral, which
incentivizes higher leverage. The value function VB is the fixed point solution of the
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recursive equilibrium, taking into account two intertemporal interlinkages: the law of
motion of wealth, and the franchise value collateral channel.
Compared to the traditional dynamic models of the capital structure,30 this model
features a grace region in the dividend space S. When the realization of the dividend s is
such as s 2 (s˜s¯,VB ; s¯), the borrower is able not to default. The borrower then has negative net





The value function is not exactly linear, as the riskiness of the contract depends on the
scale of investment x: s˜ = s¯ Ude f bq 1qx . However this concavity tends asymptotically to
linearity as x gets larger and the grace region shrinks to zero measure. The value function is
solved on Figure 2.10. The concavity of the franchise value VB(n) results in the fragility of
the franchise value collateral channel exhibited in the static model. At low levels of borrower
net worth, franchise value evaporates. The intuition for the concavity of the value function
with respect to net worth is as follows. The first-order effect is linear in net worth, as in
macro models with financial frictions31. In my model, there is an additional role of the value
function, which is to relax the default threshold, thus enhancing the debt capacity of the
borrower. This feedback loop from rollover ability on the value function is magnified at low
levels of net worth and breaks the linearity.
Compounding the concavity of the value function with respect to net worth and the
concavity of haircuts with respect to franchise yields the second result of the paper: haircuts
are countercyclical with respect to net worth if and only if there is a franchise value channel.
Proposition 9. Countercyclical haircuts and rates.
When b = 0 (no franchise value channel), haircuts and rates are procyclical.
When b > 0 (existence of a franchise value channel), haircuts and rates are countercyclical.
30Such as Bolton et al. (forthcoming).
31E.g. Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2012).
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Endogenous Franchise Value w.r.t. nB
nB
VB
Parameter choice: b = 0.85, s = 0.25, µB = 1.5, µL = 0.5.
Figure 2.10: Endogenous franchise value VB.
The proposition is illustrated on Figure 2.11. Countercyclical haircuts imply a procyclical
leverage.32 It needs the concavity of the franchise value in order to counteract the direct
effect of low net worth: a greater incentive to lever up. The countervailing force is that, at
low levels of net worth, the haircut adjust upwards to their no-franchise value levels. For
low borrower wealth levels, we have:
m(nB
( )









Furthermore, a consequence of the concavity of the value function with respect to net
worth and of the convexity of haircuts to franchise is fragility of leverage: haircuts are convex
with respect to net worth ( ∂
2m
∂(nB)2
> 0). This demonstrates that at high levels of net worth,
32The literature sometimes refers to procyclicality of leverage as with respect to xt instead of nBt . This
mechanism of leverage procyclicality is alternative to the ’scary bad news’ mechanism of Geanakoplos (2009)
and Cao (2011), which relies on an uncertainty shock on the collateral. Their shock is collateral-specific whereas
my mechanism goes through borrower net worth and is institution-specific.
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Optimal haircut w.r.t. nB
nB
m








Optimal rate w.r.t. nB
nB
r
Figure 2.11: Optimal haircut m and rate r with endogenous franchise value.
haircuts are low and stable, whereas at low levels of net worth, haircuts are high and





is very high. It is not a run, it is a progressive
depleting of the borrower debt capacity, which can be very steep when nB gets closer to
zero. It looks like a run on volumes, but it is actually an abrupt adjustment on prices.
2.3.3 Equilibrium with long-term contracts
The existence of a bargaining friction brings a rationale for bilateral long-term contracting.33
I solve here for the optimal long-term contract, and show how long-term contracting helps
mitigating the countercyclicality of haircuts. I also show that dispersed financing (i.e. J/I
high) undermines this optimal contract.34
I now allow the borrowers to choose between a long-term contract with the lender j
(relationship repo), or staying out of any long-term relationship (arm’s length repo). In the
latter case, he contracts at each period short-term repo contracts. If the borrower enters a
33The bargaining friction breaks the Fudenberg, Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) irrelevance result of long-
term contracts. Without commitment, long-term contracting would still improve over the sequence of short-term
contracts in an environment of costly search for counterparties. I leave this set up for future research.
34As a consequence, an optimal number of creditors J trades off the benefits of diversification with the costs
of dispersed financing due to the inability to promise future continuation value to the lender in this case. It can
be seen as a Jacklin (1987) critique: more competition among lenders hurts the optimal contract and leverage.
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long-term contract, he is able to compensate the lender with promised continuation value
VL+1. This additional instrument enables him to secure lower and more stable haircuts and
rates. In the timing of the game, only stage 0 is modified as follows.
• Stage 0, ’evening’: The borrower decides between entering a long-term contract (rela-
tionship repo) or staying out. In the former case, the borrower and the lender bargain
on the split of the total relationship surplus between the borrower (VB) and the
lender (VL). This long-term agreement is implemented by a sequence of a short-term
(overnight) repo contracts, which specifies a notional D (notional value of debt), an
interest rate r and a haircut m, and state-contingent promised continuation values
VLt+1(s). If she decides to stay out, the borrower bargains over short-term contracts as
in the static model.35
The continuation values of both the borrower and the lender are state-contingent in the
long-term contract. As a result, this contracting problem can be seen as an intermediary
case between Kocherlakota (1996) (two-sided lack of commitment with autarky as outside
options, under complete markets) and Geanakoplos (2003) (one-side lack of commitment
with zero as outside option, under incomplete markets).36 My set up features equilibrium
default even under the optimal contract.
35In the extension without commitment, the lender decides to break up the relationship, it searches for a new
borrower match, forming expectations about this franchise value with a mean-field approximation, as franchise













. This raises the issue of more sophisticated contracts in which the borrower whishes to signal the
quality of its balance sheet. In this extension, heterogeneity in lenders information regarding franchise value
explains flights to safety as observed in summer 2011 against European banks. With endogenous information
acquisition, the optimal long-term relational contract might then want to prevent information acquisition
about collateral but foster information acquisition about franchise value (it would be win-win for both parties).
A search cost q = q(J/I), an increasing function of the ratio J/I, would be a reduced-form to capture the
bargaining process outside the relationship. J/I is a measure of the tightness of money markets. When J >> I,
there are many more lenders J than borrowers I, and therefore the search cost of finding a free borrower is very
high. Due to the presence of multiple equilibria, the surplus of a new relationship should take into account the
probability of sunspot run on the new borrower. This would deteriorate the outside option of the lender, and as
a result strengthens the result of lower haircuts thanks to long-term relationships.
36The haircut is another price variable for collateralized debt compared to uncollateralized debt. So if this
haircut is made state-contingent, it helps completing the markets. The fact that the borrower has two choice
variables(repo spread rt and haircut mt) in effect completes markets and partially overcomes the non-state
contingency of overnight short-term debt contracts.
141










































I focus on stationary Markov equilibria.37 In this case, following Abreu et al. (1990) and
Abreu and Pearce (2007),38 I can use the continuation value of the lender VLt as an additional
state variable and write the borrowers’ maximization program in a recursive formulation:
VB(nBt ,V
L
t ) = Max{xt,mt,s¯t,ft(s)}
EB
h
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The continuation value is equal to the promised utility VLI,J,t+1 if the borrower does
not default, and to VLI 1,J,t+1 if the borrower defaults after seizing collateral. The borrower
designs his optimal long-term contract taking the outside option of the lenders as given. The
37Thus I rule out more complicated strategies, where some borrowers might ask the lender what the terms
of the contract proposed to him by the other borrowers. I also rule out cooperation among borrowers, which
could punish lenders that break up with even lower bargaining power at the start of new relationship.
38An alternative would be Marcet and Marimon (2011), where the dynamics of co-state variables give insights
on the tightness of the constraint.
142
equilibrium optimal contract is then the fixed point on this outside option. The borrower
has now a third instrument, beyond the promise s¯t and the leverage xt: the state-contingent
long-term promise VL+1(s). The optimization of this policy variable involves the following
trade-off. On the one hand, promising more VL+1(s) enables the borrower to lever up today
at no cost. On the other hand, it diminishes the share of the surplus the borrower can enjoy
inside the relationship tomorrow, as ∂VLVB < 0, as shown in the simulation in Figure 2.12,
Panel A. As long as:
rEL
h
1{no de f }
⇣
1{stays}VLt+1 + 1{quits}VL outt+1
⌘
+ 1{de f }VL outt+1
i
> VLt
then the borrower is able to lever up more than in the case without long-term relationships:
DLT > DST.
Lemma 15. The f.o.c. of the optimal short-term riskiness in presence of long-term contracts is:










































The optimal long-term contract substitutes continuation value for haircuts ( ∂m
∂VLI,J,t+1(s)
< 0).
The interpretation is that both VB and VL are supporting the promise s¯ (intangible collateral).
The relationship value VL helps mitigating the countercyclicality of VB compared to the
equilibrium with only short-term contracts.
Proposition 10. Stability of leverage in long-term relationships.
Leverage under the long-term contract is less volatile than in the sequence of short-term contracts.
Proof. Appendix derives 0 < ∂nB s˜LT < ∂nB s˜ST.
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Endogenous Franchise Value w.r.t. VL
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Low Promised Utility VL
High Promised Utility VL
Figure 2.12: Endogenous franchise value with long-term relationships.
144
In long-term relationships, the continuation value is used as a haircut waiver, and as
a result repo funding is more stable in volumes and in prices (i.e. haircuts and rates). It
avoids margin calls exactly in the states where borrower net worth is low, the states where
he would like to lever up in order to replenish capital. At low levels of net worth, under
short-term contracts, the haircut adjusts abruptly upwards. Under long-term contracts,
there is a surplus gain to grant a haircut waiver to the borrower: the lender is ready to
maintain a low haircut against the promise of more long-term continuation value.39 Indeed,
the concavity and the fragility of VB are mitigated for high levels of promised continuation
value VLt , as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 2.12. The continuation values of the relationship
for both parties in excess of their outside option commands not only the current pricing of
the repo contract, but also the volatility of the relationship to shocks.
A continuous-time version of the environment and the introduction of persistent shocks
enables to derive the following expression for the sensitivity x of the lender continuation
value to asset innovations:






When the mapping VL 7! VB(VL), we obtain that: x < s, where s is the fundamental
volatility of the asset. This can be interpreted as long-term relationships mitigating the
volatility of asset markets. Borrowers then engage in volatility transformation. It is another
justification of financial intermediation: insulate the final lender from the shocks on the
underlying collateral. The intuition for this insurance result is that it is optimal for both
39If we add precautionary motive and occasionally binding collateral constraint, this margin waiver is even
more valuable in the states of the world in which the collateral constraint binds: it economizes on margin spirals.
Moreover, in the framework of Oehmke (2012), waiving a haircut call avoids disorderly liquidation of illiquid
collateral, and as such avoid cost of illiquidity and this is translated in repo spread.
Without commitment and costly search, when the lender is far from its participation constraint, the lender is
more entranched, and so optimal contract features higher endogenous surplus, and this alters policy functions
xt and s¯t. As such it enhances the endogenous franchise value VB and achieve lower margins. Moreover, in this
case, the margin is less responsive. This a result of the dynamics of the relationship a la Thomas and Worrall
(1988): as long as the (IR) do not bind, the optimal contract does not them into account. I conjecture that the
lender will not be willing to quit the contract or renegotiate as in the outside option, due to the newness of
the relationship, the continuation values are not as high and so the haircuts required to the borrower will be
higher than in the current contract. This feature of the optimal contract (higher margins are required in new
relationships) endogenously prevent from the borrower from exiting the contract ex-post. This required high
margin in a new relationship outside option acts as an endogenous glue (no need of an exogenous cost of
breaking up the relationship) to make the optimal contract sustainable.
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parties to insure the lender against the aggregate shock even in a risk-neutral environment.
Long-term relationships enjoy more stable financing. On the contrary, the pricing terms
and volume of short-term relationships are more volatile. Therefore, it is optimal for the
borrower to concentrate its financing, provided they can commit to long-term contracts.
2.4 Extension: the rehypothecation chain
The goal of this part is to provide an economic rationale to repo chains. I model the
pyramiding arrangement consisting of having money market funds lending to broker
dealers, which in turn lend to hedge funds. The two lending agreements are secured by the
same collateral (rehypothecation). I show how the franchise value of the broker dealer is
priced in the optimal contract on both sides of its balance sheet.
I keep only two types of beliefs,40 but I break down optimists into two sub-groups:
the no-franchise optimists (’Hedge Funds’: HF) and the optimists that are endowed with
franchise value (’Broker Dealers’: BD). The pessimists are ’Money Market Funds’: MMF. I
assume rehypothecation of collateral.41 I construct an equilibrium in which MMF lends to
BD (the tri-party repo debt) and in turn BD lends to HF (the bilateral repo debt). xtri, mtri and
rtri are the number of contracts (each collaterized by one unit of the risky asset), the haircut
and the rate of the first transaction (s¯tri is the promise and Dtri the value of each contract).
xbil , mbil , rbil , s¯bil and Dbil are the respective quantities for the second transaction. Only BD
enjoys franchise value: s˜bil = s¯bil and s˜tri = s¯tri  VB. Figure 2.13 gives the t = 1 contractual
payoffs.
The balance sheet constraint of HF binds: pmbilxbil = nHF. The balance sheet constraint
40In this environment, the introduction of a 3rd type M with moderate priors and a second state-variable,
reputation capital f it , would make the moderates type emerge as Financial Intermediaries, as the one with the
relative most acute incentive to build up franchise value.
41If the Broker Dealer debt is collateralized by Hedge Fund debt, the analysis is more tedious as the BD debt
needs to be priced as a put on put, using Geske formula, but the qualitative results of the repo chain are similar.
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Figure 2.13: Repo chain with rehypothecation of collateral.
(BS) of the BD is: xbilDbil  nHF + xbilDbil . Cash raised by the BD non-invested in HF
debt is invested in the risky asset. The rehypothecation collateral constraint (CC) imposes:
xtri  xbil . There are two regimes, depending on which of the constraint (CC) or (BS)
binds. The t = 0 expected payoffs of the agents are as following, denoting the collar
DpB(mbil ;mtri) = pB(s˜bil)  pB(s˜tri):8>>>>>><>>>>>>:




1 mbil   µB   rbil + pB(s˜bil)⇤




rbil(mbil ;mtri)  rtri(mbil ;mtri)  DpB(mbil ;mtri) mtrirCp⇤
UMMF  UMMF0 = xtri
⇥ 
1 mtri   rtri   µL  p  pL(s˜tri) VBFB(s˜tri)⇤
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Solving jointly for the two bargaining processes (HF-BD and BD-MMF) delivers that BD
engages in a positive carry trade on repo rates.
Lemma 16. The Broker-Dealer earns a positive repo rate spread:












From the BD first order conditions in (mbil ;mtri), the rehypothecation chain features
even lower haircuts.
Proposition 11. A high Broker-Dealer franchise value lowers both the bilateral and the tri-party
haircuts.
Proof. Appendix shows ∂m
tri
∂VB < 0 and
∂mbil
∂VB < 0.
Even if both BD and HF are equally optimistic, they will find a rationale to contract
secured debt. The haircut spread mbil   mtri can be negative, and this is sustainable in
equilibrium as the BD is compensated through a positive rate spread rbil   rtri. It rationalizes
bilateral haircuts lower than triparty haircuts in normal times, while observing bilateral
haircuts higher than tri party haircuts in stress times.
The introduction of a role for franchise value in the ability to lever up provides a
justification for financial intermediation, alternative to the threat of runs as disciplining
device as in Diamond and Rajan (2001a) and Diamond and Rajan (2001b), or the returns to
scale in monitoring costs as in Diamond (1984) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997). In my
approach, financial intermediaries has a superior ability to develop franchise value, and this
helps mitigating the bargaining frictions on both sides of the balance sheet of the broker
dealer. It delivers in equilibrium the two-tiered structure: HF 7! Broker Dealer 7! MMF.42
Broker-dealers, on their asset side, are more able to seize the collateral than pessimists. At
the same time, on their liability side, they are more able to lever up their franchise value
42This mechanism is reminiscent of the industry practice, especially by universal banks, to wrap up the
collateral with some of its own credit risk/franchise value.
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than hedge funds. The first array is backed by tangible collateral: so more responsive but
also more robust. The second array is backed by intangible franchise value, and therefore
less responsive to collateral shocks.
Moreover, the comparative statics of the haircut spread being positive with respect to
volatility, it rationalizes why, with an increase in uncertainty s, bilateral haircuts are more
responsive than tri-party haircuts. This also delivers a more volatile (and procyclical in
general equilibrium) leverage for HF than for BD, consistent with Krishnamurthy (2010)
evidence. Furthermore, the haircut spread can turn negative.
In General equilibrium, when endogeneizing the price p of the asset, p is equal to the
sum of its fundamental value and of two collateral values: the one enjoyed by HF and the
one enjoyed by BD. This happens from rehypothecation practice, a collateral multiplier effect.
Bringing this repo chain to dynamics requires two state variables: net worth of the BD and
of the HF, and derive the value function VB(nB; nHF) along the lines of section 3. This set
up delivers a leverage more procyclical for HF than BD at high levels of BD net worth. On
the other hand, at low levels of BD let worth, the concavity of VB(nB; nHF) makes both HF
and BD leverage procyclical, a state that can be thought of systemic crisis.
2.5 Empirical analysis
The purpose of this section is to provide support to the 3 key predictions of the model:43
1. Proposition 1: in the cross-section, high franchise value borrowers secure lower haircuts
and rates.
2. Proposition 2: in the time-series, haircuts are more sensitive to borrower’s franchise at
low net worth.
43Moreover, haircuts and rates are more sensitive to franchise value when the collateral is illiquid/volatile
(Corollary 1), so the effects should be stronger on illiquid collateral. The static model has the additional
prediction that haircuts and rates are more sensitive to franchise value with higher effective bargaining power
of the lender (Corollary 4). The dynamic model also predicts that haircuts are low and stable at high borrower
net worth and high and fragile at low borrower net worth.
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3. Proposition 3: haircuts and rates are lower and more stable in long-term relationships.
Taken together, the tests reject the hypothesis that repo markets are perfectly competitive
and provide evidence that relationships matter even in secured funding. Repo markets
involve four types of prices and volumes determinants: collateral specific (the type of
the underlying security of the repo), borrower i specific (its franchise value VB), lender j
specific (its bargaining power w and its risk attitude), and relationship ij specific (long-term
relationship value VL).
2.5.1 Data
I use a hand-collected dataset of repo transactions (repurchase agreements) contracted over
the last six years by money market funds.44 My dataset includes 27, 172 repo transactions
extracted from the quarterly SEC filings of the universe of the 145 largest Prime Institutional
Money Market Funds. Money Market Funds (MMF) compose the largest volume of repo
lending. According to the September 2012 Flow of Fund, US Money Market Funds hold
$508.4 bn outstanding in repo contracts for 2012Q2, which represents 65% of total volume
of repo lending in the US to banks and broker dealers on this quarter.45 In turn the repo
holdings of the MMFs in the sample account for $280 bn, i.e. 55% of the total MMF holdings.
As the sample is composed of the prime institutional money market funds, I argue that the
selection bias of the sample works against the tested hypothesis of screening with respect
to borrower franchise and relationships. Indeed, smaller funds would have an even more
pronounced incentive to trust franchise and relationships over collateral. I merge this dataset
with broker-dealers characteristics: CDS from Markit and balance-sheet quantities from
Y9-C call reports.
44Most transactions in the dataset are US tri-party (using JP Morgan Chase and BNY Mellon as a clearing
bank).
45The ratio is computed from Table L207 of Sept. 2012 Flow of Funds. MMF holdings are the liability
line ’Money market mutual funds’ and total repo lending to banks and broker dealers are the sum of the
following asset lines: ’U.S. chartered depository institutions’, ’Foreign banking offices in the U.S.’, ’Credit unions’
and ’Security brokers and dealers’. The aggregate time-series of other source of funding of broker dealers
(commercial paper and fed funds) show that these markets do not perfectly substitute to secured funding.
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Data from Money Market Fund filings
The identity and CIK numbers of the 145 largest Prime Institutional Money Market Funds is
obtained from Peter Crane intelligence. Prime Money Market Funds are a recent financial
innovation which allegedly offers higher returns with no risk, and are allowed to invest in
non-government securities. Following the procedure of Krishnamurthy et al. (2011), I parse
with a Perl script all the quarterly filings of the last 6 years of these 145 MMF (24 quarterly
filings for each MMF: forms N-Q, N-CSR and N-CSRS available on SEC Edgar website).46
MMFs of the same family concatenate their filings in the same html file. I collapse these
MMF in one lender identity j, in order to wash out substitution effects from one fund
to another within the same family. The haircut can be computed from the collateral fair
value and the notional, and the repo rate can be computed from the repurchase amount
and the notional.47 I categorize the collateral described as free-entry text in MMF filings
into 9 categories: Treasuries, Agencies, Municipals, Commercial Paper, Corporate Debt,
Foreign Debt, Equities, Structured Finance and Mixed Pool. This follows the topography of
collateral used in custodian contracts of tri-party agreements. My dataset contains all the
repo transactions reported in these SEC filings, and details for each of those: the volume of
the transaction, the rate, the haircut, the maturity, the collateral type and the identities of
the borrower and the lender. The counterparty identity is manually screened and replaced
by the relevant franchise name (e.g. Barclays for Barclay’s Capital or any subsidiary of
Barclays). I compute the repo spread, as the difference between the repo rate and the Fed
fund rate of the same maturity.
46I carry out robustness checks on N-MFP forms, filed monthly by the MMF since November 2010.
47For joint repurchase agreements, the haircuts and rates are computed over the entire collateral pool, and
assigned to each repo transaction included in the joint repurchase agreement. This type of joint contract usually

























































































Figure 2.14: Aggregate repo volume by collateral class.
Complementary data source
I use specific characteristics of borrowers and of lenders as regressors on repo prices and
volumes. For borrowers, I match the broker-dealers included in the repo dataset with Y9-C
call reports items: goodwill (Y9C item BHCK3163) as proxy for the franchise value VB and
total equity capital (Y9C items BHCK3300 and BHCK2948) as proxy for borrower net worth nBt .
I also fetch their respective exposure to the different funding markets: commercial paper (Y9C
item BHCK2309) and fed funds (Y9C item BHDMB993), in order to control for substitution
effects between these markets. I also match the borrowers with market-based measures of
their franchise: CDS and CDS lagged 3 months (from Markit).48 Regarding the lenders,
I use CRSP Mutual Fund database to construct a measure of their risk attitude based on
Inflows and Yield their experienced in 2008, following the procedure of Kacperczyk and
Schnabl (2012) and Chernenko and Sunderam (2012). For collateral, I use volatility index
(VIX and TED)) to capture the volatility of the underlying collateral. Finally, to assess
the persistence of relationships between Hedge Funds and Broker Dealers, I use prime
brokerage information in TASS dataset. For robustness, I also explore the cross-section
of haircuts and rates in a sample not from money market funds but from pension funds,
which are not regulated by Rule 2a  7. Data have been obtained under the Freedom of
48CDS of 5 year tenure (the most liquid). I manually take into account franchise mergers (HVB taken over by





Figure 16 plots the time-series of aggregate repo volume from the dataset by collateral
class. It follows a pattern analogous to the Flow of Fund repo lending to banks and broker
dealers, albeit less dramatic. The discrepancy therefore comes from repo not contracted
by money market funds, e.g. the rest of the world lending category in Flow of Fund which
sharply contracted over the crisis. This is consistent with the hypothesis of the existence
of relationships between banks and broker dealers and money market funds that helped
sustain a stable level of repo funding over the crisis along these relationships. The right-hand
side panel plots the same time-series excluding Treasuries & Agencies. Consistent with
Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) and (Martin, 2012), it documents a volatile level of repo funding
for structured finance. I use this segment of the repo market to gain power in the test of
the franchise value channel. The time-series of aggregate volume has a semestrial spiky
shape.49 This might be due to difference in data reporting between forms N-Q (q2 and q4),
and forms N-CSRS/N-CSRS (q1 and q3). This is not of a concern given the cross-sectional
analysis.
Pricing terms
Table 2.1 gives the summary statistics of haircuts. For pricing terms (haircut and rate), the
dataset is winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels to dismiss reporting mistakes. The majority of
repo transactions collateralized by Treasuries command a haircut of 2%. However, some are
not, and these are mostly term repos with long-term maturities. Figure 2.18 documents that
there is a higher haircut dispersion for more volatile collateral, consistent with Proposition 4
49The relative decline of volume at each end-of-year quarter hints to some window-dressing practices.
Although this is not a first-order issue in the present idiosyncratic analysis, I run robustness regressions
excluding all quarters q4.
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of the model. Summary statistics of repo spreads are given in Table 2.2 and dispersion in
Figure 2.19. Even more than haircuts, repo spreads exhibit dispersion around the mean for
more volatile collateral. Maturities are the third pricing variable of a repo transaction and
its summary statistics are given in Table 2.3. In the specifications presented in the following,
I focus on overnight repos (maturity of 1 day) to make sure the results are not driven
by maturity risk. Across the three pricing variables, the sample documents an aggregate
time-varying funding premium, especially in the Lehman episode and over the European
debt crisis. I investigate in the following their idiosyncratic component.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics of haircuts by collateral class
col_class mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
1-Treasuries .023 .021 .02 .02 .02 .02 .029
2-Agencies .026 .03 .02 .02 .02 .029 .029
3-CommPaper .029 .01 .02 .02 .029 .033 .048
4-Municipals .039 .021 .02 .02 .038 .048 .065
5-CorporateDebt .048 .033 .02 .029 .048 .056 .074
6-ForeignDebt .055 .036 .029 .03 .048 .053 .092
7-Equities .063 .02 .048 .048 .048 .077 .091
8-StrucFinance .046 .036 .02 .02 .032 .071 .077
9-MixedPool .027 .013 .02 .02 .02 .035 .048


















TS haircut by collateral class
Figure 2.15: Times-series of haircuts by collateral class.
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Table 2.2: Summary statistics of repo spreads by collateral class. The repo spread is the spread between the
repo rate and the Fed fund rate of the same maturity. It is annualized and given in basis points
col_class mean sd p10 p25 p50 p75 p90
1-Treasuries -3.91 43.9 -21 -5.89 1.23 6.25 16.9
2-Agencies 4.14 30 -15.3 -2.7 4.17 14 25
3-CommPaper 21.1 20.3 5.33 11.9 16.4 27.7 49.3
4-Municipals 31.9 31.2 -12.7 16.6 29.7 38.7 81.8
5-CorporateDebt 24.8 42.6 -11.9 12.5 22 40.8 70.1
6-ForeignDebt 55.3 56.9 10.4 20.1 35.9 51.9 171
7-Equities 29.3 29.3 -8.99 18.2 27.7 39.2 53.3
8-StrucFinance 29.5 45 -10.7 2.92 24 44.9 83.4
9-MixedPool 9.47 34.1 -16.8 -3.14 10.5 31.7 36






















TS repo_spread by collateral class




























































































TS repo_spread by collateral class for LT maturities
Figure 2.17: Time-series of repo maturities, by collateral class.
Table 2.3: Summary statistics of repo maturities by collateral class.
col_class mean p50 p75 p90
1-Treasuries 9.71 1 3 24
2-Agencies 11.6 3 3 32
3-CommPaper 18.2 1 6 90
4-Municipals 19.9 1 32 90
5-CorporateDebt 24.4 3 31 90
6-ForeignDebt 14.3 2 3 30
7-Equities 23 3 7.5 90
8-StrucFinance 48.1 3 90 182
9-MixedPool 2.36 2 3 4
Total 13.1 2 3 35
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Microstructure: network of relationships
In Figure 2.20, I provide a graphical representation of the network of bilateral repo transac-
tions for two key quarters: 2007q3 (start of the crisis) and 2008q3 (midst of the crisis). The
dataset features 40 borrowers (broker-dealers) and 45 lenders (the 145 money market funds
grouped by family).
One static feature of the network relies in agents’ heterogeneity in their concentration of
financing. On the borrower side, nodes like Merrill, Citi and Goldman Sachs secure repo
funding from a variety of sources. On the contrary, Deutsche Bank, Barclays and JP Morgan
exhibit concentrated financing. I construct quantitative measures of financing dispersion.
For a node i 2 I the universe of borrowers, with Dij the repo volume in the relationship
between borrower i and lender j over the given quarter, I define the following metrics. The
first one uses the extensive margin of relationship existence, the second one is inspired by














One dynamic feature consists in the persistence of bilateral edges, especially the ones
involving a borrower exhibiting concentrated financing. These bilateral edges flag the poten-
tial existence of a long-term relationship between the two agents. I construct quantitative
measures to capture the persistence of bilateral connections:50
50Similarly to the static metrics, the first one uses information on the extensive margin (prior existence of the
relationship), whereas the second one uses the continuous information of repo flows.
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persistenceratioi,t =
Âj #relationshipsij|existing at t 1
Âj #relationshipsij,t
And a bilateral-specific measures of long-term relationships:
persist relij,t = 1{link ij t 1}
history relij,t = Ât  1{link ij t }
Table 2.4 presents the summary statistics of these relationship metrics for the 40 borrow-
ers in the sample, along with the balance sheet characteristics from call reports. Figure 2.21
illustrates the time-serie pattern of the heterogeneity of the persistenceratioi,t metrics. Table
2.5 presents the summary statistics of the symmetric metrics for the lenders (grouped in 40
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Figure 2.19: Dispersion in repo spreads, by collateral class
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Figure 2.20: Network of repo transactions
Borrowers are vertically aligned on the left of the bipartite graph. Lenders (collapsed by MMF family) are
vertically aligned on the right. Each edge connecting one borrower with one lender documents the existence
of a bilateral relationship. The thickness of the edge is given by the oustanding repo volume of the bilateral
relationship, normalized by the total outstanding volume in the dataset for the quarter 2007q3. The upper panel
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Figure 2.21: Dynamic metrics of network structure, for borrowers and lenders
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Table 2.4: Summary statistics of borrowers.
Name is the identity of the borrower. The following quantities are averaged over the 24 quarters of the
sample: Repo is the volume of funding raised by the borrower in the sample ($Bil), Assets are the total
assets from Y9-C call reports ($Bil), Net worth is total assets minus total liabilities ($Bil), Cap Ratio is
(totalassets  totalliabilities) /totalassets, CDS is 5 year tenure CDS spread on the borrower name, Scope is the
scope of the network of the borrower as defined in the text, PersistNb is the number of relationships of the
borrower that already existed in at the previous quarter, NbRel is the number of all relationships of the borrower,
NbLTRel is the number of Long-Term relationships, Concentr is equal to one if the borrower has relative
concentrated financing (i.e. number of LT relationships superior to the median of number of LT relationships in
the sample of borrowers).
Name Repo Assets Networth CapRatio CDS Scope PersistNb NbRel NbLTRel Concentr
BARC 66 359 21 0.06 0.87 0.89 22 23 25 1
DB 47 21 -7 -0.35 0.62 0.92 27 23 32 1
BNP 31 0.58 0.78 14 17 24 1
BOA 30 991 98 0.07 0.34 0.87 11 20 13 1
RBOS 26 43 25 0.60 1.02 0.91 15 17 16 1
CS 23 0.32 0.86 12 15 12 1
GS 22 702 42 0.06 1.03 0.89 16 20 23 1
CITI 18 1060 -3 -0.02 1.04 0.88 9 13 17 1
MS 17 606 57 0.09 1.29 0.87 11 15 8 1
UBS 17 0.65 0.87 19 16 14 1
MER 16 1.22 0.86 7 14 14 1
SOCGEN 16 0.73 0.80 4 8 8 1
JPM 13 1005 131 0.11 0.71 0.81 9 14 40 1
HSBC 12 192 -62 -0.34 0.55 0.91 8 12 7 1
GREEN 10 0.84 4 10 3 0
LEH 10 3.85 0.75 7 11 0 0
BNY 9 185 87 0.46 0.85 0.47 1 2 1 0
BEAR 9 0.85 7 14 1 0
CALYON 7 0.41 0.92 2 4 6 0
ING 6 0.67 0.66 5 4 6 0
ABN 6 78 -7 -0.08 1.65 0.69 3 6 3 0
RBC 6 69 16 0.23 0.83 4 8 8 1
WF 4 349 73 0.12 0.61 0.74 3 5 7 1
FORT 4 0.70 0.57 2 4 0 0
BMO 3 63 27 0.43 0.56 0.71 1 2 4 0
COUNT 3 110 -25 -0.23 0.51 1 3 2 0
SCOT 3 0 0 0.19 0.45 0.75 0 2 8 1
TD 2 112 71 0.64 0.49 0.88 2 4 8 1
MIZ 2 0.47 0.83 1 2 2 0
DRSDNR 1 0.36 0.47 1 2 0 0
WAMU 1 1.39 0 1 0 0
ABBEY 1 0.34 0 1 0 0
NAT 1 1.56 1 1 2 0
CIBC 0 1 -1 -1.77 0.53 0.74 1 2 3 0
MITSU 0 1 1 0 0
WEST 0 1 1 0 0
NYFED 0 0 1 0 0
CANT 0 1 1 0 0
STATE 0 139 85 0.60 0.37 2 3 0 0
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Table 2.5: Summary statistics of lenders.
Name is the identity of the lender. The following quantities are averaged over the 24 quarters of the sample:
Repo is the volume of funding raised by the borrower in the sample ($Bil), RepoExp is the ratio of repo
holdings to Total Net Assets of the MMF, NbRel is the number of all relationships of the borrower, Scope is the
scope of the network of the lender as defined in the text, Persist is the ratio of relationships of the borrower
that already existed in at the previous quarter. Inflows08 is the cumulative monthly flows over 2008 where
f lowst = TNAt TNAt 1TNAt 1 , InflowsCum is the same quantity cumulated over the 24 quarters of the sample, Yield08
is the cumulative monthly yields over 2008 of the MMF, YieldCum is the same quantity cumulated over the 24
quarters of the sample.
Name Repo RepoExp Inflows08 InflowsCum Yield08 YieldCum NbRel Scope Persist
Federated 66 0.07 0.22 1.54 -0.00 5.68 19 0.94 0.84
Fidelity 38 0.13 -0.03 0.62 0.07 5.89 12 0.68 0.72
Wells Fargo 34 0.02 1.32 4.58 -0.16 5.15 12 0.95 0.83
JPMorgan Liquid 32 0.00 0.50 0.96 0.04 -12.57 10 0.91 0.88
Invesco 32 0.01 -0.06 -27.43 10 0.89 0.60
JPMorgan Prime 28 0.06 0.44 1.19 -0.01 5.01 9 0.90 0.72
Goldman Sachs FS 20 0.12 -0.20 0.44 -0.31 5.17 8 0.65 0.65
BlackRock Cash 20 0.01 0.53 -0.59 -0.13 -24.51 11 0.93 0.86
First American 20 0.01 1.26 1.36 -0.12 5.20 13 0.97 0.90
BlackRock Lq 16 0.08 0.51 0.26 -0.01 5.61 10 0.90 0.91
Morgan Stanley Inst 14 0.03 -0.51 0.58 -0.09 6.01 12 0.93 0.87
BofA 12 0.03 0.23 1.11 -0.15 5.18 13 0.98 0.77
Dreyfus Cash 11 0.00 1.76 2.66 -0.14 4.37 10 0.95 0.57
Schwab 8 0.01 -0.17 0.20 -0.13 3.90 7 0.86 0.38
Northern 8 0.04 -0.25 0.06 -0.88 3.21 12 0.93 0.82
TDAM 8 0.00 1.01 3.48 4.35 -7.77 3 0.38 0.82
State Street SSgA 8 0.06 -0.12 0.54 -0.18 5.11 11 0.74 0.74
UBS 8 0.02 0.22 0.17 -0.13 5.29 6 0.86 0.70
FFI 6 10 0.91 0.75
State Street 5 0.13 0.25 4.08 4.81 10.66 10 0.84 0.71
HSBC 3 0.01 1.45 2.05 -0.23 5.20 5 0.81 0.53
Dreyfus Instit 3 0.03 0.17 1.32 -0.07 5.73 5 0.90 0.58
Franklin 2 0.04 0.56 1.18 -0.71 3.09 5 0.79 0.69
RBC Prime 2 0.01 0.01 1.27 -0.66 0.74 5 0.87 0.69
Fifth Third 2 0.00 -0.02 0.46 0.14 3.82 6 0.90 0.70
Western Asset Cash 2 0.01 0.86 1.16 -0.00 -12.68 2 0.63 0.69
Dreyfus Instit Res 2 0.00 0.07 -0.75 -1.76 -26.16 6 0.96 0.80
Invesco Premier 2 0.01 0.50 -27.46 8 0.92 0.53
SEI 1 0.01 0.26 0.88 -0.27 4.99 6 0.69 0.80
Marshall 1 0.00 0.23 0.58 0.04 5.75 6 0.82 0.94
Daily Income 1 5 0.94 0.82
DWS Cash Res 1 0.00 -0.09 0.23 -0.21 5.24 3 0.63 0.46
DWS Cash Mgmt 1 0.00 0.07 0.13 -0.27 4.69 3 0.63 0.49
DWS Cash Res Prime 1 0.00 -0.32 -0.76 -0.31 -15.97 3 0.73 0.45
DWS Series 1 0.00 0.31 0.64 -0.16 5.72 3 0.55 0.45
DWS Prime 0 0.00 -0.20 -0.94 -0.28 3.43 4 0.74 0.60
Virtus 0 0.00 -0.15 -1.53 -0.14 5.55 2 0.83 0.58
DWS Daily Assets 0 2 0.80 0.45
Victory 0 0.01 0.15 -0.98 -0.68 3.41 5 0.95 0.73
Vanguard 0 0.00 0.28 1.70 -0.04 5.95 8 0.93 0.70
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2.5.3 Test of the model
First, I reject the null hypothesis that repo markets are perfectly competitive. Under this
hypothesis, characteristics related to the identity of the borrower and the lender should
not matter in repo funding whose price should be solely determined by the nature of
collateral. Second, I investigate the power of borrower-specific, lender-specific and bilateral-
relationship-specific characteristics to explain repo pricing and volumes.
The first stage is therefore to extract the component in haircuts and repo rates that is not
explained by the nature of collateral and aggregate conditions. I carry this out by computing
the residual of the OLS of haircuts and repo spreads on quarterly time fixed effects and
collateral type fixed effects(specification (0a)):51
ml,ijt = µmt +Âk bmk 1{col k} + e
m
l,t
rl,ijt = µrt +Âk brk1{col k} + e
r
l,t
The quarter and collateral class coefficients of the first-stage regression are given in Table
2.6. The coefficients on each collateral class fixed effect are in line with model, which implies
that more volatile collateral command higher haircuts and higher rates. The quarterly
time fixed-effect coefficients document aggregate change in repo funding over the sample.
Interestingly, the OLS does not find an aggregate time-effect on haircuts, but shows a
significant positive aggregate coefficient of 44bps for 2007q4 at Lehman crisis, immediately
followed by significant coefficients from 2008q1 to 2008q4, from  57bps to  27bps. Taken
together with the Flow of Fund evidence that repo funding volume progressively declined
over this period are evidence that the 2007q4 funding stress episode was a negative supply
shock (less repo supply), followed by a protracted negative demand shock (less repo
demand). The residuals mˆl,t and rˆl,t are the idiosyncratic components I am investigating in
the following.
51Arguably, on the US tri-party repo market, for a given collateral type, the lender does not care about which
exact security collateralizes the repo. Indeed, the lender delegates to the clearing bank the responsibility to check
that the collateral posted by the borrower enters in the collateral type agreed upon by the two party, according
to the collateral topography of the custodian agreement. Therefore, collateral type fixed effects are sufficient to
absorb all the collateral-specific component from the dependent variables.
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In order to flag the identity of which borrowers and which lenders get consistent
idiosyncratic pricing, I run are the following dummy specification (0b):52
ml,ijt = µmt +Âk bmk 1{col k} +Âi b
m
i 1{borrower i} +Âj b
m
j 1{lender j} + e
m
l,t
rl,ijt = µrt +Âk brk1{col k} +Âi b
r
i1{borrower i} +Âj b
r
j1{lender j} + e
r
l,t
Results are reported Tables 2.7 and 2.8, columns 1 and 3. Several dummy variables are
omitted due to colinearity. Testing for bmi = b
m
j = 0 rejects the null hypothesis of perfect
competition. Moreover, dummy coefficient already show that strong franchise borrowers are
securing repo with lower spreads and MMF with high bargaining power are getting higher
spreads.
52Robustness checks I ran include adding an interaction term 1{col k} ⇤ 1{borrower i} to control for borrowers
riskier only because they are more exposed to volatile collateral.
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Table 2.6: First stage OLS (0a): Haircuts and Rates on Collateral Class and Quarters.
The omitted collateral class is Treasuries, and the omitted quarter is 2006q1. I only report quarterly time-fixed
































⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 2.7: OLS specification (0b): borrower dummies.
Borrowers fixed-effects. The specification (0b) is ran on the entire sample (16387 transactions). The smallest
































Collateral FE Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y
N 16,387 16,387
R-squared 0.86 0.38
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Table 2.8: OLS specification (0b): lender dummies.
Lenders fixed-effects. The specification (0b) is ran on the entire sample (16387 transactions). The smallest
lenders (according to the ranking of Table 2.4) are not displayed. Omitted lender is Blackrock Cash.
haircut repo_spread










MMF_name==First American -0.00⇤⇤⇤ -15.25⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (2.03)




MMF_name==JPMorgan Liquid -0.00⇤⇤⇤ -6.89⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (1.77)








MMF_name==Wells Fargo 0.00⇤⇤ -5.01⇤
(0.00) (2.15)
Collateral FE Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y
N 16387 16387
R-squared 0.86 0.38
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Test of the effect of borrowers franchise value
Test of Proposition 1: ∂m
∂VB < 0 and
∂r
∂VB < 0 To test the franchise value channel, I run a
panel regression of haircut and rate on measures of borrower franchise as regressors, still
including collateral dummies and time fixed effects (specification (1a)):
ml,ijt = µmt + bmB V
B +Âk bmk 1{col k} +Âj b
m
j 1{lender j} + e
m
l,t
rl,ijt = µrt + brB V
B +Âk brk1{col k} +Âj b
r
j1{lender j} + e
r
l,t
For measures of VB I use the following characteristics: CDS, CDS lagged, book value
of equity and goodwill.53 Table 2.9 reports the results. The coefficient brB is statistically
and economically significant: 43bps has to be compared to the mean gross yield of repo
contracts: 20bps. The coefficient bmB is also significant when use CDS lagged one quarter,
and net worth computed from Y9-C call reports. I find support that stronger franchise
(lower CDS) secure lower haircuts, at the expense of higher rates, consistent with the model.
Compared to Krishnamurthy et al. (2011) which find no effect from borrower identity,
two characteristics of the dataset are in order to explain the different results. First, as I parse
also smaller money market funds (but not securities lenders), I get more borrowers in the
dataset. Moreover, smaller money market funds might be more prone to trust franchise
beyond collateral.
53CDS spreads capture risk-neutral default probabilities and a recovery rate from the debt holder standpoint.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Identification strategy: the European sovereign debt crisis I use the European sovereign
debt crisis as an exogenous shock on the franchise value channel. Arguably, this crisis is
a shock uncorrelated to the underlying US collateral (US structured finance, US corporate
debt), and I take advantage of the fact that European banks act as US financial intermediaries:
borrowing from US MMF before lending to US households. The US subsidiaries of European
banks are heavily reliant as borrowers on US tri-party repo market, as shown by network
graphs (figures 20 and 21) and heavy lenders to US shadow banking sector. The European
debt crisis is an exogenous shock to the franchise of European borrowers i: borrower ticker
equal to DB, CS, UBS, ABN, HSBC, HVB, DRSDNR, SOCGEN, BARC, CALYON, CMZB,
BNP, ING, FORT. 54
I run the following Difference-in-Difference specification (1b):55
mijt = µmt + bm1 ⇤ 1Eur crisis + bm2 ⇤ 1Eur crisis + bm3 ⇤ 1Eur crisis ⇤ 1Eur bank + eml,t
rijt = µrt + br1 ⇤ 1Eur crisis + br2 ⇤ 1Eur crisis + br3 ⇤ 1Eur crisis ⇤ 1Eur bank + erl,t
The test of the franchise value channel is: bm3 , b
r
3 > 0. Table 2.10 reports the results of
this specification. In line with prediction 5, the results are highly significant when using the
illiquid collateral sample. The coefficients bm1 , b
r
1 < 0 are also interesting and document a
negative demand shock in repo funding over the European crisis.
54If I had data on European lenders investing in US tri-party as hinted by repo volume from Flow of Fund,
i.e. j belonging to Europe, I could use the European debt crisis as an exogenous shock on the relationship value
VL, symmetrically to what I do here on VB.
55Due to the short time period of the sample, robustness checks include to run the specification of 1Eur bank
on symmetric pre- and crisis samples separately, following Bertrand et al. (2004).
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Table 2.10: Specification (1b): Difference-in-Difference on European borrowers.
This table presents the results of a Difference-in-Difference specification that uses the European
sovereign debt crisis as an instrument of European borrowers. Repo transactions contracted on the
US tri-party are collateralized by US securities uncorrelated to the European shock. 1European crisis is
a dummy variable equal to one from 2010q1 to 2012q2, and equal to zero from 2006q1 to 2009q4.
1European bank is a dummy variable equal to one for the following borrowers: DB, CS, UBS, ABN,
HSBC, HVB, DRSDNR, SOCGEN, BARC, CALYON, CMZB, BNP, ING, FORT, and equal to zero for
the other borrowers. The first two regressions are run on the whole sample, the last two ones are ran
on the sample excluding repo transactions collateralized by Treasuries and Agencies.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
haircut repo_spread haircut repo_spread
1Europeancrisis 0.00⇤⇤⇤ 0.71 0.01⇤⇤⇤ -16.16⇤⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (2.08)
1Europeanbank -0.00 -1.14 -0.01⇤⇤⇤ -7.70⇤⇤
(0.00) (0.85) (0.00) (2.45)
1Europeancrisis * 1Europeanbank -0.00 1.98 0.01⇤⇤⇤ 10.01⇤⇤
(0.00) (1.23) (0.00) (3.29)
Collateral FE Y Y Y Y
N 16702 16702 3608 3608
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.10 0.10
⇤ p < 0.05, ⇤⇤ p < 0.01, ⇤⇤⇤ p < 0.001
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Test of Corollary 1: ∂
2m
∂s∂VB < 0 and
∂2r
∂s∂VB < 0 A first piece of evidence is that there is
more dispersion in haircuts and repo rates for illiquid collateral than for liquid collateral,
and during quarters with high volatility than quiet quarters. This is illustrated by the 10th
and 90th percentiles on Figures 2.18 and 2.19. Results of the previous specification are much
more significant when excluding Treasuries and Agencies from the sample. I also run the
dummy specification with interaction terms:
ml,t = µmt +Âi Âk bmik1{col k} ⇤ 1{borrower i} + eml,t
rl,t = µrt +Âi Âk brk1{col k} ⇤ 1{borrower i} + erl,t
Test of the effect of lenders risk attitude
Corollary 4 predicts that lenders with more pessimistic beliefs should obtain lower haircuts
and lower rates, and also should trust more the franchise value. The first piece of evidence
comes from the lenders coefficients in specification (1) (Table 2.8): preeminent money market
funds secure higher haircuts and rates. It leads to investigate how the haircut and the repo
spread comove in the cross-section of lenders. To this end, I run the following preliminary
regression:
rl,ijt = µrt + aml,ijt +Âk brk1{col k} +Âj b
r
i1{borrower i} + e
r
l,t
The coefficient obtained is positive and significant: a = 295 with a standard error
(clustered at the lender level) of 28 . This suggests that, in the market for secured funding, the
MMF risk-return trade off demonstrated by Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012) is complemented
by another type of heterogeneity, the one on the borrower side documented above. I
investigate two plausible explanations consistent with this positive coefficient a: lenders
heterogeneity in pessimism or in relationship value.
To investigate further the origin of the effect of this heterogeneity on repo lending, I test
lender characteristics on both the haircut and the rate (specification (2a)):
ml,ijt = µmt + bmL V
L +Âk bmk 1{col k} +Âj b
m




rl,ijt = µrt + brL V
L +Âk brk1{col k} +Âj b
r
j1{borrower i} + e
r
l,t
I use for VL the following MMF characteristics, proxying pessimism and concentration
limits: RepoExpj. Results are reported in Table 2.11. bmL > 0 and b
r
L > 0 are both economi-
cally and statistically significant, showing that MMF with higher bargaining power secure
both higher haircuts and higher rates. Moreover, when use for VL metrics characterizing
MMF risk-taking attitude / pessimism (Inflows08 and Yield08), I find bmL > 0 and b
r
L > 0,
consistent with the results on unsecured funding volumes of Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2012)
and Chernenko and Sunderam (2012).
Table 2.11: Specification (2a): continuous OLS test of lender risk-taking attitude.
This table tests in the cross-section of lenders for the hypothesis of heterogeneity in pessimism
(state-dependent utility, isomorphic to risk-aversion). RepoExp is the ratio of repo holding to total
asset at the MMF level (proxy for bargaining power). Inflows2008 and Yield08 are respectively
the inflows and the yield experienced by the MMF in 2008, used as proxy for MMF risk-taking.
Time, Collateral Class and Borrower fixed effects are included. Repo collateralized by Treasuries or
Agencies are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the Lender level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)







Borrower FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Collateral FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 2982 3411 3411 2982 3411 3411
R-squared 0.89 0.87 0.87 0.50 0.65 0.66
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Test of the effects of long-term relationships
Proposition 3 states that repo funding is more stable (less countercyclical) for borrowers
enjoying long-term relationships. Long-term relationships should enjoy lower and more
stable haircuts and rates. I measure the existence of long-term relationships by more
concentrated financing and longer history of the relationship.
Results on pricing variables: haircuts and rates The first exercise is to complement the
dummy OLS with relationship dummies. The specification I run are (specification (3a)):
ml,ijt = µmt +Âi bmi 1{borrower i} +Âj b
m
j 1{lender j} + b
m
ij 1{borrower i}1{lender j} +Âk b
m
k 1{col k} + e
m
l,t
rl,ijt = µrt +Âi bri1{borrower i} +Âj b
r
j1{lender j} + b
r
ij1{borrower i}1{lender j} +Âk b
r
k1{col k} + e
r
l,t
Even for the second set of specification, bilateral relationship coefficients are significant,
especially on the rates (brij). This dummy regression elicits which (i, j) pair between a
broker-dealer borrower and a MMF lender is an actual long-term relationship. The sign of
the coefficients bmij and b
r
ij informs in which direction the bilateral relationship is more in
favor. Results of this voluminous dummy regression are available upon demand.
I now investigate how the respective bargaining powers of borrowers and lenders affect
the haircut and rate pricing. I run the following specifications with continuous dependent
variables (specification (3a) - can be run on first differences):
ml,ijt = µmt + bmRelBt + gmRelLt + dmhistory relij +Âk bmk 1{col k} + e
m
l,t
rl,ijt = µrt + brRelBt + grRelLt + drhistory relij +Âk brk1{col k} + e
r
l,t
For RelBt and RelLt , I use different measures of the impact of relationships on respectively
the borrowers and the lenders: RepoSharei and #relationshipsi and ScopeL, and the symmet-
ric measures for lenders bargaining powers dj.56 The test of Corollary 4 is bm, br > 0 and
56Even if these regressors are highly endogenous, they capture the bargaining power d information according
to my model (see also Lee and Fong (2012) for a model with endogenous network formation where this property
is also true).
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gm,gr < 0. Results on the sample excluding Treasuries and Agencies are reported Table
2.12. The results are more conclusive for repo spreads than for haircuts. This is due to the
empirical fact that haircuts are not negotiated on a daily basis, but set in the custodian
agreement. We observe a negative significant effect of RelLt both for haircuts and rates. The
results of the OLS give some significance for the RelLt . In line with Corollary 1, results on
the sample excluding Treasuries and Agencies are even more significant. The results using
the history of the relationships are conclusive for PersistentRel: persistent relationships are
able to achieve lower rates for the borrower.57
Result on volume variables First I analyze the stability of the network structure. I use
two metrics to capture the stability of bilateral connections. On the intensive margin,
DVolij = |DRepoVolij| is the absolute value of the change, from one quarter to another, in
the repo volume of bilateral relationship between borrower i and lender j, normalized to the
total quarterly repo volume. On the extensive margin, 1rel ij,t is a dummy variable equal to 1
if the bilateral connection ij at the quarter t. The test is done via probit. The two regressors
are HistoryRelij,t = Ât  1{link ij t } and PersistentRelij,t = 1{link ij t }. Thus specification (3b)
is:









The test of the model is bint < 0 and bext > 0. Table 2.13 reports the results and finds
significant coefficients consistent with the model. The probit coefficient can be interpreted
(dprobit) as: one more quarter of history of the relationship increases by 12% the probability
of existence of the relationship in quarter t.
57The existence of previous relationship is still an endogenous variable. One could instrument the prior
existence of relationship by lending to first-time borrowers. This would be instruments of an exogenous variation
in relationships.
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Finally, I test the effect of the existence of long-term relationships on the stability of
secured funding volume for borrowers. DRepo = |DRepoVolB| is the absolute value of the
change, from one quarter to another, in borrower B repo funding normalized to the total
quarterly repo volume. Repo/ST = Repo/ST f unding is the ratio, for borrower B, between
its repo funding (in $) and the $ sum of all its short-term funding sources: fed funds +
repo + short-term deposits + commercial paper + short-term liabilities (data from Y9-C call
reports). This proxies for the easiness of access to repo for borrower B and captures potential
substitution from other funding sources, in case of repo funding difficulties. VBtotMMFrisk
is a measure of MMF risk-taking behavior, aggregated at the Borrower level. NbPersRel
is the number of bilateral relationships that the borrower already had at the previous
quarter. NbLTRel is the number of long-term relationships the borrower enjoys (a long-term
relationship is defined when the number of quarter of existence of the relationship is above
the median of the universe of relationships). The last two lines are interaction terms to test
that long-term relationships help stabilize repo funding.
Borrowers with long-term relationships enjoy more stable funding. It is tested in
specification (3c):
|DRepoVolB|i,t = a+ bNbLTReli,t + ei,t
Table 2.14 reports the results of this specification, as well results of specification with
potential borrower repo volume stability as regressors. I find that the existence of Long-Term
relationships mitigates the sensitivity of repo funding to the quality of the franchise (mea-
sured by  CDSquarter). The existence of long-term relationships provides an explanation
of why repo lending was fairly stable over the crisis. It is consistent with Hrung and Sarkar
(2012), which finds an autocorrelation of 0.95 in the volume of borrower repo funding, in
the daily tri-party repo data of the Fed.
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Table 2.12: Specification (3a): Regression of haircuts and rates on relationships indicators.
This table tests for relationship characteristics priced in haircuts and rates. The number of relationships NbRelB
and NbRelL proxy for the concentration of financing for the borrower, and for the concentration of the lending
base for the lender. Repo volumes RepoVolumeB and RepoVolumeL proxy for the respective bargaining powers.
ScopeB and ScopeL is an Herfindhal index measuring the atomicity of the respective counterparty bases: it is
high when the counterparties are uniformly dispersed. PersistentRel and HistoryRel are relationship-specific
variables: PersistentRel is a dummy variable equal to one if the bilateral connection also exists at the previous
quarter, HistoryRel counts the number of quarters in which the bilateral connection was existing up to the
date of the repo transaction. Time, Collateral Class and Borrower and Lender fixed effects are included. Repo
collateralized by Treasuries or Agencies are excluded from the sample. Standard errors are robust and clustered
at the relationship level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)

















Borrower FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Lender FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Collateral FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Quarter FE Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 3497 3497 3493 3497 3497 3497 3497 3493 3497 3497
R-squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
179
Table 2.13: Specification (3b): Regression of volumes on relationships indicators (long-term relationships and
borrower stable network).
This table tests the effect of long-term relationships on the stability of the network of bilateral connections.
DVolij = |DRepoVolij| is the absolute value of the change, from one quarter to another, in the repo volume of
bilateral relationship between borrower i and lender j, normalized to the total quarterly repo volume. 1rel ij,t is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the bilateral connection ij at the quarter t. NbRelB is the number of relationships
a borrower has at a given quarter. ScopeB is an Herfindhal index measuring the atomicity of the counterparty
base. The two latter regression are run via probit, and the R2 given for these regressions is McFadden’s pseudo
R2.
(1) (2) (3) (4)









N 6668 6571 527 2095
R-squared 0.18 0.18 0.47 0.22
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Table 2.14: Specification (3c): Regression of volumes on funding stability indicator (long-term relationships
and borrower stable funding volume).
This table tests the effect of long-term relationships on the stability of secured funding volumes for one given
borrower. DRepo = |DRepoVolB| is the absolute value of the change, from one quarter to another, in borrower
B repo funding normalized to the total quarterly repo volume. Repo/ST = Repo/ST f unding is the ratio, for
borrower B, between its repo funding (in $) and the $ sum of all its short-term funding sources: fed funds + repo
+ short-term deposits + commercial paper + short-term liabilities (data from Y9-C call reports). This proxies for
the easiness of access to repo for borrower B and captures potential substitution from other funding sources, in
case of repo funding difficulties. VBtotMMFrisk is a measure of MMF risk-taking behavior, aggregated at the
Borrower level. NbPersRel is the number of bilateral relationships that the borrower already had at the previous
quarter. NbLTRel is the number of Long-Term relationships the borrower enjoys (a Long-Term relationship is
defined when the number of quarter of existence of the relationship is above the median of the universe of
relationships). The last two lines are interaction terms to test that Long-Term relationships help stabilize repo
funding. Standard errors are robust and clustered at the borrower level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
DRepo DRepo DRepo DRepo DRepo DRepo DRepo Repo/ST














N 448 238 238 669 669 448 448 246
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.10 0.39
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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2.6 Conclusion
This paper develops a model of decentralized markets for secured funding in which the
franchise value of borrowers and long-term relationships matter. Continuation values
substitute for collateral and sustain low and stable levels for both the haircuts and the rates.
Due to the endogeneity of borrower franchise value, haircuts are countercyclical. This can
be mitigated by establishing long-term bilateral relationships. This channel is magnified
when the collateral is volatile and when lenders competition is imperfect. Franchise value of
broker-dealers can also rationalize long intermediation chains as the efficient arrangement
to monetize franchise.
The empirical analysis on a hand-collected dataset of repo transactions rejects the null
hypothesis that repo markets are perfectly competitive. It demonstrates that relationships
are priced even in secured funding, and are instrumental in the stability of refinancing. It
shows that this stability is conditional on the existence of franchise and relationships, which
can unravel quite abruptly. Even if small compared to ABCP, repo markets can therefore be
quite destabilizing for the financial system.
Even though constrained efficient, the present model delivers policy recommendations.
It enables to compare the effectiveness of different ex post policy instruments to alleviate a
credit crunch. Franchise value is concave with respect to borrower net worth. This advocates
for equity injections (e.g. second Paulson plan) in order to jump start franchise values and
restore confidence in secured funding markets. Alternatively, lending facilities (LTRO, TALF,
PDCF, TSLF, CPFF, AMLF) also enable financial intermediaries leverage by short-circuiting
the bargaining friction in private secured funding markets. In the model though, it has a
negative side-effect of breaking up welfare-improving long-term relationships in private
secured funding markets. On the other hand, the model does not provide any support
for policies of asset purchases (TARP), as in general equilibrium it would merely have a
crowding-out effect of private investment.
Regarding ex-ante policies, the existence of a franchise value channel supports institution-
level regulation of haircuts and leverage, and not at an asset-level. Finally, the model of the
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rehypothecation chain advocates for more transparency in prime brokerage, as bargaining
outcome on rtri(mtri) instead of rtri(mbil ;mtri) leads to suboptimal choice of haircuts.
An interesting extension of the model is to endow borrowers and lenders with a costly
capacity to learn about the collateral, in a rational inattention framework. Under the
presence of franchise, the lender cares less about the collateral, and as a result learns less
about it. This predicts that there is less learning on a specific class of collateral if one strong
franchise value is the marginal buyer in this market.
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in the Banking Sector1
3.1 Introduction
Liquidity plays an enormous role in financial crises. Fleming (2012) notes that across its
many liquidity facilities, the Federal Reserve provided over $1.5 trillion of liquidity support
during the crisis. The number is much higher if one includes other forms of government
liquidity support such as lending by the Federal Home Loan Bank – lending to banks peaks
at $1 trillion in September 2008 – or the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation guarantees –
insurance limits are increased in the crisis, and the guarantees are extended to $336 billion of
bonds as of March 2009 (He, Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010)). Recognizing the importance
of liquidity in the crisis, the Basel III committee has proposed regulating the liquidity of
commercial banks. Yet, despite its importance there is no consensus on how to measure
1Co-authored with Jennie Bai (McDonough School of Business at Georgetown University) and Arvind
Krishnamurthy (Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University and NBER). We thank Viral Acharya,
Allen Berger, Christa Bouwman, Markus Brunnermeier, Dong Beom Choi, Adam Copeland, Michael Fleming,
Antoine Martin, Klaus Schaeck, and seminar participants at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Bank
of France, Bank of England, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research, European Bank
Association’s 5th Annual Financial Stability Conference at Tilburg, Georgetown University, Copenhagen Business
School, University of Rhode Island, for helpful comments. Jonathan Choi provided excellent research assistance.
JEL Classification: G21, G28. Keywords: liquidity mismatch; liquidity regulation; market liquidity; funding
liquidity.
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liquidity. Indeed, the only consensus is that liquidity is a slippery concept and is hard to
measure.
This paper implements a liquidity measure proposed by Brunnermeier, Gorton and
Krishnamurthy (2011, 2012). Their "Liquidity Mismatch Index" (LMI) measures the mismatch
between the market liquidity of assets and the funding liquidity of liabilities, at a firm level.
There are many empirical challenges that arise in implementing their theoretical measure.
We take up these challenges and design a procedure to implement the LMI that relies on
balance-sheet as well as off-balance-sheet information of a given bank and market indicators
of liquidity and liquidity premia. We construct the LMI for the universe of bank holding
companies (BHCs) in the U.S. and describe features of the time-series and cross-sectional
properties of the bank-specific and aggregate LMI.
What makes a good liquidity measure? First, we argue that a liquidity measure should
be useful for macro-prudential purposes. It should measure liquidity imbalances in the
financial system, offering an early indicator of financial crises. It should also quantitatively
describe the liquidity condition of the financial sector, and the amount of liquidity the Fed
may be called upon to provide in a financial crisis. The LMI performs well on these metrics.
An important aspect of the LMI is that it can be aggregated across banks to measure the
liquidity mismatch of a group of banks or the entire financial sector. Liquidity measures
which are based on ratios, such as Basel’s liquidity coverage ratio, do not possess this
aggregation property. Our aggregate LMI as shown in Figure 3.3 indicates a growing
liquidity mismatch over the period from 2002 to 2007. In 2007 Q1, the LMI is near (negative)
$3 trillion. Thus, had the LMI been computed in 2007, the Fed would have expected
that in the event of an aggregate liquidity crisis, it may need to provide $3 trillion of
liquidity to completely mitigate the liquidity-run aspect of the financial crisis.2 Moreover,
the LMI reverses course from 2008 to mid-2009, coincident with the Fed’s liquidity injections,
2One theoretical rationale to justify liquidity injections by the Fed is an inter-bank market freeze, as modelled
in Acharya and Skeie (2011). Another reason is the stigma of borrowing at the discount window. See Ennis and
Weinberg (2012) for a signaling model of this stigma. A liquidity injection also prevents coordination failures
that can lead to bank insolvency, as in fundamental bank runs models a la Rochet and Vives (2004).
186
returning to its 2004 level. Finally, we show that the LMI methodology can naturally be
used to administer a liquidity stress test by a regulator, and present the results of such a
stress test at various time points.
Our second benchmark arises from micro considerations. We argue that an efficient
liquidity measure should describe liquidity risk in the cross-section of banks, identifying
which banks carry the most liquidity risk. We show that our measure performs well in this
dimension. When market-wide liquidity conditions deteriorate, a firm with a worse LMI
should be more negatively affected. We examine the cross-section of banks and show that
banks with a worse LMI have lower stock returns during the 2008 financial crisis. We also
find that across event dates corresponding to a worsening of liquidity conditions, the low
LMI banks experience more negative stock returns. Across event dates corresponding to
an increase in Fed liquidity provision, the low LMI banks experience more positive stock
returns. Our cross-sectional analysis also reveals interesting patterns in the way that firms
manage liquidity. We find that banks with high liquidity mismatch (low LMI value) have
high stock returns before and after the crisis, when aggregate liquidity conditions were good.
Moreover, we find that the banks that have the lowest LMI (i.e. the most liquidity shortfall)
are the largest banks, perhaps suggesting a strategy of exploiting the too-big-to-fail backstop.
The LMI thus helps to describe the cross-section of liquidity risk in the financial sector.
For regulatory purposes, the cross-sectional LMI can help identify systemically important
institutions, but here using a liquidity metric.
These two dimensions, the macro and the micro, appear to us to be the most important
dimensions on which to evaluate a liquidity measure. One contribution of the paper is
to offer these metrics. This is particularly important going forward because there are in
principal many ways to measure liquidity and what is needed are benchmarks that can be
used to discriminate across measures.
Related Literature
Our paper is related to a small literature on how to measure liquidity. On the practitioner
side, there are a number of different metrics that firms use to manage liquidity, ranging
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from the accounting ‘quick’ ratio to more sophisticated measures. On the policy side,
several central bank studies including Banerjee (2012), de Haan and End (2012) investigate
measures for bank liquidity regulation in response to Basel III. The pioneering paper in the
academic literature is Berger and Bouwman (2009), which is the first paper to recognize
the importance of measuring liquidity and propose a theoretically-motivated liquidity
measure. Berger and Bouwman (2009) measure the liquidity mismatch at the bank level and
explore the cross-sectional and time-series properties of this liquidity mismatch measure.
The principal theoretical difference between the LMI and the Berger-Bouwman measure
is that the LMI incorporates information from market measures of liquidity and liquidity
premia.3 In the language of Berger and Bouwman, our liquidity weights are time-varying,
while their liquidity weights are only asset and liability specific. Time variation in these
liquidity weights is important in capturing liquidity stress during a financial crisis. Another
contribution of our paper is in discussing and evaluating the LMI against the benchmarks
we have suggested. These benchmarks are important because they help us to calibrate the
liquidity weights, which are hard to pin down on purely theoretical grounds.
There is also a banking and corporate finance literature that explores the determinants of
liquidity holdings on a firm’s balance sheet, for example, Heider, Hoerova and Holhausen
(2009), Acharya and Merrouche (2013) and Acharya and Rosa (2013). In most of this
literature, liquidity is defined as the cash or liquid assets held on the asset side of the
balance sheet. In our approach, liquidity is constructed from both asset and liability side
of the balance sheet (as in Berger and Bouwman (2009)), and is furthermore dependent on
market-wide liquidity conditions. Each asset and each liability contributes to the liquidity
position of the bank. We leave it for future work to revisit this literature using our more
comprehensive liquidity measure.
In comparing the stock returns of banks that hold more liquidity on their balance sheet
to those holding less liquidity, we find that the former underperform during non-crisis
3There is an alternative measure in Berger and Bouwman (2009) that sets the weights on bank loans to vary
with the amount of securitization. In our paper, the time-varying feature is generalized to every item on and off
balance sheet.
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periods. This may be because holding liquidity is on average costly, carrying insurance
benefits that are only reaped in crisis periods (as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1998)). It will be
interesting to link our findings with a welfare analysis and study the benefits and costs of
holding liquidity. It will also be interesting to see if our empirical analysis offers clarity on
the optimal regulation of bank liquidity (see e.g., Stein (2013)).
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section builds up a theoretical model for the
liquidity mismatch measure and Section 3.3 constructs the empirical measure. Section 3.4
evaluates the LMI in the macro dimension while Section 3.5 evaluates the LMI in the micro
dimension. Section 3.6 concludes the paper and discuss future work.
3.2 Liquidity Mismatch Index: Theoretical Framework
The Liquidity Mismatch Index (LMI) of Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2011,
2012) provides one approach to measure a bank’s liquidity. They define the LMI as the
“cash equivalent value" of a firm in a given state assuming that:
i Counterparties act most adversely. That is, parties that have contracts with the firm
act to extract as much cash as possible from the firm under the terms of their contracts.
This defines the liquidity promised through liabilities.
ii The firm computes its best course of action, given the assumed stress event, to raise
as much cash against its balance sheet as it can to withstand the cash withdrawals.
That is, the firm computes how much cash it can raise from asset sales, pre-existing
contracts such as credit lines, and collateralized loans such as repo backed by assets
currently held by the firm. The computation assumes that the firm is unable to raise
unsecured debt or equity. The total cash raised is the asset-side liquidity.
Central to this definition is that liquidity is computed based on a scenario where
counterparties act most adversely. To understand why the worst-case is appropriate,
consider defining liquidity for a hypothetical Diamond-Dybvig bank that is subject to a
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bank run. Suppose that the bank owns 100 long-term illiquid assets where early liquidation
generates 50. The bank is financed by 75 of short-term demandable deposits and 25 of
equity. The liquidity stress that the bank is exposed to is the coordination failure whereby
depositors withdraw funds expecting every other depositor to withdraw funds. For this
case, the LMI is  25, being the net of 75 and 50. More broadly, the definition of the LMI
is based on the idea that liquidity stress always involves coordination failure, which is
captured by the scenario that parties with contracts with the bank extract as much cash as
possible under the terms of the contract.











Assets (ait,k) and liabilities (l
i
t,k0) are balance sheet counterparts, varying over time and by
asset or liability class (k, k0). The liquidity weights, lt,ak > 0 and lt,lk0 < 0, are key items to
compute. Points (i) and (ii) offer some guidance on these weights, but leave considerable
latitude. The main contribution of our paper is to propose liquidity weights lt,ak and
lt,lk0 , following a derivation based on banks’ optimization through choosing their liquidity
mismatch.
3.2.1 Bank Optimization Problem and LMI Derivation for Liabilities
We first focus on computing the liability side LMI, Âk0 lt,lk0 l
i
t,k0 . It is easier to explain our
methodology by moving to a continuous maturity setting, although we implement the LMI
based on a sum of discrete liability classes as in formula (3.1). We use T to denote the
maturity of liability class k0. Thus, let lit,T be the liability of the bank i due at time T, where
the notation {lit,T} denotes the stream of maturity-dated liabilities.
We are interested in summarizing the stream {lit,T} as a single number, LMI({lit,T}, t),
that captures the liquidity features of the liabilities and how it enters into a bank’s decision
problem. Our measurement system satisfies a recursive principle: given the LMI({lit,T}, t) at
some date t, the LMI at date s < t is the “discounted value" of LMI({lit,T}, t). This structure
190
is natural in this case. Consider a bank which has say 200 of overnight debt and 100 of
two-day debt that represents no immediate liquidity stress. Tomorrow, the 100 of debt will
become overnight debt and represent immediate liquidity stress. Our LMI measure treats
this shrinking of maturity in a smooth recursive fashion.
Denote VN({lit,T}, t) as the value to the bank of choosing liability structure {lit,T}. The
bank earns a liquidity premium on its liabilities. In particular, pt,T is a liquidity premium
the bank earns by issuing a liability of maturity T. The liquidity premium should be thought
as the profit on a “carry trade" of issuing liabilities which investor pay a premium pt,T and
investing the proceeds in long-term assets. Here pt,S > pt,T for S < T, and pt,T = 0 for
large T (i.e. only short-maturity liabilities earn a liquidity premium). Given this liquidity
premium structure, the bank is incentivized to issue short-maturity debt. The cost of
short-maturity debt is liquidity stress. The bank chooses its liabilities to solve,






where the function G(·) represents non-liquidity related reasons for choosing a given liability
structure, and the liquidity dimension of liabilities is captured in the remaining terms. Note
that in writing this expression, and for all of the derivations that follow, we assume for
simplicity that the interest rate is effectively zero.
For our purposes, the key term in equation (3.2) is the last one which represents the cost
of liquidity stress. We can think of yi as the probability of entering liquidity stress, the LMI
(a negative number) as the dollar liquidity need in the stress event, and qi as the cost of
acquiring the liquidity needed to cover the stress. For example, one way to think about qi is
that it reflects the implicit and explicit cost for a bank of going to the discount window. This
interpretation is natural for a bank risk manager. We will also think about applying our
model for regulatory purposes. In this case, qi can be interpreted as the regulator’s cost of
having a bank come to the discount window for access. We pursue this latter angle later in
this section when discussing the case where there are many banks with correlated liquidity
shocks. Finally, an alternative interpretation of yi is that it is the Lagrange multiplier in a
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risk management problem for a bank that maximizes value subject to a risk-management or
regulatory constraint that  LMI({lit,T}, t) < LMI, that is, the risk manager imposes a cap
on how negative the liquidity mismatch can become.
As an example, if the relevant stress is the failure to rollover $100 of overnight debt, which
happens with probability 20%, and in which case the bank resorts to the discount window
paying an explicit and implicit penalty of 1%, then the numbers are y = 20%, q = 1%, and
LMI =  100.
In a liquidity stress episode, all contractual claimants on the bank act to maximally
extract cash from the bank. This means that overnight debt holders refuse to rollover debt
and the bank has to cover the cash shortfall from this loss of funding. A liquidity stress
episode is defined by a horizon. If the stress lasts for two days, then holders of two-day
debt may also refuse to rollover funding, and so on. We assume that at any t, there is a
chance µdt that at date t+ dt the stress episode ends and firm has access to free liquidity.
The liquidity need function, LMI, can be defined recursively,
LMI({lit,T}, t) =  lit,tdt+ (1  µdt)LMI({lit+dt,T}, t+ dt). (3.3)
This equation reflects a recursive principle: the LMI at date t is the “discounted value" of
LMI at t+ dt.
We look for an LMI function that is maturity-invariant, that is, a function where the
liquidity cost measured at time t of a liability maturing at time T is only a function of T   t.





where lT t is a liquidity weight at time t for a liability that matures at time T. It captures
the marginal contribution of liability liT to the liquidity pressure on the bank. Substituting
the candidate cost function into the recursion equation (3.3) and solving, we find that,
lT t =  e µ(T t). (3.5)
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So the liquidity weight is an exponential function of the µ and the liability’s time to
maturity T  t. A high µ implies a low chance of illiquidity, and hence high liquidity. The
liquidity weights we have constructed embed the expected duration of liquidity needs.
This characterization of liquidity weights is consistent with the description of LMI given
in Brunnermeier, Gorton and Krishnamurthy (2012). Their paper considers the following
experiment: Suppose that a firm has free access to liquidity (e.g., being able to access
equity markets) follows a Poisson process, there is a probability µ that the firm is able to
raise equity in any given day. Then, the LMI is based on the expected liquidity outflow
going forward. Define the function f (T, µ) 2 [0, 1], where T = 1 corresponds to one day
and T = 30 corresponds to 30 days, as the probability that the firm is unable to access
free liquidity by date T. The probability is decreasing in T at a decay rate governed by
the parameter µ. Then, the liquidity weight for a given contract lt,Lk0 with maturity T is
proportional to f (T, µ). Furthermore, there may be times, say during a crisis, when the
liquidity stress is likely to last longer so that µ is smaller and f (T, µ) is higher. In these
periods we would expect lt,Lk0 to be even lower.
3.2.2 Measuring µ
A key variable in the construction of the LMI is µ, which measures the expected duration of
the stress event. We aim to map µ into an observable asset price. Consider a hypothetical
bank which makes its decisions only based on liquidity considerations (i.e. for this bank,
G({lit,T}) = 0). The first order condition for the bank in choosing lit,T is:
pt,T = y
iqie µtT. (3.6)
The bank earns a liquidity premium on issuing liabilities of maturity T, but at liquidity cost
governed by e µtT. The FOC indicates a relation between µt and the liquidity premium,
which is governed by the market’s desire for liquidity.
We propose to measure the liquidity premium using the term structure of OIS-TBill
spreads. We assume that pt,T is proportional to OIS-TBill spread of the given maturity. This
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assumption says that when investors have a strong desire to own liquid assets, as reflected
in the spread between OIS and T-Bill, any financial intermediary that can issue a liquid
liability can earn a premium on this liquidity. There is clear evidence (see Krishnamurthy
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2013b) and Nagel (2014)), on the relation between the liquidity
premia on bank liabilities and market measures of liquidity premia. The OIS-TBill spread is
the pure measure of the liquidity premium, as it is not contaminated by credit risk premia.
Under this assumption, µt is proportional to ln(OIS  TBill)/T. Thus we use time-series
variation in the OIS-TBill spread to pin down µt.
The derivation above is carried out with the assumption that µt varies over time, but is a
constant function of T. However, µ itself has a term structure that reflects an uneven speed
of exit from the liquidity event (i.e., µt is a function of T). The term structure of µ is reflected
in the term structure of the liquidity premia, which is observable. It is straightforward to





In our empirical implementation, we assume that this term structure is summarized by
two points, a 3-month liquidity spread and a 10 year liquidity spread at every time. Thus
we implicitly restrict attention to a two-factor structure for liquidity premia.
3.2.3 LMI Derivation including Assets
Let us next consider the asset side equation, Âk lt,ak a
i
t,k. In a liquidity stress event, the bank
can use its assets to cover liquidity outflows rather than turning to the discount window (or
other sources) at cost qi per unit liquidity. The asset side LMI measures the benefit from
assets in covering the liquidity shortfall.
For each asset, at,k, define its cash-equivalent value as (1  mt,k)at,k. Here mk is most
naturally interpreted as a haircut on a term repurchase contract, so that (1 mt,k)at,k is the
amount of cash the bank can immediately raise using at,k as collateral. Then the total cash
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The bank can use these assets to cover the liquidity outflow. Define the LMI including assets
as, LMI({lit,T},wt, t), and note that the LMI satisfies the recursion:
LMI({lit,T},wt, t) = maxDt 0
⇣





At every t, the bank chooses how much of its cash pool, Dt, to use towards covering liability
at date t, lt,t. Given that there is a chance that the liquidity stress episode will end at t+ dt,
and given that the cost of the liquidity shortfall is linear in the shortfall, it is obvious that
the solution will call for Dt = lt,t as long as wt > 0, after which Dt = 0. We compute the





That is, after T⇤, the bank will have run down it’s cash pool. By using the assets to cover





which is therefore also the value to the bank of having assets of wt.
In implementing our LMI measure, we opt to simplify further. Rather than solving





t,TlT tdT, we instead assume that the cost avoided of having wt of cash is









t,TdT = wt. For example, in the case where T
⇤ is one
day, the approximation is exact since effectively the cash of wt is being used to offset today’s
liquidity outflows one-for-one, saving cost of yiqiwt.
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Furthermore, we categorize the liabilities into maturity buckets rather than computing a
continuous maturity structure since in practice we only have data for a coarse categorization










where, the asset-side weights are
lt,ak = 1 mt,k, (3.11)
and the liability-side weights are
lt,lk0 =  e µTk0 . (3.12)
3.2.4 Aggregation and Correlated Shocks
Suppose there is a unit measure of banks, indexed by i, each choosing assets and liabilities





We want to capture the idea that running a liquidity mismatch for a given bank at a time
when many banks are running a large liquidity mismatch is more costly than when many
banks are running a small mismatch. For example, a regulator or a risk manager may want
to penalize the LMI more in the case of aggregate shocks than idiosyncratic shocks. To this
end, we penalize the liquidity weights in simple way to capture the aggregate dependence.
We assume that,
lt,lk0 =  e µTk0 e g
]LMIt (3.14)
This dependence can be thought as follows:




As]LMIt < 0, the effective duration parameter, µˆ is lower, which translates to a longer
duration of the liquidity event. We can think of our modeling as capturing a risk-adjustment
to the probability of a liquidity stress, similar to change of measure common in asset pricing.
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The parameter g (“risk aversion") captures the extent of the risk-adjustment. We likewise
assume that,
lt,ak = (1 mt,k)e g]LMIt , (3.15)
since asset side liquidity is more valuable for a bank facing a more costly liquidity need.
Note that this approach requires us to solve a fixed point problem:]LMIt is a function
of the ls by the definition of the LMI, and the ls are a function of]LMIt. We solve the


















Âk bqi(1 mt,k)ait,k +Âk0 bqie µTk0 lit,k0⌘ di
1+ g ⇤ ´ 10
⇣
Âk bqi(1 mt,k)ait,k +Âk0 bqie µTk0 lit,k0⌘ di . (3.17)
When g = 0, there is no amplification effect. When g > 0, the aggregate LMI is higher in
absolute value.
3.2.5 Equilibrium
The preceding subsections describe a decision problem that pins down]LMI, the aggregate
quantity of liquidity supplied by the banking sector. Theoretically, the bank supplied
liquidity is part of a general equilibrium in the market for liquidity. Although it is not
essential for our measurement exercise, being more explicit in describing this equilibrium
may help in providing academic context for the exercise. Following Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998), there is a demand for liquidity from the non-financial sector D(pT), which is a





t and government supplied liquidity St. Thus the market clearing condition
is,
D(pT) = St +]LMIt (3.18)
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which, along with pT = yiqie µT, pins down the price pT and the aggregate liquidity]LMI.
The g parameter captures the market risk aversion, and the e g]LMIt in aggregate LMI can
be seen as a change of measure on µ.
3.3 Liquidity Mismatch Index: Empirical Design
Following our theoretical model, we need to collect assets and liabilities for each bank
and define their liquidity weights correspondingly. The asset-side liquidity weights are
driven by haircuts of underlying securities, while the liability-side weights are determined
by liabilities’ maturity structure and easiness of rollover (‘stickiness’). Both are affected by
the expected stress duration, which is pinned down by market liquidity premium.
We construct the LMI for U.S. bank holding companies (BHC). The key source of balance
sheet information of BHCs comes from the FRY-9C Consolidated Report of Condition and
Income, which is completed on a quarterly basis by each BHC with at least $150 million
in total assets before March 2006 or $500 million since then.4 The sample period is from
2002:Q1 to 2013:Q1. The dataset includes 2870 BHCs throughout the sample period, starting
with 1884 firms in 2002:Q1 and ending with 1176 firms in 2013:Q1. Among 2870 BHCs,
there are 41 U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks, such as Taunus corp (parent company is
Deutsche Bank) and Barclays U.S. subsidiary. Table 3.1 lists the summary statistics for these
BHCs, including Total Assets (in $mil), Leverage (the ratio of total liability to total asset),
Foreign to Total Deposit ratio, Risk adjusted asset (in $mil), Tier 1 Risk-based Capital Ratio,
Total Capital Ratio, and Tier 1 Leverage Ratio (all three are Basel regulatory measures), as
well as return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Panel B provides a snapshot of
the top 50 BHCs, ranked by their total asset values as of March 31, 2006. The top 50 BHCs
together have a total asset of 10.58 trillion US dollars, comprising a large fraction of total
4The Y-9C regulatory reports provide data on the financial condition of a bank holding company, based
on the US GAAP consolidation rules, as well as the capital position of the consolidated entity. The balance
sheet and income data include items similar to those contained in SEC filings; however, the regulatory reports
also contain a rich set of additional information, including data on regulatory capital and risk-weighted assets,
off-balance sheet exposures, securitization activities, and so on.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics of Bank Holding Companies in Y9-C Reports during 2006-2013
Panel A
Universe (N=1507) Public (N=509) Public US (N=481) TOP 50 US
mean std mean std mean std mean std
Total Asset ($Mil) 14.89 120.84 35.30 204.39 34.13 205.30 360.85 619.11
Leverage 0.91 0.04 0.91 0.03 0.91 0.03 0.90 0.02
Foreign/Total Deposit 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.07 0.11 0.21
Risk-adj. Asset ($Mil) 9.60 74.83 22.65 126.90 22.30 127.90 233.65 380.80
Tier1 Capital Ratio 12.59 5.66 12.30 4.01 12.35 3.96 11.19 2.63
Total Capital Ratio 14.20 5.56 13.89 3.84 13.93 3.79 14.04 2.54
Tier1 Leverage Ratio 9.24 3.50 9.21 2.47 9.26 2.42 8.50 1.94
ROA (annualized) 1.24 4.30 0.96 3.93 0.97 3.95 1.42 3.36
ROE (annualized) 18.57 49.95 16.26 44.89 16.41 45.18 19.71 33.31
Panel B: Top 50 BHCs (rank is based on total asset values as of 2006:Q1)
Tier1 Tier1 Risk-based
Rank Company Size($Bil) Leverage Lev. Ratio Capital Ratio
1 CITIGROUP 1884.32 0.93 5.16 8.59
2 BANK OF AMER CORP 1463.69 0.91 6.36 8.64
3 JPMORGAN CHASE 1351.52 0.91 6.19 8.66
4 WACHOVIA CORP 707.12 0.90 6.01 7.42
5 METLIFE 527.72 0.93 5.55 9.51
6 WELLS FARGO 482.00 0.90 7.89 8.95
7 HSBC NORTH AMER HOLD 478.16 0.93 5.90 8.13
8 TAUNUS CORP 430.40 0.99 -0.82 -3.97
9 BARCLAYS GROUP US 261.22 0.99 1.08 10.96
10 US BC 219.23 0.90 8.16 8.75
20 BANK OF NY CO 103.46 0.89 6.67 8.19
30 UNIONBANCAL CORP 52.62 0.91 8.44 8.68
40 SYNOVUS FC 31.89 0.88 10.64 10.87
50 WEBSTER FNCL CORP 17.10 0.89 7.68 9.21
Total 10581.94 0.92 6.07 8.04
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industry assets.
3.3.1 Asset-side Liquidity Weight
The assets of a bank consist of cash, securities, loans and leases, trading assets, and intangible
assets. Under a liquidity shock, a bank can raise cash by borrowing against a given asset
or by selling that asset. Asset liquidity weight defines the amount of cash a bank can raise
over a short-term horizon for a given asset. A good weight spectrum across assets should
comply with two criteria: i) reflecting the market price in real time, ii) capturing the liquidity
ranks across assets in a consistent way. For example, assets like cash, and federal funds are
ultra liquid and hence should have a fixed sensitivity weight value of one, the highest rank.
Assets like fixed and intangible assets are extremely difficult or time-consuming to convert
into liquid funds and hence should have a fixed weight value of zero. The challenge is to
find a measure which can be applied to various types of in-between assets and also reflect
their time-varying market prices.
Implied from our theoretical model, we construct asset liquidity weights from haircut
data on repo transactions. (Appendix C.1 shows the details.) One minus the haircut in a
repo transaction directly measures how much cash a firm can borrow against an asset, so
that the haircut is a natural measure of asset liquidity sensitivity. In addition, the haircuts
change over market conditions and hence can reflect the real-time market prices. The haircut
is also known to vary with measures of asset price volatility and tail risk for a given asset
class, which are commonly associated with market liquidity of the asset. Thus, the haircut
is particularly attractive as a single measure of asset liquidity.
We collect haircut data based on repo transactions reported by the Money Market Fund
(MMF) sector, which is the largest provider of repo lending to banks and dealers.5 According
5The MMF data measures haircuts in what is known as the tri-party repo market (see Krishnamurthy, Nagel
and Orlov (2014) for details). It is apparent that haircuts in the tri-party market were much more stable than in
the bilateral repo market (see Copeland, Martin and Walker (2010) and Gorton and Metrick (2010)), which leads
to the concern that tri-party haircuts may not accurately capture market liquidity conditions. We conduct a
robustness check by calculating the asset-side liquidity sensitivity using the bilateral repo haircuts recovered
from our tri-party repo data and the differences of haircut between bilateral and trip-party repo documented
in Copeland, Martin and Walker (2011).(We thank the authors for providing the data on the differences of
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to the Flow of Funds data of September 2011, US Money Market Funds have $458 billion of
holdings in repo contracts, representing 46% of the total volume of repo lending in the US.
The list of the 145 largest prime institutional Money Market Funds is obtained from Peter
Crane intelligence. Our approach follows Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Orlov (2014). For each
fund, we further parse forms N-Q, N-CSR and N-CSRS from the SEC Edgar website. We
obtain the following details for each repo loan at the date of filing: collateral type, collateral
fair value, notional amount, repurchase amount at maturity, and the identities of borrower
and lender. Using this information, we compute the haircut from the collateral fair value P
and the notional amount D as m = 1  P/D.
bilateral and tri-party repo haircuts.) The resulting liquidity sensitivity weights remain almost unchanged
for high-quality assets such as Treasury and agency bonds, but become more variable during the crisis for
low-quality assets such as asset-backed securities, corporate debt, and foreign debt. However, when using the
bilateral repo haircuts, the impact on the calculation of liquidity mismatch index is not much different from that
using the tri-party repo data.
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Table 3.2: Haircuts by Collateral type.
Collateral Mean Std P5 P25 P50 P75 P95
Treasuries .023 .021 .020 .020 .020 .020 .029
Agencies .026 .030 .020 .020 .020 .029 .033
CommPaper .029 .010 .020 .020 .029 .033 .048
Municipals .039 .021 .020 .020 .038 .048 .091
StrucFinance .046 .036 .020 .020 .032 .071 .091
CorporateDebt .048 .033 .020 .029 .048 .056 .085
ForeignDebt .055 .036 .021 .030 .048 .053 .106
Equities .063 .020 .048 .048 .048 .077 .094
Average .030 .030 .020 .020 .020 .029 .074
Between the extreme liquid (cash) and illiquid (intangible) assets, two main categories,
securities and trading assets, share the same components. These components resound
with the collateral classes in repo transactions: Treasuries, agencies, commercial paper,
municipals, corporate debt, foreign debt, structured Finance, and equity. Table 3.2 shows
the distribution of haircut rates across collateral types in our sample. It is clear that Treasury
bills and bonds have the lowest haircuts when serving as collateral, with an average rate of
2.3%. Agency bonds have the second lowest haircut, on average of 2.6%. Commercial paper
and municipal bonds have relatively lower liquidity, and hence slightly higher haircuts,
with an average of 2.9% and 3.9% respectively. Structured finance assets, corporate debt and
foreign debt have higher haircuts around 5%.
Though sharing similar components, different categories serve as different purposes on
the balance sheet. For example, securities categories can be further divided into held-to-
maturity securities and available-for-sale securities. Together with securities in trading assets
category, these securities should claim different liquidity sensitivity weights depending on
their purposes. When facing a liquidity shock, securities in the trading assets category are
often the first to be sold, whereas similar securities in the available-for-sale category are the
second in the selling consideration, and those in the held-for-maturity category are often
untouched unless in an emergency. To accommodate this concern, we assign a constant that
scales the liquidity sensitivity weights depending on the purpose a security serves on the
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balance sheet. The scale coefficient is one for securities in the Trading Assets category, 0.75
for Available-for-Sale Securities, and 0.50 for Held-to-Maturity Securities.
One remaining category undiscussed yet important is bank loans. Ideally, we should use
the loan transaction data to compute loan liquidity weights. However, we hesitate to do so
for two reasons. First, although our repo market data does not include the collateral class of
loans — rather we use the haircut of structural finance repo contract to capture the liquidity
of loans secured by real estates, and use the maximum of haircuts across all collateral classes
to capture the liquidity of commercial & industry loans — our haircuts for loans match
the number as shown in Copeland, Martin and Walker (2011) (category ‘Whole Loans’ in
Table 2). More importantly, even if we derive liquidity sensitivity from loan transaction data,
there is a challenge on how to match this weight to the weights from other assets. Overall,
we need measures that maintain the relative liquidity rankings across asset categories and
it is easier to do this using a single liquidity measure such as haircuts. Clearly, there are
subjective judgments that goes into the weights, although this is a general feature of this
type of exercise (e.g., the liquidity measures in Basel III are also based on judgment). In
particular, the constant scales assigned to different asset categories are ad-hoc. This raises
the concern that the sensitivity of the scale may affect the calculation of liquidity mismatch
index. We do robustness checks by allowing the scale to change 25 percent lower and higher
and recalculated the LMI. These checks result in similar time-series and cross-sectional
performance of LMI.
3.3.2 Liability-side Liquidity Weights
Whereas the asset-side is liquidity inflow, with an exposure to liquidity equal to one minus
the haircut, the liability-side is liquidity outflow, carrying negative weights. Liability-side
liquidity depends on contract maturity and liability’s easiness of rollover. The goal of a
bank’s liquidity risk management is to balance liquidity inflow and outflow in order to
achieve an optimal firm value by minimizing the liquidity stress cost.
We implement the theoretical derivation of liquidity weights as follows, with the details
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shown in Appendix C.1. According to our model, the liability-side liquidity weights (putting
aside the g feedback for now) are determined jointly by {µ, Tk0}:
lT t =  eµTk0 .
The parameter µ captures the expected stress duration and we estimate it through the
combination of short-term and long-term market liquidity premium:
µTk0 = µSTmin(Tk0 , 1) + µLT(Tk0   1)1Tk0>1. (3.19)
The literature has considered many proxies to measure the liquidity premium, so that
there is no uniformly accepted candidate to measure µ. The main drawback of proposed
measures such as the Libor-OIS spread and the Treasury-Eurodollar spread is that they are
contaminated by credit risk (see Smith (2012) for a detailed discussion). We choose to use
the spread between OIS swap rates and Treasury bills as our measure, as such a spread is
likely to be minimally affected by credit risk. Yet, as Treasury bills are more liquid than
overnight federal funds loans, this measure will capture any time variation in the valuation
of liquid securities. Furthermore, as opposed to other measures of liquidity premium, say
micro-structure measures drawn from stocks or bonds, TOIS is more closely aligned with
the funding conditions of financial intermediaries. In equation (3.19), we use the logarithm
of 3-month and 10-year OIS-TBill spreads to measure the short-term and long-term liquidity
premium, µST and µLT. Figure 3.1 plots the two spreads at daily frequency. We observe that
TOIS was volatile and strikingly large since the subprime crisis starting from the summer of
2007, suggesting the deterioration of funding liquidity. It became stable and close to zero
since the summer of 2009, reflecting the normalization of liquidity conditions.
The parameter Tk0 indicates the maturity of liability. For example, overnight financing
(federal funds and repo) has a maturity of 0, commercial paper has a maturity of 0.25 year,
debt with maturity less or equal than one year has T = 1, debt with maturity longer than
one year has T = 5, subordinated debts have T = 10, equity has a maturity of 30 years. For
insured deposit, we assign its maturity proxy as T = 10 while uninsured deposit is more
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Figure 3.1: Liquidity factors µST and µLT.
vulnerable to liquidity withdraw hence has a much shorter maturity proxy, say T = 1. For
trading liabilities, we follow the rule for trading assets and use the haircut rates to define
corresponding liquidity weights. Figure 3.2 shows the liability-side liquidity weight with
respect to the maturity parameter Tk0 , conditional on scenarios of market liquidity premium.
The left panel shows the case for a longer maturity Tk0 2 (0, 15] years, and the right panel
shows a snapshot for Tk0 2 [0, 1]. In normal times when the OIS-Tbill spread is small (dash
blue line, OIS-TBill=0.01), only the very short-term liabilities have high weights. In liquidity
crisis (solid black line, OIS-Tbill=0.9), all types of liabilities have significantly larger weights
except the very long-duration securities such as equity.
We also examine the liquidity sensitivity of off-balance-sheet securities.6 We label
these off-balance-sheet data as contingent liabilities, which include unused commitments,
credit lines, securities lend and derivative contracts. Contingent liabilities have played an
increasingly important role in determining a bank’s liquidity condition, especially during
the financial crisis of 2007 - 2009. Given their relative stickiness to rollover in normal times,
6The off-balance-sheet securities are based on Schedule HC-L (Derivatives and Off-Balance-Sheet Items) and
HC-S (Servicing, Securitization, and Asset Sales Activities) in Y-9C report.
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Figure 3.2: Liability Liquidity Weights as a function of Maturity: lLk =   exp(  ln(OIS  Tbill)Tk0).
we assign a maturity proxy of T = 5 or 10 years.
Sharing the concern in asset-side liquidity weight, we also do the sensitivity analysis on
the maturity parameter Tk0 . The performance of LMI in next two sections remain unchanged
for different sets of reasonable maturity setup.
3.4 Macro-Variation in the LMI
3.4.1 LMI as a Macro-Prudential Barometer
The LMI can be aggregated across firms and sectors. This is a property that is not shared
by Basel’s liquidity coverage measure which is a ratio and hence cannot be meaningfully
aggregated. Summed across all BHCs, the aggregate LMI equals the supply of liquidity
provided by the banking sector to the non-financial sector. We suggest that this aggregate
LMI is a useful barometer for a macro-prudential assessment of systemic risk, which is a
principal advantage of our method in measuring liquidity. When the aggregate LMI is low,
the banking sector is more susceptible to a liquidity stress (“runs"). Indeed, the macro aspect
of the aggregate LMI has already played a role in our construction: in the previous section,
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we computed the funding liquidity stress via a feedback that depends on the aggregate LMI,
relying on the notion that the aggregate LMI is a macro-prudential stress indicator.
Figure 3.3 plots the aggregate liquidity mismatch over the period from 2002 to 2013.
Recall that a negative value of LMI at the firm level indicates a balance sheet that is more
vulnerable to liquidity stress (i.e. liability illiquidity is greater than the liquidity that can
be sourced from assets). Consistent with Diamond and Dybvig (1983) and Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990), we find that the banking sector carries a negative liquidity position (that
is, the banking sector provides more liquidity than it consumes, hence the banking sector
creates liquidity) throughout our sample. The magnitude of the LMI is important as it
indicates whether our calibration of the liquidity weights are in the right ballpark. The LMI
right before the crisis is about 5.5 trillion dollars which is of the same magnitude as the Fed
and other government liquidity provision actions in the crisis.
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Figure 3.3: Aggregate Liquidity Mismatch ($trillion) for Top 50 and All BHCs
The liquidity position evolves markedly over time. At the beginning of our sample,
2002Q1, the total liquidity mismatch was about -0.84 trillion dollars. There was a pronounced
increase in the LMI afterwards and an acceleration in 2007. The LMI hit its trough in 2008Q1
when the total mismatch achieved -5.54 trillion dollars, prefacing the financial crisis. The
liquidity mismatch reversed with the Fed’s liquidity injections and as the crisis faded and
recovered to the pre-crisis level by 2009Q1. The trough of the liquidity mismatch occurred
two quarters before the Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy and four quarters before the stock
market reached its nadir. This suggests that the LMI can serve as a barometer or an early
warning signal of a liquidity crisis. The evolution of the LMI is also related to the liquidity
intervention by government, which we will discuss further in the next subsection.
Figure 3.3 also plots the time-series of aggregate LMI summed over top 50 BHCs. These
BHCs were the primary users of the Fed’s liquidity facilities from 2007 to 2009. The
aggregate LMI of the top 50 BHCs is very close to that of the universe of BHCs, in terms
of both the pattern and the magnitude. This evidence suggests that in dollar amount,
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Figure 3.4: Liquidity Mismatch On and Off Balance Sheet
the US banking sector’s liquidity condition is overwhelmingly determined by large banks
represented by the top 50 BHCs. The remaining banks have a small impact totaling about
0 ⇠ 300 billion dollars over time.
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To understand further the composition of aggregate LMI, we present in Figure 3.4 the
liquidity mismatch on and off balance sheet. Clearly, the off-balance-sheet liquidity pressure
has been alleviated since the end of 2007. The change seems closely related to regulatory
rules such as the Dodd-Frank Act on structured financial products.
3.4.2 LMI Decomposition: Asset, Liability, and Liquidity Weights
The LMI depends on assets, liabilities, and liquidity weights. Panels A and B in Figure 3.5
show the asset- and liability-side liquidity, scaled by total assets, for top 50 BHCs.7 The scale
of the y-axis is in the same order across two panels (asset-side is [0,1] whereas liability-side
is [-1,0]), in order to facilitate a comparison of the relative movement in asset and liability
liquidity. The red line is the median value while the shade area depicts the 10th to 90th
percentiles. Both asset-side and liability-side liquidity contribute to the movement in the
LMI, yet the liability side seems to play a bigger role. During 2008–2013, banks slightly
increase their asset liquidity while have largely reduced liquidity pressure from the liability
side. Panel C in Figure 3.5 plots the ratio of asset liquidity to liability liquidity (in absolute
value) for the top 50 BHCs. The movement in the median ratio is consistent with our
findings of the time-series pattern in the aggregate LMI.
7The result remains robust if we extend the analysis to the universe of BHCs. For brevity, we here only
report the results for Top 50 banks, given the fact that they dominate the aggregate LMI and hence should be
the target of our research.
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A. Asset-side Liquidity (Â lt,Akx
i




C. Distribution of the Asset/Liability Liquidity Ratio (Â lt,Akx
i
t,Ak/|Â lt,Lk0 xit,Lk0|)
Figure 3.5: Decomposition of LMI by Assets and Liabilities for Top 50 BHCs. The red solid line is the median
value while the shade area depicts the 10th to 90th percentile.
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Figure 3.6: Effect of time-varying liquidity weights on LMI
We next turn to explaining how the changing liquidity weights contribute to movements
in the LMI. Figure 3.6 plots the LMI under three weighting schemes: the blue line is
our baseline case with time-varying weights; the green dashed line uses a fixed set of
weights as of 2006Q1 (before the financial crisis); and the red dashed line uses weights as
of 2008Q1 (the trough of the LMI). All three lines use the same contemporaneous balance
sheet information. The three variations show that the time-varying weights contribute
to a difference in liquidity of approximately 3 trillion dollars in the trough of 2008Q1,
compared with using the pre-crisis weight as of 2006Q1. This figure also highlights the
importance of adopting a time-varying weight linked to market conditions in terms of
accurately delineating the banking sector liquidity.
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3.4.3 Liquidity Stress Test
The Federal Reserve has recently engaged in liquidity stress tests which are designed to
examine banks’ ability to withstand a given liquidity stress event. The liquidity stress test is
an addition to the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP), which has become a
standard process to test if a bank has sufficient capital to cover a given stress event. The
decomposition of Figure 3.6 indicates a simple methodology to run a liquidity stress test
within our measurement framework. The only difference across the three lines in Figure 3.6
are the liquidity weights, which in turn are determined by the time-varying repo haircuts
mt and the funding liquidity factor (µt). We suggest that a liquidity stress test can be
implemented as a set of realizations of the funding liquidity factor or repo haircut, and
these realizations can be traced through the liquidity weights to compute the stress effects








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































We run a liquidity stress test at three time points: 2006Q1 (before the crisis), 2008Q1
(liquidity trough) and 2012Q4 (Fed’s first liquidity stress test). Table 3.3 reports the results.
Consider the first column corresponding to 2008Q1. The first row in the benchmark, denoted
as "T", corresponds to the LMI value as of 2008Q1. The next line, denoted as "[0,T]”, reports
the historical average LMI up to this time point. We then compute the LMI under stress
scenarios. The first line of the funding liquidity scenario reports the LMI based on assets and
liabilities as of 2008Q1, but using liquidity weights that are based on one standard deviation
(1-sigma) from the historical mean value of the funding liquidity state variable. We similarly
report numbers over the next few rows based on weights when funding liquidity factor µt
or haircut m¯t is 1, 2, and 6 sigmas away from historical mean values.
The numbers reflect that during the severe liquidity dry-up in 2008Q1 the aggregate
liquidity condition was between 2 to 6 sigmas from historical average values. In contrast, in
2012Q4, a six-sigma deviation from its historical average value, either under the funding
liquidity or haircut stress scenarios, does not result in an LMI as low as the 2008Q1 scenario.
That is, the banking sector currently has a better liquidity profile than when it enters the
financial crisis.
3.5 LMI and the Cross-Section of Banks
The previous section presented one benchmark for evaluating the LMI, namely its utility
from a macro-prudential viewpoint. We now consider another benchmark for evaluating
the LMI. If the LMI contains information regarding the liquidity risk of a given bank, then
changes in market liquidity conditions will affect the stock returns of banks differentially
depending on their LMI. That is, as market liquidity conditions deteriorate, a firm with a
worse liquidity position (lower LMI) should experience a more negative stock return.
We begin this section descriptively. We first show how the LMI of different banks varies
over time, and what characteristics of banks correlate with their LMI. Then we examine the
stock returns of banks with different LMIs under various liquidity events.
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3.5.1 Cross-Sectional LMI
Figure 3.7 plots the cross-sectional distribution of the LMI over the universe of BHCs, with
Panel A for the LMI scaled by total assets and Panel B for the LMI in absolute dollar
amount. The red solid line is the median value while the shade area depicts the 10th to 90th
percentiles.
The median value of the scaled LMI in Panel A follows the aggregate pattern in Figure 3.3.
The shaded region (10th and 90th percentiles) is also stable suggesting that bank holding
companies tend to have a stable cross-sectional distribution of liquidity. The version in Panel
B, where LMI is not scaled rather in dollar amount, tells a different story and indicates a
vast heterogeneity across banks’ liquidity condition. The figure suggests that bank size (as
measured by total assets) plays an important role in differentiating the absolute amount of
liquidity mismatch across banks. At the beginning of the sample, the BHCs have a small
dispersion in their liquidity conditions. The dispersion widens noticeably after 2007, likely
because of the development of structured financial products. After the financial crisis, the
dispersion narrowed again as some of these products are unwound, but remains wider than
in the early 2000s.
We plot the time-series LMI for twelve representative banks in Figure 3.8, with Panel A
for LMI scaled by total assets and Panel B for LMI in dollar amount. The LMI is negative
for most of the bank holding companies, illustrating the pervasive liquidity mismatch of
the banking sector during the crisis. For banks such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America,
Wells Fargo, the LMI dramatically deteriorated during the crisis, but improved steadily from
2009 onwards, yet remained negative throughout the sample. For other banks like Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley, the LMI was also negative but much smaller in magnitude.8
For banks like Citibank and Northern Trust, the LMI was negative in the beginning but
switched the sign after the crisis, indicating a liquidity-surplus condition.
8The data for Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley begin in 2009Q1 given that these investment banks
converted to bank holding companies after the Lehman event in September 2008.
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A: LMI Scaled by Total Asset
B: LMI in Absolute Dollar Amount ($Billion)
Figure 3.7: Cross-sectional distribution of Scaled and Dollar LMI for All BHCs. The red solid line is the
median value and the shade area depicts the 10th to 90th percentile. The sample is the universe of BHCs filling
Y-9C reports.
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Panel A: LMI scaled by Total Assets
Figure 3.8: Selected Bank-Level Liquidity Mismatch
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Panel B: LMI in dollar amount ($Thousand)
Figure 3.8 (Cont’d) Selected Bank-Level Liquidity Mismatch
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The absolute level of the LMI may be useful as an indicator of systemic importance (i.e.
"SIFI" status). For this purpose, we plot the bank-level LMI in dollar amount in Panel B,
with the same y-axis scale to allow comparison. In the cross-section, banks have strikingly
different liquidity levels. Banks like JP Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup have
large liquidity shortfall during the crisis whereas banks like State Street Corp, Northern
Trust have a far smaller liquidity shortfall.
We report the top 15 banks with the most significant liquidity mismatch in Table 3.4,
based on the average absolute LMI level over the whole sample. Banks with the most
liquidity shortfall also correspond with common notions of the "too-big-to-fail" banks:
Bank of America, Citigroup, JP Morgan Chase, Wachovia, and Wells Fargo taking the
top positions. These banks experience their most stressed liquidity conditions in 2008Q1.
American Express (ranked tenth) had the largest liquidity shortfall in the first quarter of
2009. The mortgage-related financial institution, Countrywide, saw it biggest liquidity
mismatch in 2006Q2, one year before the subprime crisis. We also report the top 5 banks
with the best average liquidity condition. They are smaller banks, although still among the
top 50 BHCs.
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We investigate the relationship between the LMI and bank characteristics for the universe
of BHCs. Table 3.5 shows the results of regressing scaled-LMI and absolute LMI (in dollar
amount), on a set of bank characteristics, which are collected from the Y-9C reports. The
univariate specifications suggest that banks tend to have lower scaled LMI (worse liquidity
condition) when they have larger risk-weighted assets, or more profitability (measured by
return on asset (ROA)), or lower capital ratio. The multivariate specification (4) shows
that these results are robust after the inclusion of other BHC characteristics. Specifications
(5)-(8) show the similar results using the absolute LMI as dependent variable. Among all
bank characteristics, risk-adjusted asset has the most explanatory power on bank liquidity
condition.
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Table 3.4: Banks with the most Significant Liquidity Mismatch
This table shows the LMI summary statistics for selected banks. Panel A presents the summary for banks with
the most negative LMI in dollar amount out of the Top 50 banks, ranked by the average LMI values across the
sample of 2006Q1 to 2012Q1; Panel B presents the results for banks with the most positive dollar LMI out of the
Top 50 banks, that is, with the best liquidity condition. BHC with only one quarterly observation are excluded
from the list. Time indicates the quarter at which the absolute LMI is the lowest for a given BHC.
Panel A: Banks with the most negative dollar LMI (mean)
LMI (in $bil)
Name Net LMI Mean Median Std Min Time
1. Metlife -0.54 -276 -290 94 -452 2012Q3
2. JPMorgan Chase -0.22 -235 -186 142 -541 2008Q3
3. Bank of America -0.15 -229 -209 130 -505 2008Q1
4. Citigroup -0.10 -147 -175 209 -565 2008Q1
5. Wachovia -0.14 -78 -82 40 -165 2007Q4
6. Wells Fargo -0.12 -74 -74 37 -217 2008Q4
7. Morgan Stanley -0.10 -66 -66 12 -91 2013Q1
8. Goldman Sachs -0.07 -53 -50 16 -78 2012Q4
9. US BC -0.15 -38 -41 15 -63 2008Q1
10. Bank of NY -0.32 -32 -30 17 -55 2006Q4
11. American Express -0.22 -32 -30 6 -42 2012Q2
12. Countrywide -0.23 -29 -28 14 -48 2005Q4
13. Capital One -0.19 -27 -26 13 -51 2007Q4
14. National City -0.17 -23 -23 6 -34 2008Q1
15. Suntrust -0.12 -20 -15 10 -41 2008Q1
Panel B: Banks with the most positive dollar LMI (mean)
LMI (in $bil)
Name Net LMI Mean Median Std Min Time
1. E Trade 0.13 7 6 1 5 2013Q1
2. IMB 0.19 5 5 0 5 2012Q1
3. Northern Trust 0.03 5 -1 13 -12 2007Q2
4. Commerce 0.06 1 1 2 -4 2007Q4
5. First Niagara 0.00 0 0 1 -1 2011Q3
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Table 3.5: The Relationship of LMI with Bank Characteristics
This table presents the results of pooled cross-sectional regression for the universe of public bank holding
companies during 2006Q1 to 2012Q1. The standard errors are robust and clustered by bank. All variables are
adimensional (ratios) except Total Assets, Risk-adjusted Assets and Unscaled LMI are in billion dollars.
Depend variable: Scaled LMI Depend variable: Unscaled LMI
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Risk-adj. Assets -0.19*** -0.14 -0.29*** -0.48
(0.06) (0.60) (0.04) (0.58)
Tier1 Capital Ratio 1.36*** 1.81* 0.14** -0.45
(0.35) (0.93) (0.06) (0.33)
ROA (annualized) -0.53*** -0.60*** -0.04** -0.02*
(0.11) (0.12) (0.02) (0.01)
Total Assets -0.03 0.12
(0.41) (0.37)
Total Capital Ratio 0.88 0.46
(0.87) (0.33)
Tier1 Leverage Ratio -2.54*** 0.16*
(0.70) (0.10)
ROE (annualized) -0.02** -0.00
(0.01) (0.00)
Constant -0.08*** -0.25*** -0.08*** -0.18*** -0.00 -0.02** -0.01** -0.02
(0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02)
N 6055 6055 6057 6055 6055 6055 6057 6055
R-squared 0.02 0.11 0.02 0.22 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.54
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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3.5.2 LMI and Market Performance
We first investigate the correlation between LMI and stock market performance.9 To this
end, we sort BHCs and construct two portfolios: LMI High and LMI Low, based on their
scaled LMI values averaged over the episode up to 2006Q1. Note that the unscaled LMI is
driven almost entirely by bank size, hence it is less suitable when we study the relationship
between bank liquidity and stock market performance (although as we have shown, the
scaled LMI also correlates positively with size). The High LMI portfolio contains 100 BHCs
with the highest LMI (best liquidity condition), and the Low LMI portfolio contains 100
BHCs with the lowest LMI (worst liquidity condition), in the universe of public BHCs during
the pre-crisis period. Table 3.6 describes the summary statistics of the banks forming each
of the two portfolios.
9Given that the balance sheet information of foreign banks’ U.S. subsidiaries cannot match their parent

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.9: Equity Market Capitalization by ex ante LMI Portfolios. The figure shows the market capitalization
scaled by the level as of 2006Q1 for the Low (bottom 100 banks) and High (top 100 banks) portfolios sorted by
the average LMI during the pre-crisis period: 2006Q1 - 2007Q2, across all public BHCs. For consistency of
balance sheet information and stock market performance, we exclude the U.S. subsidiaries of foreign banks.
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Figure 3.9 presents the cross-section of market performance, where equity market
performance is measured by the market capitalization of the portfolio normalized by its
level as of 2006Q1. As shown in the figure, the Low LMI portfolio of BHCs outperformed
the High LMI portfolio before the crisis. This pattern reversed in the crisis, when banks with
a larger liquidity shortfall (the Low LMI portfolio) experienced lower stock returns. The gap
between Low and High portfolios continued widening till 2009Q1 (the episode when stock
market tumbled to record low point), then narrowed down. The pattern reversed again
with the better performance of the Low LMI portfolio in the post-crisis period, though the
reverse lasts shortly.
One possible explanation for our finding is that hoarding liquidity is costly, and only
generates benefits in crises periods. Thus the low LMI banks are systematically more risky
and more exposed to crises than the high LMI banks. Berger and Bouwman (2009) show
that banks which are the most active in liquidity creation are rewarded by the stock market.
We show that this correlation is dramatically reversed in crisis times. This result provides
support to the hypothesis that the banking sector actively creates liquidity in good times
(pre-crisis) but at the expense of building fragility, an idea that is tested in the aggregate by
Berger and Bouwman (2012). Our cross-sectional approach identifies that the banks that
create the most liquidity are the most vulnerable to financial crises.
3.5.3 Event Study: LMI and Liquidity Shock
The LMI is intended to measure the exposure of a bank to a liquidity stress event. If the
LMI is informative in this dimension then we should observe differential performance of
banks with different LMI across market-wide liquidity events. In particular, we expect
that the banks with low LMI (poor liquidity) to perform worse under a negative liquidity
shock whereas it performs better under a positive liquidity shock. We follow an event study
methodology to test this hypothesis.
We sort the public BHCs and construct two portfolios according to their LMI values at
the end of previous quarter, LMI High and LMI Low. Each portfolio contains value-weighted
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100 banks with the highest/lowest LMI value. We use the Fama-French three-factor model
to compute expected returns within the estimation window of [t-180, t-30], where t denotes
the event day of a liquidity shock.
We then choose significant liquidity events in the sample. These events are chosen based
on considering a large move in the TOIS spread as well as economic news such as the
announcement of Fed liquidity facilities. Note that events cluster in the crisis and hence
obscure the effect of liquidity shock. To identify a clean event, we choose the first event
over any consecutive 30 days when the TOIS makes a significant negative jump or when
the Fed announces the creation of a liquidity-related facility. We end-up with three events
on positive liquidity shocks, PDCF (March 17, 2008), CPFF (October 7, 2008), and TALF
(November 25, 2008), as well as three events on negative liquidity shocks, DTOIS=-59bps
(August 20, 2007), DTOIS=-30bps (October 10, 2008), and DTOIS=-53bps (September 17,
2008).
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Negative Shock Positive Shock
Figure 3.10: Event Study: LMI and Liquidity Shock. The figure shows the cumulative abnormal return for
LMI low (bottom 100 banks) and LMI high (top 100 banks) portfolios sorted by the LMI at the end of previous
quarter before an event. Negative events are selected based on the daily change of Tbill-OIS spread, and positive
events are selected based on the announcement of Federal Reserve Liquidity facilities.
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Figure 3.10 show the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) during the [-2, 5] event
window, with a normalization on the event date t = 0. We observe that the Low LMI
portfolio underperforms the High LMI portfolio in days after a negative liquidity shock,
whereas it overperforms the High LMI portfolio after a positive liquidity shock, confirming
our hypothesis.
3.5.4 LMI and Liquidity Betas
Our findings from the event-study suggest that the LMI may also capture the Beta of the
bank to liquidity stress. We pursue this further in this section. Using a similar framework
like Flannery and James (1984), we first estimate the sensitivity of common stock returns
to the funding liquidity factor, then we examine whether our measure of funding liquidity
sensitivity (the beta) is related to the LMI. In detail, we compute a "liquidity beta" by
using the funding liquidity factor FLt as a fourth factor in the standard Fama-French factor
analysis:
rt,k   r ft = bmq(t),k ⇤ (rmt   r ft ) + bHMLq(t),k ⇤ rHMLt + bSMBq(t),k ⇤ rSMBt + bFLq(t),k ⇤ FLt + et,k (3.20)
where FLt is in the form of logarithm. We estimate quarterly time-varying betas bq(t),k
based on daily returns in a window including the current and previous quarter (six months).
Compared to the ‘order-flow’ liquidity factor used by Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), our
funding liquidity factor FLt does not resort to any stock market price information.
Next we verify that the LMI contains information for the bank’s beta. We run a cross-
sectional regression of the estimated liquidity betas on the bank’s LMI at the current (q) or
previous quarters (q  j):
bFLq,k = aq + g
LMI
q ⇤ LMIq j,k + uq,k, j = 0, 1, 2, (3.21)
where we are interested in the coefficient gLMI .
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A: Contemporaneous (j = 0)
B: One quarter Lag (j=1)
C: Two quarters Lag (j=2)
Figure 3.11: Regression of liquidity betas on LMI: time-series of Liquidity Premium gLMI. The figure shows
the coefficients in bFLq(t),k = aq + g
LMI
q ⇤ LMIq j,k + uq,k, where LMIq j,k is bank k’s LMI at the quarter
q  j, bFL is the exposure of bank stock return to funding liquidity factor. Shade denotes the +1/-1 standard
error.
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Figure 3.11 presents the time-series of the coefficient gLMI , under different lags of LMI
(j=0,1 and 2 quarters). We observe that this coefficient is negative and significant near and
during the onset of the crisis, in accordance with the intuition that BHC with more negative
LMI have higher positive liquidity betas (these BHCs are more sensitive to the innovation in
the liquidity factor). However, the coefficient loses significance after the crisis, suggesting
that liquidity risk is priced in stock prices no more, or alternatively, liquidity is no longer a
concern in normal times.
3.5.5 LMI and Federal Reserve Liquidity Injection
We next discuss the impact of the government’s liquidity injection on the U.S. banking
sector’s liquidity mismatch during the crisis. The Fed launched a range of new programs
to the banking sector in order to support overall market liquidity. Appendix C.2 provides
the background on these programs. The liquidity support began in December 2007 with
the Term Auction Facility (TAF) and continued with other programs. It is apparent from
Figure 3.3 that the improvement in the aggregate liquidity position of the banking sector
coincides with the Fed’s liquidity injection. While we cannot demonstrate causality, it is
likely that the liquidity injection has played a role in the increase of the aggregate LMI.
We study the effect of the Fed injections on the cross-section of LMI. There are 559
financial institutions receiving liquidity from the Fed,10 among them there are 87 bank
holding companies (those submit Y-9C regulatory reports). These BHCs on average borrowed
95.8 billion dollars, with a median value of 0.7 billion dollars. The bank-level borrowing
amount ranges from $5 million to $2 trillion. The ten bank holding companies which have
received the most liquidity are Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, Bear Sterns, Bank of America,
Goldman Sachs, Barclays U.S. subsidiary, JP Morgan Chase, Wells Fargo, Wachovia and
Deutsche Bank’s US subsidiary, Taunus.
10One parent institution may have different subsidiaries receiving the liquidity injection. For example,
AllianceBearnStein is an investment asset management company. Under this company, there are seven borrowers
listed in the Fed data such as AllianceBearnStein Global Bond Fund, Inc, AllianceBearnStein High Income Fund,
Inc, AllianceBearnStein TALF Opportunities Fund, etc.
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A: LMI post-crisis minus LMI in the crisis
B: LMI post-crisis minus LMI pre-crisis
Figure 3.12: Correlation between Fed liquidity injections and the change of LMI (in dollar amounts)
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Figure 3.12 plots the relation between the Fed liquidity injection and the change in LMI,
cross-sectionally. The liquidity injection is measured by the log of the dollar amount of loans
received by a given BHC, and the change in LMI is measured by the log of the difference in
LMI between the post-crisis and the pre-crisis period (Panel A) and between the post-crisis
and the crisis period (Panel B). Both panels document a strong positive correlation between
the change in LMI and the level of the Fed liquidity injection. This evidence confirms the
effect of the Fed’s liquidity facilities on improving the banking sector liquidity.11
To formally test the impact of government liquidity injection, we check how the condition
that a bank receives a liquidity injection or not has an impact on the relationship of LMI
and stock returns. To this end, we run cross-sectional regression of returns Rj,T on net LMI
and its interaction with Fed injection dummy variables.12 Table 3.7 presents the results. In
Panel A we test the stock market response to ex ante LMI, which is the average value during
the pre-crisis period (2006Q1 - 2007Q1).
Rj,T = aT + bT ⇤ netLMIj,pre + dT ⇤ netLMIj,pre ⇤ 1injection + ej,T, T = [crisis, post-crisis].
(3.22)
where Rj,T is annualized stock return compounded over the crisis period (2007Q2 - 2009Q2)
and the post-crisis period (2009Q3 - 2012Q1). The Fed injection dummy is equal to 1 if the
BHC did receive a Fed liquidity injection, and to 0 otherwise. Panel B replaces ex ante LMI
by contemporaneous LMI, which is the average of LMI over the period on which stock returns
are compounded):
Rj,T = aT + bT ⇤netLMIj,T + dT ⇤netLMIj,T ⇤ 1injection+ ej,T, T = [pre-crisis, crisis, post-crisis].
(3.23)
Panel B carries out the same exercise using change in LMI instead of level of LMI.
11Berger, Bouwman, Kick and Schaeck (2013) shows that capital injections and regulatory interventions have
a costly persistent effect on reducing liquidity creation. Taken together, their result and our result advocate for
liquidity injections in crisis times as a desirable policy intervention.
12We also conduct a robustness exercise where the Fed liquidity injection dummy is replaced by the log of
the loan amount a bank has received from the Fed. This substitution does not alter the results in terms of signs
and significance.
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It computes changes in LMI as the difference of net LMI between a pre-period and a
post-period.
Rj,T = aT + bT ⇤DnetLMIj,(T pre) + dT ⇤DnetLMIj,(T pre) ⇤ 1injection+ ej,T, T = [crisis, post-crisis].
(3.24)
Table 3.7 carries two main findings. First, it confirms the previous result that a more
negative LMI, regardless of whether it is the pre-crisis LMI or contemporaneous one, predicts
underperformance during the crisis and outperformance after the crisis. The second point
is related to Fed liquidity injections. The interaction terms always point toward an opposite
effect than the direct effect of LMI on returns. This suggests that the banks which have
received liquidity injections are more insulated from the fragility a negative LMI has brought
to the bank’s stock return.
3.6 Conclusion
This paper implements the liquidity measure, LMI, which evaluates the liquidity of a given
bank under a liquidity stress event that is parameterized by liquidity weights.
Relative to the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) of Basel III (which is conceptually closer
to our liquidity measurement exercise than the Net Stable Funding Ratio), the LMI has
three principal advantages. First, the LMI, unlike the LCR, can be aggregated across banks
and thereby provide a macro-prudential liquidity parameter. Second, the LCR uses an
arbitrary liquidity horizon of 30 days. Our implementation of the LMI links the liquidity
horizon to market based measures of liquidity premia as well as the aggregate LMI. Thus
our measurement has the desirable feature that during a financial crisis when liquidity
premia are high, the LMI is computed under a longer-lasting liquidity scenario. Likewise,
when the aggregate LMI of the financial sector is high, indicating fragility of the banking
sector, the LMI is computed under a longer-lasting scenario. Third, the LMI framework
provides a natural methodology to implement liquidity stress tests.
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Table 3.7: Case Study: Fed liquidity injection with dummy as Fed injection regressor
This table illustrates the sensitivity of bank return to Fed liquidity injections depending on their LMI. Over the
crisis, banks with lower LMI underperformed the higher LMI banks, but at the same time were more positively
sensitive to a Fed liquidity injection.
Panel A: The Impact of Pre-crisis Liquidity Level
LMIpre LMIpre ⇤ 1injection constant N Adj-R2
Rcrisis 0.125*** -0.150** -0.021*** 356 0.04
(0.04) (0.06) (0.00)
Rpost -0.101** 0.002 0.021*** 282 0.03
(0.04) (0.09) (0.00)
Panel B: The Impact of the Liquidity Change
DLMIcrisis pre DLMIcrisis pre ⇤ 1injection constant N Adj-R2
Rcrisis -0.273*** 0.110 -0.027*** 356 0.02
(0.10) (0.34) (0.00)
DLMIpost pre DLMIpost pre ⇤ 1injection constant N Adj-R2
Rpost 0.037 -0.026 -0.015* 270 0.03
(0.05) (0.12) (0.01)
Panel B: The Impact of Contemporaneous Liquidity Level
RT LMIT LMIT ⇤ 1injection constant N Adj-R2
Rcrisis 0.124*** -0.160** -0.018*** 356 0.03
(0.04) (0.08) (0.00)
Rpost -0.154** -0.026 -0.044*** 270 0.00
(0.06) (0.13) (0.01)
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The LMI has a close precedent, the Berger and Bouwman (2009) liquidity creation
measure. The primary change relative to the Berger-Bouwman measure is that the LMI is
based on time- and state-dependent liquidity weights. This is an important modification
because it naturally links bank liquidity positions to market liquidity conditions, and thus
is better suited to serving as a macroprudential barometer (and a stress testing framework).
We have shown that the LMI performs well relative to our macroprudential benchmarks.
We have also shown that the LMI contains important information regarding the liquidity
risks in the cross-section of banks.
We do not view the LMI measures of this paper as a finished product. We have made
choices regarding the liquidity weights in computing the LMI. These weights play a central
role in the performance of the LMI against our macro and micro benchmarks. It will be
interesting to bring in further data to better pin down liquidity weights. Such data may
be more detailed measures of security or funding liquidity drawn from financial market
measures. Alternatively, such data may be balance sheet information from more banks,
such as European banks, which will offer further data on which to calibrate the LMI. In
either case, the approach of this paper can serve as template for developing a better liquidity
measure.
To conclude we can brush how Monetary Policy would affect LMI. We would argue
that: (i) Unconventional monetary policy acts on the liquidity weights: haircuts policy a la
Ashcraft, Garleanu and Pedersen (2010) acts on asset side liquidity weight, and liquidity
injections by the Fed, as shown in our paper, act on liability side weights (ease TOIS). (ii)
Conventional monetary policy acts on the balance sheet quantities: too accommodative
monetary policy (low r) would induce banks to reach-for-yield, increase liquidity transfor-
mation and lower LMI. As a consequence, taking for granted that we can brush a ballpark
for optimal LMI from welfare analysis, monetary policy could be used as a tool to impact
LMI and target optimal LMI, whether through balance sheets or liquidity weights. The
most effective policy depends on BS quantities / weights sensitivities to policy in current
times (in good times, conventional monetary policy should better work, through balance
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sheet quantities, whereas in bad aggregate times, unconventional monetary policy through





This paper studies the optimal design of a joint liability arrangement problem for a group
of sovereigns that decide to borrow jointly. Exactly as banks are supplying safe assets to the
economy by bundling assets that are negatively correlated on their balance sheet, sovereign
authorities should be able to diversify the sovereign risk among themselves.
In the policy debate, one of the often-discussed proposals to alleviate the ongoing
European economic crisis has been the issuance of Eurobonds, broadly defined as liabilities
shared by several countries. The three most developed policy contributions up to date are:
(i) the Blue Bond proposal of (Delpla and Von Weizsacker, 2011), (ii) the Eurobills proposal
of (Hellwig and Philippon, 2011), and (iii) the European Safe Bonds (ESBies) proposal of
(Brunnermeier and al., 2011). This papers aims at providing theoretical foundations to these
policy proposals, by qualifying under which sets of assumptions such arrangement would
be beneficial. We also calibrate the optimal levels of pooling and tranching on the Eurozone
economy.
Our main result is that Eurobonds is a desirable instrument in order to implement a
fiscal union, when explicit transfers are not available. The benefit of pooling is not a priori
1Co-authored with Eduardo Davila (Harvard University). Keywords: sovereign debt, Eurobonds, safe assets.
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straightforward, as the Modigliani-Miller theorem makes it generically irrelevant. Worse,
joint debt issuance is plagued with a free-rider problem. When given the opportunity to
pool a share of its debt with other countries, all countries end up overborrowing due to
a moral hazard problem in the issuance of public debt. Nevertheless, in our framework,
countries would like to risk-share through a fiscal union, but explicitly transfers are not
available, perhaps because of political economy frictions. In this case, Eurobonds prove to
be a market-based instrument that enables to implement the risk-sharing agreement. We
derive the optimal share of pooling as an interior solution to the trade off between the cost
of pooling (free-riding externality) and the benefit of pooling (risk-sharing externality).
Eurobonds turn out to lead to a Pareto improvement when there is demand for safety
in the economy. We show that pooling sovereign debt into Eurobonds and tranching them
into a safe part (’blue bonds’ or ’ESBies’) provides more safe assets to the economy than the
uncoordinated equilibrium, even when countries have access themselves to the tranching
technology. The intuition is as follows. Countries that do enjoy a safety premium do
not internalize that the safety premium also carries on all the inframarginal units of debt
issued. When the source of the safety premium is exogenous to the agents of the zone
(i.e. outside demand for safety), countries would be better off by asking the safe countries
(which enjoy the safety premium) to issue more individual debt, and risky countries to issue
less individual debt. Such Pareto improvement is implemented by the ex-ante arrangement
of pooling and tranching the joint liability.
We frame the design of Eurobonds as a second best problem. The social planner wants
to redistribute income towards countries with higher need, i.e. higher marginal utility. A
ex-ante agreement of joint-issuance will achieve this goal by manipulating asset prices in
the sovereign debt market. However, as the agreement only has access to one instrument
(the pooled share q of all individual sovereign debt that is issued), the first-best allocation
cannot be achieved. Moreover, we show that the social planner does not want to pool all
the debt because of the free-riding externality. As a result the optimal share of pooling to
implement the transfer is interior: q 2 (0; 1). In a second step, when we introduce demand
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for safety, a Pareto improvement can be achieved by joint-liability issuance.
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the vast literature on sovereign default, in the tradition of Eaton and
Gersovitz 1981. Given the stochastic nature of our environment though, we capture both
strategic and suffered default. Most of the literature is concerned about debt sustainability
(Aguiar and Gopinath 2006, Arellano 2008) or maturity choice (Aguiar and Amador 2013).
We address here a different question, the design of supranational public debt issuance
scheme. This mechanism design approach is inspired by (Davila, 2013), which applies it to
the design of bankruptcy policies.
The paper connects a recent literature on the macroeconomic shortage of safe assets:
(Caballero and Farhi, 2013), (Gorton and Ordonez, 2013), (Gourinchas and Jeanne, 2012),
(Weymuller, 2013a). Whereas the latter addresses the question of optimal public debt
issuance to foster private debt creation in a closed economy, our paper is concerned with
the mechanism design faced by a supranational authority. Issuing debt to cater to a specific
demand for assets is also present in (Greenwood et al., 2010).
4.2 A model of joint sovereign debt issuance
4.2.1 Environment
There are two dates, t = {0, 1} and |I| sovereign countries, denoted by i 2 I, with I =
{1, . . . , |I|}. For simplicity, we focus most of our discussion in the case of |I| = 2. Our
model builds upon the canonical model of default in international debt markets.
The only departure is that we allow for an ex-ante institutional arrangement. Before
any public debt issuance, sovereigns agree on pooling a share q of any level of public debt
they will issue. The synthetic liability thus created is called a Eurobond. If countries i each
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This promise is issued jointly on international debt markets, at a single price qE0 . We make
the following assumption on seniority: sovereign cannot selectively default on Eurobonds.
That is, in the case of default of individual country i, all the debt is written down to
zero, both the qBi0 which is part of the Eurobond, and the residual (1  q) Bi0 issued at an





i. Eurobonds consists in this institutional arrangement, which makes
bonds fungible. In other words, sovereigns must default on all their debt, they cannot
default selectively.3
4.2.2 Sovereign choice of public debt issuance
Each country i is populated by a risk averse representative agent which maximizes time sepa-
rable expected utility. Flow utility U (·) satisfies U0 > 0 and U00 < 0; we allow for a different
values of the discount factor bi, to capture potentially different borrowing needs among
countries. We define J (C1) = maxx2{0,1}
n








where I {·} stands for the indicator function for default. Therefore the problem solved by




























Where Ci0 and C
i
1 is the consumption of each country at t = 0 and at t = 1 respectively.
Each country chooses to borrow in the international markets an amount Bi0. A fraction q of
each dollar borrowed by country i is pooled into a joint liability bond, i.e., a EuroBond (E).
2The face value of any debt contract is how much is promised be repaid tomorrow.
3Discuss Russia 98 case, Argentina 2001. Hold outs.
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The rest of the amount borrowed remains the individual liability of each country i.
The initial net output of country i at t = 0 is given by yi0.
4 Output of country i at
t = 1 is stochastic and denoted by Yi1. The joint distribution of Y
i
1 is given by a distribution
F
 




. Define si the volatility of the output i. Following Aguiar and Gopinath 2006
and Arellano 2008, we model default cost as a loss of output. For tractability, this default










0 + (1  q) q˜i0
where qE0 is the unit price of a Eurobond of unit face value and q˜
i
0 is the unit price of a unit
bond backed only by sovereign i. We define qi0 as the unit price per dollar owed at t = 1 by
country i. It is the price that the sovereign faces, taken as given the institutional Eurobond
arrangement.




1   Bi0s (4.1)
Ci1,D = (1  d)Yi1 (4.2)
We assume that a country that defaults does not pay any of its debt back;6 neither the
individual part (1  q) nor the Eurobond part q.
4The net output can be thought as disposable income.
5The parameter d captures all costs associated with defaulting; international sanctions. We abstract from
investment.
6The extension to the case in which the sovereign pays back part of its loan is straightforward.
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Optimal default decision at t = 1
In our setup, a country i decides to default at t = 1 when the output realization Yi1 is
sufficiently low.7 We assume that there is no possibility of renegotiating the contracts,8 and
we rule out the existence of any kind of bailout policy between countries.
A country i decides to default when Ci1,ND < C
i





Countries default when their income realization is below an endogenous threshold.
Under this formulation, sovereigns may decide to default when they do not have enough
resources to repay the debt or also when, even having sufficient resources to pay their debt
back, it is more profitable to suffer the penalty than repay. Thus it embeds both strategic
and suffered defaults.
Optimal borrowing choice at t = 0
Taking into account its optimal default decision at t = 1, by backward induction each





































































is the derivative of the demand curve with respect to the total amount of
Bi0. Where f
i denotes whether agents internalize their price impact or not. The general
case considers price taking sovereigns, i.e. small open economies. On the other hand, large
7Compare to Arellano which has a region of default instead.
8This should be the case in equilibrium when debt holders can hold out.
9LHS is marginal benefit, RHS is marginal cost of extra unit of borrowing.
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countries take into account their price impact, i.e. they realize they face a downward sloping
demand curve in their own debt.10 We focus on the latter case.
The equation 4.4 traces out a supply curve for the sovereign debt of country i. Under
mild assumptions on the income distribution, this supply curve is increasing. A key feature
of the model is that this supply curve does not depend directly on the Eurobond share q.
This policy function will impact debt issuance of country i, but only through its indirect
effect on the equilibrium price qi0s.



























Assumption 3. The discount factor bi is sufficiently low.
Assumption 1 is here to ensure the marginal benefit and the marginal curves for the
sovereign do cross out, hence pinning a unique privately optimal level of debt from the
sovereign f.o.c. Apart from the log case, non-trivial second order conditions need to be
verified to ensure that the supply curve of sovereign debt is upward sloping.
4.2.3 Risk-neutral bond pricing
There are I + 1 bonds to be priced: the unpooled sovereign bond issued by each individual
country, and the Eurobond. International markets price risk neutrally any security, with
discount factor b⇤ = 11+r⇤ . We disregard issues related to the nationality of the debt holders.
Pricing of individual bonds
The bond demand for the fraction of debt not pooled into the Eurobond is priced as such:

















10This is reminiscent of Aguiar and Amador 2013, in which the government acts as a monopsonist: he fully
takes into account its price impact.
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The prices of individual bonds are generically independent of any correlation structure
of the shocks between the countries.
Pricing of Eurobonds
A risk-neutral representation of the assets decomposes linearly the price of the Eurobond.
Thus, without any demand for safety from the international lenders, the correlation structure
of income shocks does not matter in the pricing of Eurobonds.





























































Correlations do not matter in the pricing of Eurobonds. Holding a Eurobond is exactly
the same as holding Bi0d units of each country i debt. Hence by law of one price, the price
of Eurobond cannot differ from the price of the portfolio of individual bonds that exactly
replicate the payoffs of the Eurobond.
4.3 Equilibrium: Cournot game in issuance of sovereign debt
We define the uncooperative Cournot game equilibria for this economy. Each country takes
into account their price impact when they issue public debt.
Definition 7. A Cournot game is defined as a set of allocations and prices such that:
(i) Sovereigns optimize their borrowing level and default decisions;
(ii) International lenders break even in their public debt holdings.
246
Effective borrowing price of the sovereign The equilibrium in the debt markets is given
by the combination of the first-order conditions of the two borrowing countries and the debt
pricing conditions coming from international lenders. We look for an equilibrium in which
both the Eurobond and the individual bonds are issued. Lenders pricing conditions act as
no arbitrage conditions between these two types of assets. q does not directly enters in the
two bonds prices q˜i0 and q
E
0 . Hence q impacts the equilibrium only by controlling the weight
between the individual bond and the Eurobond in the effective price faced by the sovereign.






























































When q = 0, sovereigns borrow as if they were alone. As long as q > 0, the effective price
faced by the sovereign i depends on the equilibrium amount of debt issued by the other
sovereign  i.































0s + (1  q) q˜i0s












































































we can write the first-order
condition :














































































interested in the slope of the reaction function:
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Figure 4.1: Equilibrium of the issuance Cournot game with symmetric countries. Solid lines are reaction














Lemma 17. If the pooling share is positive (q > 0) and the volatility si of output low enough, then





Lemma 2 formalizes the non-cooperative behavior between the issuance of the two
countries. The equilibrium exhibits a free-riding externality which induces countries to
overborrow.
4.3.1 Case of symmetric countries
In this case, in equilibrium Bi0 = B
 i
0 , and by inspection of the first-order condition 4.9 we
obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 12. In the case of symmetric countries, individual sovereign borrowing increases with
the share q pooled in the Eurobond.
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Figures 4.1 illustrates the equilibrium with a CARA-normal specification:U0 (C0) =




. It plots the two reaction functions. The equilibrium, which is
given by their intersection, moves towards higher levels of borrowing when the Eurobond is
introduced.
4.3.2 Case of asymmetric countries
Assume that the output country i is riskier than the output of country  i, ceteris paribus: the
volatilities of output are such that si > s i. In this case at the symmetric equilibrium, the
marginal revenue for the “safe” country  i than for the “risky” country i. A perturbation
argument derives the following proposition.
Proposition 13. In the case of asymmetric countries, increasing the pooling share q leads to higher
borrowing from the riskier country and to lower borrowing from the safe country.
Figure 4.2 illustrates the equilibrium with the CARA-normal specification. One reaction
function is now downward sloping around the initial symmetric equilibrium. It is explained
by the lower marginal revenue for the safe country when the risky country increases the
level of its borrowing.
4.4 Optimal level of sovereign debt pooling
We now solve for the social planner’s problem. The planner has the ability to choose the
pooling share q and the tranching threshold y of the Eurobond. It has as instrument the
institutional arrangement of how much to pool q, which is decided ex-ante the actual bor-
rowing choices by sovereigns. It optimizes the values of q and y, subject to the equilibrium
described above. We characterize the Pareto frontier in this economy.
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Figure 4.2: Equilibrium of the issuance Cournot game with asymmetric countries: the output of country i
is riskier than the output of country  i. Solid lines are reaction functions under low pooling (q = 0.1) and
dashed lines are reaction functions under high pooling (q = 0.5).
4.4.1 Social planner’s problem
The planner maximizes a social welfare function with arbitrary weights li. Denote Wi the
indirect utility of sovereign i in equilibrium, the social welfare function is:





The planning problem on q is:
















This maximization is subject to individual budget constraints (4.1) and (4.2) and to
the optimal individual choices for Bi0, determined by (4.9), and the default thresholds,
determined by (4.3).
Substituting budget constraints and individual default decisions, we can write the
planning problem as:
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By the envelope theorem, we can substitute the first order condition 4.4 for Bi0 of each


















































































is the perceived change in borrowing conditions by country i when choosing how
much to borrow. dB
i
0
dq is the equilibrium response of B
i
0 to movements in q, which is a function
in principle of changes in prices too. dq
i
0
dq is the equilibrium change in prices of debt issued
by a country i; it has the component of the EuroBond and the component of the individual

































































The weight term has a leverage term times an elasticity. The planner tries to optimize
the price movements. We have shown that there is an interior solution to this problem. In
the general case,
dqi0/qi0
dq is different for different countries. Increasing q can make borrowing
cheaper for some countries and more expensive for others.
4.4.2 Welfare with symmetric countries
In the case of symmetric countries, as we have Bi0 = B
 i
0 in equilibrium, the marginal






















For low levels of borrowing, the first term dominates. By increasing the pooling share q,
the level of borrowing increases, due to the negative free-riding externality in debt issuance
that makes countries overborrow. The marginal revenue decreases. As a consequence, for
each of the symmetric countries, the indirect utility of the country decreases when pooling
is introduced: dW
i
dq |q=0 < 0. This is due to the It results in sovereign bonds that are riskier,
hence a lower bond price and welfare. The following proposition is a direct consequence.
Proposition 14. With symmetric countries and no exogenous safety demand, introducing Eurobonds
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is welfare destroying. The optimal share of pooling is zero.
4.4.3 Welfare with asymmetric countries
We analyze the case where the output of one country is riskier the output of the other


































The last term captures the cross-subsidy from the safer country to the riskier country.
As this term increases with the level of pooling, it conveys the intuition of the following
proposition.
Proposition 15. When countries are asymmetric, increasing the share of pooling increases the
borrowing and the welfare of the risky country, whereas it decreases the borrowing and the welfare of
the safe country.
In other words, the joint-liability scheme of the Eurobond implements a transfer:
dW1
dq |q=0 > 0 and dW
2
dq |q=0 < 0. The following figure traces the allocations that can be
implemented with different shares q of pooling. The specification is CARA-normal. As
this Pareto frontier is downward sloping, no Pareto improvement can be achieved with the
Eurobond instrument.
Case of a utilitarian welfare function We can derive an analytical solution for the optimal
pooling threshold as a function of the Pareto weights li. We characterize here the solution in
the case of a utilitarian social welfare function. When the terms that sovereigns internalize
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Figure 4.3: Pareto frontier: allocations that can be implemented by the Eurobond, according to the share of
pooling q.






























































Where we have assumed that li = 1 (utilitarian social function), to derive the third
line. Setting dWdq = 0, we find the following proposition under standard assumptions (Inada
conditions).
























This magnitude is between 0 and 1. Note that q1 q ⇡ q when q is small. We will have
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to show that dq
E
0
dq < 0 and that
dqi0
dq > 0. The denominator captures the aggregate loss and
the numerator captures the individual change. Intuitively, the planner wants to tradeoff the
gains derived from pooling more (risk-sharing transfer) with the losses from the free-riding
externality.
When the utilities are logarithms, we can simplify further the expression for the optimal
share of pooling q⇤. The budget constraints is Ci0 = yi0 +
⇣
qqJL0 + (1  q) qi0
⌘
Bi0 (in this









+ (1  q) qi0Bi0Ci0 ) 1 =
yi0
Ci0




































The intuition for the results is as follows. When #q
JL
0
q is very low, that is when markets
are willing to accept a large amount of Eurobonds without moving greatly interest rates,
this is the optimal policy to be done. When q = 1 we have too expensive joint liabilities,
when q = 0 we are not doing any risk sharing. Both are suboptimal, so there is a trade-off
from the planner’s perspective. On the one hand, increasing pooling enhances risk-sharing
between the countries. On the other hand, it also exacerbates the pooling externality, i.e.
the fact that when an individual sovereign borrows an extra unit, there are states of the
joint distribution in which he will not incur the loss, so the Eurobond is ’mispriced’, by
incentivizing the individual sovereigns to borrow too much: B⇤ > BSP. The latter can be
seen as moral hazard. Given the timeline, the pooling level is chosen ex ante the actual debt
issuance by individual sovereigns.
4.5 Welfare with exogenous safety demand
We now assume that agents have access to a tranching technology. Any liability promising
B can be split in two securities: one part yB is senior to the second part (1  y) B. This
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subordination ensures that the payoff on the senior part is yB 1{Y<yB} where Y is the
cash-flow collateralizing the liability promise B.
Furthermore we assume that there is an exogenous safety demand in the economy. It
can be microfounded by exogenous lenders that are more risk-averse than the international
(risk-neutral) lenders currently pricing the public debt. This assumption implies that, in




< a enjoys a safety
premium p (see (Stein, 2010) and Weymuller (2013a) for a microfoundation). Compared to
the case of risk-neutral lenders pricing the given liability at q, the presence of this exogenous
safety demand enhances the price of the liability to q+ p.
Assumption 4. Each asset that defaults with probability less than a is priced with an extra premium
p.
4.5.1 Bond pricing with safety demand
We analyze the pricing of a two-country Eurobond in this environment. Without safety
demand, section 2.3 showed that:










Now the correlation structure of income shocks matters in the pricing of Eurobonds. The














Figure 4.4 illustrates the state-contingent payoffs of Eurobonds. When incomes are
too low in both sovereigns, both default. When one does well but not the other, that one
defaults. When both sovereigns do fine, there is no default. The correlation structure of the
income shocks will determine whether we are more probably in quadrants 1 and 3 (positive
















Figure 4.4: Eurobond payoff: recovery rates as a function of the joint distribution
Given Assumption 2, now the correlation between the two shocks in the pricing of
the Eurobond. Indeed, assume that the parameters are such that the safety premium will
be granted to the Eurobond if and only if the probability of ending up in the bottom-left











Thus the pricing of Eurobonds requires to keep track of the exact correlation structure.
We consider the case of multivariate normal shocks, which enables us to introduce copulas
as a useful pricing tool. The multivariate normal copula is:
C (u, v; r) = F2
⇣
F 1 (u) ,F 1 (v) ; r
⌘


















































It leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 18. The Eurobond price depends on the correlation r between the two assets:
qE0 = g (B























Lemma 2 underpins how Eurobonds can create value by overturning Modigliani-Miller:
the price of the Eurobond is not equal to the synthetic portfolio of individual bonds
replicating the Eurobond payoff. Two benchmarks are given by the following cases: (i) when
shocks are independent; (ii) when all countries are ex-ante symmetric. The symmetry of the

















In the case of symmetric countries, Proposition 3 delivered the negative result that

































































which can be the case only if the country does not enjoy the safety premium individually.
It yields to the following proposition.
Proposition 17. When there is an exogenous safety demand, Eurobond pooling can achieve a Pareto
improvement.
It should be observed that the constructive case that shows the Pareto improvement
relies on the two country being risky enough individually in order not to enjoy the safety
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premium individually. If one country is safe enough to enjoy the safety premium on its
individual bond, the financial innovation of Eurobonds cannot increase welfare for this
country directly. Nevertheless, in an enriched model with production and open economy
consumption, a wealth channel can lead to such Pareto improvement. In this case, the
mechanism is as follows. Thanks to Eurobonds, sovereign debt of the risky country gains
access to the safe asset status. It leads to a wealth inflow in the risky country, which
comes from the exogenous investors. In a second time, the safe country benefits from this
exogenous wealth inflow through a terms-of-trade channel on its export goods.
4.6 Conclusion
We analyze the problem of a social planner that has the possibility to force sovereign to pool
a share of their debt before borrowing choices. We show that there exists an interior optimal
level of pooling to achieve any desired transfer on the Pareto frontier. This optimal level
trades-off the risk-sharing benefits of the Eurobond with its cost. The cost of the Eurobond
comes from a pooling negative externality that leads to overborrowing.
The optimal pooling threshold can be calibrated on observable market data. The





q ). The two can be inferred in the
European case. Indeed, before the sovereign debt crisis, sovereign debt of the Eurozone was
priced jointly, effectively as a Eurobond. Since the crisis, the fragmentation of sovereign
debt markets leads to the reversion to a pricing of sovereign bonds on an individual basis.
The Eurobond issuance is a joint arrangement which is tantamount to the two countries
entering ex-ante a contract. A natural extension is concerned with the dynamic implications.
In a dynamic environment, the contract could be self-enforced, in the same way as in
Kocherlakota (1996). The agreement will be self-enforced if and only if the participation
constraints for the two countries are satisfied at each period and each state of the world.
This introduces additional participation constraints in the program of the social planner.
Dynamics would enhance the desirable properties of Eurobonds. Indeed, regarding the
effect of voluntary participation on the optimal design of Eurobonds, the safe country will
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decide to stay in the Eurobonds despite the risky country free-riding on its signature because
with some probability this safe country will become the risky country at the next period.
A related issue is the time inconsistency in the choice of the optimal pooling share q. As
shown in the above section, q depends on the conditional correlation structure, which faces
innovations as long as shocks are persistent. It incentivizes countries to renegotiate the
ex-ante agreement.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Theory appendix
A.1.1 4-states example
Consider four equally plausible states. Assume that a t = 1 risky payoff for the technology
and consider a public security that is imperfectly negatively correlated with the technology:













Conjecture an equilibrium in which risk-neutral banks sell securities with promise 1 to
mean-variance risk-averse investors, and where the bank is pushed in default if and only if
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The three first-order conditions of the investor leads to, denoting µ the Lagrange
multiplier on their budget and Sij the covariance matrix of {Xi}:
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The market clearings for public debt and private debt are:
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Applying Cramer’s rule, developing along the third column, plugging the prices, gP
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S21 S22 S24 S25
E0[X˜5]
E0[X˜4]












S11 S12 S13 S14 S15 1
S21 S22 S23 S24 S25
E0[X˜5]
E0[X˜4]















0 1 0 0 1 0
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Consider the middle-aged generation risk-sharing problem and the generic asset correlation











The portfolio of the borrower is
264 x1
x2
375, the lender’s is
264 y1
y2
375 and the promise of the











Borrower With the change of variable: u = X0S  ´ xs¯s¯, we have: u ⇠ N  µu, s2u  with
µu(x1, x2, s¯) = x1µ1 + x2µ2  
´
xs¯s¯ and s2u(x1, x2) = x21s
2




2 . Denote F
and f respectively the density and the cdf of the standard normal distribution. We can



















Lender For the investor, the derivation is more cumbersome in order to take explicitly into
account default. With the same change of variable u = X0S  ´ xs¯s¯ and v = Y0S+ ´ ys¯s¯:
1We have:
´ a2






































e gL(Y0S+X0S)1{X0S<´ xs¯ s¯} + e gL(Y


















= WLde f +WLno de f
We have Mu,v =
264 x1µ1 + x2µ2   s¯
y1µ1 + y2µ2 + s¯





















































The value function of the lender can be expressed as:






































Its program takes the price of debt securities qs¯. As all securities yield the same interest
rate, the rate is the price: rbank = s¯qs¯ and we can write, denoting D =
´
xs¯qs¯ and S¯ =
´
xs¯s¯:





X0S  S¯  1{X0S S¯}i+ l nB + S¯ 1rbank   X0P
 










Investor maximization Their Lagrangian is:
L =  E0
h
e gL(Y0S+X0S)1{X0S<´ xs¯ s¯} + e gL(Y








So investor f.o.c are: dLds¯ = 0 =
∂WL




Introduce the borrower Marginal Rate of Substitution in the portfolio choice from Asset


















The first-order conditions can be expressed in terms of Marginal Rates of Substitution
and of Transformation. In the case of limited participation of risk-averse agents in the risky
technology3, the equilibrium is characterized by the following five equations:
3This assumption follows Basak and Cuoco (1998) and Cuoco and Kaniel (2011). The general case is solved
in the same way and features the same properties as long as the asset correlation is higher than  1. The two
cases are compared in section 2.5.4.
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• The two budget constraints:
y2p2 + D  nL (A.4)
x1p1 + x2p2  nB + D (A.5)

















, we obtain for the marginal benefits of































































Lender The algebraic complexity of investor value function is dramatically simplified
under the European feature of limited participation, i.e. investor being restricted access to





We have ∂µv∂y2 = µ2,
∂sv
∂y2 = s2 and
∂ruv











































⇢  µ2gL + g2Ls2 (sv + ruvsu)  e gLµu+ 12g2L(s2u+2ruvsvsu) ⇢1 F✓µusu   gL (ruvsv + su)
◆  
+































































Combining the two bank optimality conditions (portfolio choice A.7 and leverage choice



























This shows that the marginal benefit of an extra unit of leverage (of promise s¯) is constant
along the contract curve, i.e. does not depend on the actual promise s¯. Using the definition
of the price of debt D0(s¯) = DS¯ =
q








ˆMRSB (x1µ1 + x2µ2   µu)






















is a measure of the effective correlation on bank’s
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⌘2 , in the equilibrium that we look for in which s2x2s1x1 < 1





), we obtain that X (r) is increasing,
between  1 and 1. Furthermore, this functional is concave, with the concavity more marked





from Assumption 1 implies, as long
as X < 0 ˆMRSB < 1, but when X > 0 we get ˆMRSB > 1. So the interest rate on bank debt
critically depends on the bank balance sheet correlation measure X. We can ascertain that
rbank > 1 for sure only in the X < 0 case. Define the Safety Mismatch Index as the carry
trade on public debt (the opposite is the bank credit spread):










So the sign of the carry trade is the sign of the correlation measure X (x1, x2; r). Finally:
rsa f e   rbank < 0, r <  s2x2
s1x1
Furthermore, some algebra delivers the exact dependence:
rsa f e   rbank =
⇣








So taking the equilibrium as given (envelope condition), the carry trade SMI increases
with X (x1, x2; r), which itself increases with r. The negative carry trade is even more
negative when p2 increases.
Bank Mean Variance Frontier
The bank budget constraint combined with bank portfolio choice is a quadratic system







x1p1 + x2p2 = nB + D




The portfolio choice directly gives:
x2 =
(p2µ1   p1µ2) 










⌘ +  s21 p2   rs1s2p1  
s22 p1   rs1s2p2
  x1 (A.9)
Using the value of debt D and the expression of X then plugging x2 in the budget




x21 + bx1   c = 0
There is one and only one positive root x1 (as long as r low enough). The exact solution


















































1 + (1  2r  r2) s1s2p1p2 + s21 p22










Finally I express s2u = x21s
2




2 as a function of x1 and denoting S, we
obtain:










1  r2  s21  s22 p21   2rs1s2p1p2 + s21 p22 
This equation gives a closed-form expression for the mean-variance frontier. It implicetly
defines a functional su 7! µu which is increasing for low su, before decreasing.
Equilibrium price of debt
The contract curve is defined by D0(s¯) = p2µ2
ˆMRSL, i.e.:
ˆMRSB = ˆMRSL































































































So MˆRSL increases in gL for r low enough (to make ruv << 1) and y2 low enough (i.e.
Sb low enough). On the contract curve, we see that implies a higher equilibrium leverage.
We also observe that MˆRSL does not depend on p2, so easily get the impact of a higher
price p2 here: it increases the slope MRSB: the MB of leverage has to be higher to match the
increased price p2.
288
We can also get a approximate for the debt-pricing functional in the neighborhood of
















Equilibrium price of long-term safe asset
The GE: x2 + y2 = Sb, and adding the two budget constraints:
p2Sb + p1x1 (µ1; p2) = nB + nL
So p2 is depends on the equilibrium only through x1 (a key feature of the model):



















By the implicit function theorem applied to this resource constraint, we can characterize









So the demand curve is indeed downward sloping ( dp2dSb < 0) as long as   S
b
p1 < ∂p2x1.








Third, the dynamic model solution requires d
2p2
d(µ1)
2 . I compute it through a double
application of implicit function theorem to the resource constraint F (p2; µ1) = 0. Total















































on Sb. As we have ∂p2p2F = p1∂p2p2x1, which is < 0 (S does not dominate - cf. s.o.c.), then




The second order condition needs to be verified: ∂p2p2x1 >> 0, despite ∂µ1p2x1 < 0.








Beware of the elasticities signs: ∂µ1p2x1 < 0 and ∂p2p2x1 < 0 so the above condition is a
lower bound on u, i.e. an upper bound on Sb. The elasticities signs are guaranteed with a
high enough gL.
So finally the second-order Taylor expansion of p2 (µ1) writes:
p2 (µ1) = a  bµ1   gµ21
where b = | dp2dµ1 | =
p1∂µ1 x1
Sb+p1∂p2 x1




















p1∂µ1 p2 x1+p1∂µ1µ1 x1
Sb+p1∂p2 x1
which means that the price functional µ1 7! p2 is decreasing concave.
290
Equilibrium
Equilibrium is therefore characterized by the MVF and the debt pricing curve:
8>>><>>>:






































































































The degree 4 polynomial in lu on the RHS is increasing so it will cross the positive flat
line (rs1)
2. And the higher r2 is, the higher lu needs to be. The lower r2, the lower lu so




















































































d increasing in |r|. d spikes up when r tends to  1. Denoting
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The function x/x(x) is graphed below: it increases in x as long as x < 1. We do have
p2
µ2












































= nB + nL










Generically we have that, for an univariate normal distribution s ⇠ N (µ, s), the correla-
tion between s and p2 = a  bs  gs2, first-order in g/b5:






Applied to the random walk process of st: st+1 ⇠ N  st, s1 :




• sˆ2 = bs1
r











This is a system of 3 equations, with 3 unknowns (rˆ, sˆ2, µˆ2). The recursion implies that b
and g are themselves functions of (rˆ, sˆ2, µˆ2). s1 is an exogenous parameter. The state is
st ⌘ µ1.
4If I only consider the first-order Taylor expansion p2 = a  bst, then the endogenous beta is equal to  1.
No traction for any comparative statics.
5The exact expression in g/b is:
s (p2) = bs
r















Consider x1 (p2; µ1). In p2 = 0: S (0) = s22 p
2














• ∂µ1∂µ1x1 = 0




















By inspection we see that
∂p2∂p2
 
s21 (1  r)  2 (1+ r)2 p22
s22 p
2





s21 (1  r)  2 (1+ r)2 p22
s22 p
2
1 + (1  2r  r2) s1s2p1p2 + s21 p22
Around r =  1:
|∂p2k| =























∂p2∂p2k = 2 (1+ r)
2 ( 2  s22 p21 2 + 6s22 p21s21 p22 + 2  1  2r  r2  s1s2p1s21 p32)
+2s21 (1  r)n  
1  2r  r2  s1s2p1 2 + 3   1  2r  r2  s1s2p1  s21 p2 + s21   s22 p21 + 3s21 p22 o


















r =  1+ 4µ2






































A.1.4 Results: comparative statics















lower r make bank lever up and take more risk, whereas better p2 make bank lever up more
and take less risk. Propositions 1,2 and 3 then follow.








(2a+ b) (1  r2)
which is positive as long as 2  r2 > l2u.
Equilibrium leverage D
D = MRSB ⇤ s¯
∂D
∂p2





































































The equation: |∂s¯|s¯ >
1
p2 is true as long as p2 > p¯2 = a/2. The complementarity (i.e.






. And finally we need to make sure that y2 low. It is the case when Sb low
enough in Partial Equilibrium6. This proves the safety multiplier in Partial Equilibrium.
Risky asset holdings x1
Assumption 1 allows to work in the very high µ1 (relative to µ2 and µu) neighborhood. The
analytical expression of x1 =  b+
p



















The convexity of x1 with respect to nB drives the procyclicality of bank leverage in this
environment. Using the equilibrium: lu =
p
dnB:
















































o : ruvy2s2 needs to be small enough
to make sure the denominator dominates on the numerator.
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1  2r  r2  s1s2p1p2⇤  µ1pd
• We already see that ∂p2x1 < 0 in the neighborhood of r =  1. Denoting u = s1p2s2p1 ,




1  u2⇤ < 4 which is true as long as
s2
2 < u < 1. So this refinement of Assumption 1 prevents from imposing any condition
on r to get Proposition 2: ∂p2x1 < 0.















1  2r  r2  s1s2p1p2⇤ pd < 0
























































nL + nB   p1 (x1 + y1)
o
The f.o.c. in i = (x1 + y1) is:
ˆ
µss f (s)ds  µ0p1 = 0
The f.o.c. in cLs is:
gLe gLc
L
s f (s)ds  µs f (s)ds+ nLs = 0
The f.o.c. in cBs is:
f (s)ds  µs f (s)ds+ nBs = 0











































pK   it and cB⇤s = 0 i f s  s¯
We recognize the risky debt as in the decentralized equilibrium of the within generation
model in the case there is no long-term asset. This is the efficient risk-sharing agreement
within generation.









= bge gÂ nq egit
ˆ s¯
e git 1s f (s)ds
Jointly with the definition of s¯ and the efficient consumptions, the history {it} of efficient
levels of investment is well defined. As the equilibrium is recursive, we can write it = a st
and solve for a.
The indirect utilities derived with this allocations parametric in l traces the Pareto
frontier:























































































































maximizes the welfare of
the investors under the competitive equilibrium.
Computation of the indirect utility of risk averse investors














































Recall D = p2µ2
ˆMRSBs¯:
WL µ rsa f enL +
⇣










We sign as follows:










The trade-off is as follows: increasing p2 worsens the wealth effect and the safety
multiplier, but as bank takes less risk, it is also beneficial. There is a direct effect on nL
(a ’wealth effect’: the first term rsa f e
( )
nL), and then there is the indirect SMI/safety creation
effect (and additionally there is the cost of default: the two last terms). Both tends to call
for more Sb, as long as r is low enough. Given that r is endogenous in the dynamic model,
higher Sb leads to a higher r. As a result, there is an interior solution for Sb. Contrary to
Lorenzoni and Werning (2013) and Calvo (1988), and in line with common practice, the
government picks Sb and not p2Sb. Under this last assumption, there is no Laffer curve,
hence no multiple equilibria.
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A.1.6 Extension with sovereign risk
Closed economy
Following the assumption made in the text the public debt market value is: p˜t2 = ks
t 1{st< ¯¯s} +
pt2 1{st  ¯¯s}. We focus on Markov equilibria, defined exactly in the same way as in the main





t  = k cov ⇣st 1{st< ¯¯s}, st⌘+ cov ⇣pt2 1{st  ¯¯s}, st⌘






st 1{st< ¯¯s}, st
⌘
= s21F (h)  {s1h+ µ1} s1f (h)
cov
⇣
pt2 1{st  ¯¯s}, st
⌘
=  bs21 (1 F (h)) + {a  bµ1   bhs1} s1f (h)








t  =  bs21 + (b+ k) s21F (h) + {a  (b+ k) µ1   (b+ k) s1h} s1f (h)
We also have µ˜2 = a (1 F (h))  bµ1 + (b+ k) {µF (h)  sf (h)} and s˜2 = bs1 in a
low sovereign risk approximation.
Now, to solve for the fixed point, use the explicit expression of a and b:












As in the dynamic model with no sovereign risk, we eliminate µ˜2 and s˜2, and collate in









The right strategy is to add the sovereign term through the linear term and the quadratic









µ  Sbp1 1nB 1 r1+rpd|∂p2k|
◆2
with b = | dp2dµ1 | =
p1∂µ1 x1
Sb+p1∂p2 x1

















µ  Sbp1 1nB 1 r1+rpd|∂p2k|
◆2




0@µ1   Sbp1 1nB 1 r1+rpd|∂p2k|
1A1AF (h) + 16µ2✓
µ  Sbp1 1nB 1 r1+rpd|∂p2k|
◆2














































We directly observe that increasing s¯ (sovereign risk through h) increases r˜ and therefore
destroys the endogenous hedging properties of public debt.
Open economy














µu = x1µ1 + x2µ2 + x3µ3   s¯
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In the open economy we derive:











Similarly, on the third asset:



















So the asset side correlation metrics is now:
X =
(x2s2 + r2x1s1)
(x1s1 + r2x2s2 + r3x3s3)





So in the open economy model, all the results go through as long as we use the new X.
Consider the South bank:
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8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
x1p1 + x2p2 + x3p3 = nB + a












ˆMRSB (x1µ1 + x2µ2 + x3µ3   µu)
By inverting the 2x2 system in (x2s2, x3s3):
8>><>>:




  (p1s2r2   p2s1) x1s1




  (p1s3r3   p3s1) x1s1












with Su2 = p2p1 (s3µ1   s1r3)   p21s3 + p1p3s1r3 and S12 = p1p2s1s3
 
1  r23





















































































⌘ = nB   p2
µ2
ˆMRSBµu









and X = (x2s2+r2x1s1)(x1s1+r2x2s2+r3x3s3) , this defines the equilibrium.
The equilibrium µusu is the same as in the closed economy (the debt-pricing mapping, so
far the two banks are symmetric.). This pins down a x1 (µu, su).
We show the "redomestication" result as follows, through a perturbation argument.
Consider South bond loosing its hedging property: r3 < r2 = 0 and higher volatility s2 > s3.
This amounts to a higher gL so at the margin, lower µu and higher su. It is less expensive to




is pinned down by the closed economy equilibrium), an increasing
x1 crowds in x2 and x3 (to hedge against default). The sensitivity of which one increases








. To make x2 increase more, despite s2 increasing, it
suffices to make S12 > S
1
3. This is the case as r
2
3 decreases, making S
1
2 increasing more than
S13. As result, x
South
2 increases more at the margin than x
North
2 . Starting from the symmetric
equilibrium, we obtain redomestication of public debt.
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A.2 Empirical Appendix





































01jan2002 01jan2004 01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010 01jan2012 01jan2014
France
Figure A.2: Betas of government bonds with DJ EUROSTOXX 50 . Core countries: Germany (top) and








































01jan2002 01jan2004 01jan2006 01jan2008 01jan2010 01jan2012 01jan2014
Spain
Figure A.3: Betas of government bonds with DJ EUROSTOXX 50 . Periphery countries: Italy (top) and
Spain (bottom). Source: Financial Database.
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A.2.2 Concentration of ownership for Eurozone public debt
Figure A.4: Breakdown of Eurozone public debt by type of holders.
Figure A.5: Breakdown of Eurozone public debt by maturity: long-term in red, short-term in blue.
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A.2.3 Predictive regression of SMI = rsa f e   rbank on bank profits PB
Figure A.6: Decomposition of European banks profits.
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A.2.4 Open economy
Redomestication of government debt
Figure A.7: France (left) and Germany (right) government bond holdings by banks. Foreign debt in red,
domestic debt in blue.
Figure A.8: Italy (left) and Spain (right) government bond holdings by banks. Foreign debt in red, domestic
debt in blue.
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Bank leverage by country
Figure A.9: France (left) and Germany (right) bank short-term debt: decrease of leverage. Source: ECB.
Figure A.10: Italy (left) and Spain (right) bank short-term debt: stable leverage. Source: ECB.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Static model
B.1.1 Optimal contract
There are I borrowers and J lenders. We assume there are no inactive borrower or lender in
equilibrium. We focus on symmetric pairwise stable equilibria. The collateral constraint of
each borrower is: ÂJ xijmij p  nB so xij = 1J n
B
mij p
. We note mij = m.
Expected utility of each borrower The expected utility of the borrower, for given contracts
xij, is:
UBI,J = ÂJ xij EB
h




1{no de f }VB
i
with ÂJ xijmij p  nB
Using s˜ = s¯ VB the default threshold, recallingmp = p D and pB(s˜) = ´ s˜smin (s˜  s) fB(s)ds
(with smin and smax potentially equal to ±•):
EB
h




s¯ VB (s  s¯) ds = p
 
1+ µB












  s˜  (1  FB(s˜))VB + pB(s˜)
⌘




































(s˜,D) = Âi xijEL
h






(1+ µL)  nL(1+ µL)
With EL
h



















s˜+ (1  FL(s˜))VB   pL(s˜)  (1+ µL)D
⌘























Multilateral Nash bargaining Denoting w the bargaining power of the lender, the surplus









I formulate the induction hypothesis: UBI,J 1  UB0 = (1 w)nBSI,J 1 and ULI 1,J  UL0 =
wnBSI 1,J . The bargaining does not into account he continuation term of the borrower (static
bargaining).
1The extension where lenders have mean-variance preferences adds a penalty term quadratic in x2ij. This
























































and dI J = (1 w)w
(1 w) IJ+w
= d(1 w)
d 2 [0; 1] is a measure of the lenders effective bargaining power. Rearranging terms yields
the value D of the contract obtained from the bargaining:
D = (1 d)EL[1{de f }s+1{no de f } s¯]+d((1+µ
B)p EB[1{no de f }(s s¯)])+dI J(SI,J 1 SI 1,J)p
(1 d)(1+µL)+d(1+µB)+dI J(SI,J 1 SI 1,J)
I define the levered return (per unit of net worth) perceived by the borrower:
RlevB =
EB[1{no de f }(s s¯)]
p D
I note µd = (1  d)µL + dµB and µd barg = µd + dI J (SI,J 1   SI 1,J). Given the value of




  EB[1{no de f }(s s¯)]
(1 d)(1+µL)p (1 d)EL[1{de f }s+1{no de f } s¯]+dEB[1{no de f }(s s¯)]
I now introduce the compound distribution: Fd(s) = (1  d)FL(s) + dFB(s). It is a linear




. The beliefs d and B still satisfy




Using the expressions of EL
h




1{no de f } (s  s¯)
i
as a function
of the put perceived valuation pB(s˜) and pL(s˜), and denoting pd(s˜) the put valuation under



























   s˜  (1  FB(s˜))VB + pB(s˜)

























The first order condition delivers:
















(1  Fd(s˜))  1  fd(s˜)V
B   Fd(s˜)








1  fd(s˜)VB   Fd(s˜)


















1{no de f } (s  s¯)
i⌘2
Introducing the auxiliary functions measuring the distortion of beliefs with VB:
k1(s˜;VB) =
fd(s˜)(1 FB(s˜))  fB(s˜)(1 Fd(s˜))











By the hazard rate property we have 0  k1  1 and 0  k3  1. k1 and k3 are related
by: (1  Fd(s˜))  k3 (1  FB(s˜)) = VBk1. I then write the f.o.c:















1{no de f } (s  s¯)
i⌘2
This first order condition implicitly defines the riskiness s˜ of the optimal contract:
0 = F
 
s˜; µd, µB, s,VB, p, µd barg, b
 
B.1.2 Comparative statics
For any given parameter a 2  µd, µB, s,VB, p, µd barg, b , the implicit function theorem gives:
∂as˜ =   ∂aF∂s˜ F .





+ k1VB + s˜ fd(s˜) + ∂s˜k3 (1  FB(s˜))EB [s|s > s˜]  k3s˜ fB(s˜)
We can verify that:
∂s˜k3 =  k3
"  
fd +VB f 0d
 
(1  Fd(s˜) VB fd(s˜))  
 




Let h : VB 7! h(VB) = ( fd(s˜)+VB f 0d(s˜))
(1 Fd(s˜) VB fd(s˜))  
( fB(s˜)+VB f 0B(s˜))
















We show that 8VB, h(VB) > 0. We have h(0) = fd(s˜)1 Fd(s˜)  
fB(s˜)
1 FB(s˜) > 0 by the hazard rate









s > 0. After


















The result obtains by monoticity of function h: ∂s˜k3 =  k3h(s˜;VB) < 0.





=   fd(s˜) + k3 fB(s˜) + (1  FB(s˜)) k3h(s˜;VB)
∂s˜F =   (1  FB) k3h(VB)
h
EB [s|s > s˜]  s˜ VB
i
As EB [s|s > s˜] > s˜, we obtain: ∂s˜F < 0 for small VB.









+ ∂VBk3 (1  FB(s˜))EB [s|s > s˜]
Using ∂VBk1 =
fB(s˜)
1 FB(s˜)  fB(s˜)VB k1 and ∂VBk3 =   11 FB(s˜)  fB(s˜)VB k1, it implies:
∂VBF =   k1(1 FB)1 FB  fBVB
h







































EB [s|s > s˜]  s˜ VB
1A
By Taylor expanding first-order in VB:












At this order ∂VB s˜ < 0. The comparative statics of contract characteristics all derive from
this expression for ∂VB s˜. The value of the contract D can be expressed as a function of the
riskiness s˜:
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µd barg   µd + s˜+ (1  Fd(s˜))VB   pd(s˜) 
• Promise s¯ = sde f +VB. The first-order Taylor expansion in VB gives:












Thus starting from VB = 0 the promise increases. It also shows  1  ∂VB s˜ < 0. We also
notice the convexity and the null derivative at VB = 0.






  ⇣p(1+ µd)  s˜  (1  Fd(s˜))VB + pd(s˜)⌘
We obtain, as  1  ∂VB s˜ < 0 and 0  1 VB fd(s˜)1 Fd(s˜) < 1:







First-order Taylor expansion in VB:
∂VBm =   (1  Fd(s˜))p  1+ µd barg VB
✓
1












Thus ∂VBm < 0. We also notice the concavity of m(VB) in the neighborhood of VB = 0:
∂VBVBm{VB=0} =   1 Fdp(1+µd barg)
1
EB[s|s>s˜] s˜ < 0















  h(1+ ∂VB s˜) ⇣p ⇣µd barg   µd⌘  pd(s˜) + Fd(s˜)s˜⌘+ ∂VB s˜ ⇣s˜+VB⌘VB fd(s˜)i
From above, we have  1  ∂VB s˜ < 0, denoting µd barg   µd = barg and by integration by





⇥   s˜+VB  fd(s˜) + ∂VB s¯   s˜+VB VB fd(s˜) + p barg+ Fd(s˜)EL [s|s < s˜] ⇤
















VB (p barg+ Fd(s˜)EL [s|s < s˜])
i
Thus for VB = 0 we have ∂VBr = 0. For VB small, ∂VBr < 0. However the comparative
statics is reversed as VBgrows larger (but still VB < µB).
With respect to drifts µL (lender heterogeneity) and µB, and asset price p
Using ∂µL FL(s˜) =   1sFL(s˜) and ∂µLpL(s˜) =   1spL(s˜), we derive (first-order in VB):




Fd(s˜) (EB [s|s > s˜] Ed [s|s < s˜])
 
We have EB [s|s > s˜] > p(1+ µB) and Ed [s|s < s˜] < p(1+ µd). Using the first-order con-













As we have EB [s|s > s˜] > µB:
 










s < 1 we have ∂µL s˜ > 0: a less pessimist lender implies a higher optimal
riskiness.





p > 0 so ∂µB s˜ > 0.
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On the haircut:












  ⇣p (1  d)  ∂µB s˜(1  Fd(s˜) VB fd(s˜))⌘
So ∂µLm < 0 as soon as
µB µd






(1  d) p+ ∂µB s˜
 
p barg  pd + 2  s˜+VB  (1  Fd  VB fd) 
So for d large enough and mild beliefs heterogeneity (µ
B µd
s < 1): ∂µLr > 0.
As for the comparative statics w.r.t the asset price p: ∂pF =  (1+ µd) so ∂ps˜ < 0, the
lower the asset price the riskier the loan is chosen.
∂pm =
 






















Interactions: with respect to asset volatility s
We analyze the sensitivity of the franchise value collateral channel with respect the volatility
of the risky asset s. There is a non-zero effect, despite risk-neutrality. Using standard
properties of the Gaussian distribution: ∂sFd(s˜) =
µd s˜
s2
fd(s˜), which is negative as long as
s˜ > µd, and ∂s fd(s˜) =
(µd s˜)2
s3
fd(s˜) > 0. At small VB, ∂VB s˜ =  1 so the volatility s has no
effect on the franchise value channel. The expression for ∂VB s˜ first-order in VB:












As a result, using ∂sEB [s|s > s˜] < 0 as s˜ < µB: ∂s|∂VB s˜| > 0. Subsequently, in first-order
in VB:
































VB (p barg+ Fd(s˜)EL [s|s < s˜])
i
Given that ∂s fd > 0, we obtain in the neighborhood of VB = 0: ∂s|∂VBr| > 0.
Interactions: with respect to bargaining parameter d
d captures all the effect of imperfect competition among lenders.
∂dF =
   µB   µL  p+ ∂dk1VB(s˜+VB) + ∂d (Fd(s˜)Ed [s|s < s˜]) + ∂dk3 (1  FB(s˜))EB [s|s > s˜]
We have ∂dk1 =   fL  fB1 VB fB1 FB
and ∂dk3 =
(FL FB+VB( fL  fB))
1 FB VB fB . First-order in V
B: ∂dF =
 FL(s˜d).
Where the last FL is the characterization function of optimal promise s˜d (under parameter
d = 0 but evaluated at d). As we have ∂s˜F < 0 and FL(s˜0) = 0, I can conclude: ∂dF < 0 and




1A+ ∂d ✓  1p (1+ µd + barg)
◆⇣







  ( ∂d s˜) ⇣1  Fd(s˜) VB fd(s˜)⌘
∂dr µ
 















as the second bracket is an increasing function of beliefs disagreement µB   µL. So we
obtain:
∂dm > 0 and ∂dr > 0
• Haircut:
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, for s high enough
and mild beliefs disagreement:

































VB (p barg+ Fd(s˜)EL [s|s < s˜])
 








The three dependences w.r.t. d are decreasing (s˜, fd and
 
µd barg
  1) therefore we derive
the surprising result that when competition is more imperfect among lenders there is less
screening with respect the franchise value: ∂d|∂VBr| < 0.
• With respect to endogenous outside options barg. From the f.o.c: ∂bargF = 0 so
∂bargs˜ = 0. As we have:
m =
1
p (1+ µd + barg)
⇣





1+ µd + barg
◆
=   1




As a result ∂bargm < 0 and ∂µd barg r < 0.
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B.1.3 Endogenous bilateral surplus
The two last comparative statics shows that the optimal riskiness s˜ does depend on d
(and thus of I and J), but not on barg (and thus not on the outside options barg =
w(1 w) (SI,J 1   SI 1,J)). However the optimal haircut does depend on both d and barg.

























We formulate the induction hypothesis: UBI,J 1  UB0 = (1  w)nBSI,J 1 and ULI 1,J  
UL0 = wn
BSI 1,J .







































Plugging mIJ p = 1(1+µd+w(1 w)(SI,J 1 SI 1,J))R
























This equation recursively characterizes the endogenous surplus of the bilateral relation-
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ship (I, J). The surplus depends on how it is shared (w), and is equal to zero if beliefs are
identical.
B.2 Dynamic model in discrete time
B.2.1 Equilibrium with short-term contracts
We verify Blackwell sufficiency conditions of the Bellman equation show existence and
uniqueness of function value VB. There are no multiplicity of equilibria where each lender
lends to all borrowers. However there are other asymmetric equilibria, for instance in which
no lender lends to a given borrower, and as such the franchise of the latter is low, reinforcing
the equilibrium property of not lending to this given borrower.
The only difference is that agents now takes into account the endogeneity of the franchise
value VB with respect to net worth nBt+1, and as a result the impact of the choice of s˜ on the
















































I note the continuation component:












The f.o.c can be written, using ∂VBRlevB (s˜) =   (1 Fd)R
d unl (1 FB)RBunl
(Rd unl)
2 (in the static model,
∂s˜RlevB (s˜) = 0):
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0 =






































































de f , s˜)
 
= 0 in the dynamic model:
∂s˜EB
h























So the f.o.c can be written, rearranging terms:
























Concavity of the value function VB(nt) Differentiating this f.o.c w.r.t nB (optimal riskiness
does not move first-order by the envelope condition), using



































































Using ∂nBVB > 0, this equation implies: ∂nBnBVB < 0.











































nB ∂nBnBVB + ∂nBVB
 
> 0. Therefore ∂nBFdyn < 0,
which, along with ∂s˜Fdyn > 0, results in ∂nB s˜ > 0.
• Haircut m: m = 1
p(1+µd barg)
 
p(1+ µd)  s˜  (1  Fd(s˜))VB + pd(s˜)
 
So ∂nBm =   1p(1+µd barg)∂nB s˜
⇥
1  Fd(s˜) VB f d(s˜)⇤ implies ∂nBm < 0
Fragility:














At low net worth levels nB: ∂nBnBm > 0
∂nB s˜ =  A
⇣
∂nBV
B + nB ∂nBnBV
B
⌘
∂nBnB s˜ =  A
⇣
2∂nBnBV
B + nB ∂nBnBnBV
B
⌘
∂nBnB s˜ µ  2A∂nBnBVB





























So ∂nBr = ∂nB s˜⇥ ∂s˜r+ ∂nBVB ⇥ ∂VBr with ∂VBr < 0.
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At low levels of nBt at which ∂nBVB high enough: ∂nBr < 0.
B.2.2 Equilibrium with long-term contracts
Following Abreu-Pearce-Stacchetti (1980), we can use the promised utility to the agent (who
is the lender here) as state variable. We now have two state variables: the borrower net
worth nBt and the lender continuation value VL.








































• The bilateral Nash bargaining delivers a contract value D = numden :
num = (1  d)EL
h











































The only change of the dynamics compared with static bargaining is the value of µd barg:












































• And the dynamic f.o.c. still holds:















































So the f.o.c can be written, rearranging terms:

























I show now how the optimal riskiness s˜ depends on the continuation value VLI,J,t+1
promised to the lender. The countercyclicality of the haircut comes from ∂s˜RlevB ∂nBV
B in
the continuation term, which by variational argument as a positive impact on optimal
riskiness s˜ (same effect as of minus price  p). The optimal long-term contract counteracts
this countercycality by the term 1
nB(1+µd barg)
∂s˜VL∂VLVB: as nB decreases, this term increases




does not decrease too fast. The impact of the continuation term is
dampened, making the variation of optimal riskiness s˜ less sensitive to the state variable nB.




























d bargRlevB (s˜) + bEB
h





d barg = b(1 d)nB : 0 = (1  d)RlevB (s˜) +EB
h
1{no de f }∂VLI,J,t+1V
B
i
The intuition is that increasing the long-term promise VLI,J,t+1 to the lender by one unit
increase the short-term gain for the borrower by (1  d)RlevB (s˜) but decreases its long-term
expectation by EB
h
1{no de f }|∂VLI,J,t+1VB|
i
. Under the optimal long-term contract, the two legs
are equalized.
∂VLI,JV
B < 0 and |∂VLI,JVB| = (1  d)RlevB (s˜)
• Finally I show formally that 0 < ∂nB s˜LT < ∂nB s˜ST.
∂s˜Fdyn =   (1  FB) k3h(VB)
h














































































As ∂VLVB < 0 the term   1(nB)2(1+µd barg)∂s˜V
L∂VLVB is positive and therefore counteracts




< 0. Using |∂VLI,JVB| = (1  d)RlevB (s˜) (f.o.c in VLI,J,t+1) this








  ∂nBFdyn ST   b 11 ∂s˜VB (Runld )2∂s˜RunlB ´ smaxs˜ 1(nB)2(1+µd barg)∂s˜VL   ∂VLVB  fB(s)ds














Optimal riskiness is less senstive to net worth under long-term contracts than under
short-term contracts.
B.3 The rehypothecation chain
We stack two I-J set ups described above. There is one multilateral Nash bargaining between
the HF and the BD and one multilateral Nash bargaining between the BD and the MMF.
This implies two r(m) mappings, which are inter-related.
Expected utilities of each agent
• Hedge Fund expected value (its balance sheet constraint always binds - no cash
hoarding - so pmbilxbil = nHF):










• Broker Dealer expected value (its balance sheet constraint does not always bind:
p
 
1 mbil  xbil  nBD + p  1 mtri  xtri):





























• Money Market Fund expected value:








1/ Scarce collateral regime Assume we are in a scarce collateral regime. In this case:
• The BD collateral constraint binds: xtri = xbil
• The BD balance sheet constraint is slack: p  1 mbil  xbil < nBD + p  1 mtri  xtri




In this regime, we can write the BD expected utility as:




rbil(mbil ;mtri)  rtri(mbil ;mtri)  DpB(mbil ;mtri) mtrirCp
i
where we introduce the value of the collar: DpB(mbil ;mtri) = pB(s˜bil)   pB(s˜tri) =
´ s¯bil
s¯tri VB FB(s)ds. The first term can be called the repo spread (carry trade from lending at a
higher rate than borrowing). The second term (the collar) arises from the composition of the
two put options the borrower bears (long with MMF, short with HF) and would be traced to
a haircut spread. The third is cash gains arising from collateral management (high haircuts
secured against HF, low haircuts against MMF).
Derivation of the two mappings rbil(mbil ;mtri) and rtri(mbil ;mtri) Denote wbil the bargain-
ing power of the lender BD in the HF-BD bilateral repo and wtri the bargaining power of











































B(s˜bil ; s˜tri) + (1 wtri) 11 mtrip
L(s˜tri)













µL + 11 mtri p










µB + 11 mbil p




µL + 11 mtri p
L(s˜tri)
⌘i
Maximization program of the Broker Dealer The equilibrium is given by the BD program:
Max







s˜MMF   pB(s˜MMF) +VB(1  FB(s˜MMF))
⌘
+ xcr¯+ bnVB(1  FB(s˜MMF))}
(BD balance sheet constraint) s.t. xc + xBDDHF  nBD + xMMFDBD(s˜MMF)
(BD collateral constraint) s.t. xMMF  xBD
(BD de f ault condition) s.t. de f ault i. f . f . s < s˜MMF
(Nash bargainings) s.t. rbil(mbil ;mtri) and rtri(mbil ;mtri)








rbil(mbil ;mtri)  rtri(mbil ;mtri)  DPB(mbil ;mtri) mtrirCp
i
where:




























• Fo.c. with respect to mtri (it uniquely defines mtri, independently from mbil):









































fL(s˜tri)  (1+ rbil)p fL(s˜tri)
⌘
So ∂mtri Htri > 0. Similarly ∂wbil H
tri > 0 and ∂wtri Htri < 0 and ∂VBHtri > 0 and ∂µLHtri < 0,
so ∂wbilm
tri < 0 and ∂wtrimtri > 0 and ∂µLmtri > 0 and ∂VBmtri < 0
• Fo.c. with respect to mbil :
























For high wtri and low wbil : ∂VBHbil < 0. We also have: ∂mbil Hbil < 0, ∂wbil H
bil > 0 and
∂wtri Hbil < 0 and ∂VBHbil < 0. As a result: ∂wbilm
bil > 0, ∂wtrimbil < 0 and ∂VBmbil < 0.
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Appendix C
Appendix to Chapter 3
C.1 Computing the LMI
We propose an integrated measure of the Liquidity Mismatch undertaken by individual
banks. We factor in all the balance sheet information and account for the effect of each
balance sheet entry on the liquidity pressure faced by a bank. The implementation of the
LMI is parsimonious yet captures the key degrees of liquidity variability (balance-sheet
item heterogeneity and time-series variation). Moreover, the methodology developed in
this paper is flexible and can be improved on in future research. For instance, the bL0k
sensitivity parameters can be refined and could be estimated, for example, by regressing the
corresponding-maturity bond yield on the funding liquidity factor.
ASSETS
Category Ak lAk
Cash cash and balances due from depository institutions 1
federal funds sold 1
securities purchased under agreements to resell 1
Trading Assets Treasury securities (1 mTrsy)
agency securities, excluding MBS (1 mAgency)
residential MBS guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA (1 mAgency)





Available for Sale Treasury securities 0.75(1 mTrsy)
agency securities, excluding MBS 0.75(1 mAgency)
residential MBS guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA 0.75(1 mAgency)






Held for Maturity Treasury securities 0.50(1 mTrsy)
agency securities, excluding MBS 0.50(1 mAgency)
residential MBS guaranteed by FNMA, FHLMC, or GNMA 0.50(1 mAgency)





Loans loans secured by real estates 0.25(1 mStrucFin)
commercial & Industry Loans 0.50(1 Max{mk})
other Loans 0.50(1 Max{mk})
lease financing receivables 0.50(1 Max{mk})
Fixed Assets premises and fixed assets 0
other real estate owned 0
investment in unconsolidated subsidiaries 0
Intangible Assets goodwill and other intangible assets 0
Other Assets 0
LIABILITIES: lL =   exp( µTk0)
Category Lk0 Tk0
Fed Funds overnight federal funds purchased 0
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Repo securities sold under repo 0
Deposits1 insured 10
uninsured 1
Trading Liabilities trading liabilities (1 mk0 )
Other Borrowed Money commercial paper 0.25
with maturity <= 1 year 1
with maturity > 1 year 5
Other Liabilities subordinated notes and debenture 10
other liabilities 10
Total Equity Capital equity 30




Notes: 1. A bank’s deposit can be decomposed into multiple categories: insured and uninsured deposits,
interest-bearing and noninterest-bearing deposits, domestic and foreign deposits, time deposits and broker
deposits, and so on. Among them, insured and uninsured category directly relates to a bank’s liquidity
condition. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) provides deposit insurance in order to guarantee
the safety of deposits in member banks. Such deposits, since fully guaranteed by the FDIC, should have little
influence on a bank’s liquidity. However, the insured and uninsured category are not clearly broken down in
the Y-9C report. We collect such data instead from the Call Report FFIEC 031 Schedule RC-O – Other Data for
Deposit Insurance and FICO. The Call Report data are for banks that are subsidiaries of the BHCs which file the
Y9C. Therefore we manually merge the call reports data back to their highest holding company. The deposits at
the BHC level is thus the sum of deposits of all its subsidiary commercial banks.
Based on the FDIC insurance limits and the call report decomposition data, we calculate the insured deposit
as the combination of i) all deposit lower than the FDIC limit K and ii) the first K dollar amount in the accounts
above the limit multiplying the number of such deposit accounts. There are two insurance coverage changes
in our sample period. First, the FDIC increased insurance limits from $100,000 to $250,000 per depositor on
October 3, 2008. Yet this change is not reflected in the Call Report RC-O until 2009:Q3. We follow the data
availability and change our definition for insured/uninsured deposit beginning in 2009:Q3. Second, the FDIC
increased the insurance for retirement accounts from $100,000 to $250,000 on March 14, 2006. This change is
reflected in the 2006:Q2 call reports and our definition reflects this change beginning in 2006:Q2.
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2. We study four types of contingent liabilities that may exert a pressure on bank’s liquidity. Many
banks carry unused commitments, including revolving loans secured by residential properties, unused credit
card lines, commitments to fund commercial real estate, construction, and land development loans, securities
underwriting, commitments to commercial and industrial loans, and commitments to provide liquidity to
asset-backed commercial paper conduits and other securitization structures. The second type are credit lines,
including financial standby letters of credit and foreign office guarantees, performance standby letters of credit
and foreign office guarantees, commercial and similar letters of credit.1 A third type of contingent liability is
securities lent. The last type of contingent liability in our study is the derivative contract. Item 7 in Schedule HC-L
lists the gross notional amount of credit derivative contracts, including credit default swaps, total return swaps,
credit options and other credit derivatives. However, such gross notional amount does not reflect the contracts’
liquidity. What matters in a credit derivative contract in terms of liquidity impact is the additional collateral
or margin required in a stress event. We therefore use Item 15 to collect the fair value of collateral posted for
over-the-counter derivatives.2
C.2 Background on Federal Liquidity Injection
The Federal Reserve System (Fed) undertook numerous measures to restore economic stability from the financial
crisis of 2007 - 2009. Beyond its conventional monetary policy tools, the central bank, citing "unusual and
exigent circumstances," launched a range of new programs to the banking sector in order to support overall
market liquidity.
Conventionally, the Fed uses open market operations and the discount window as its principal tools to
manage reserves in the banking sector. During the crisis, however, the effectiveness of the discount window was
limited because of a sigma effect. Banks were reluctant to approach the discount window since such action
could cause market participants to draw adverse inference about the bank’s financial condition (see, for example,
Peristiani (1998), Furfine (2003), Armantier, Ghysels, Sarkar and Shrader (2011)).
1Berger and Bouwman (2009) consider unused commitments and standby letters of credit as asset-side
liquidity whereas we treat them as liability-side liquidity. It’s true that unused commitments and credit lines
are similar to loans and hence can be treated as assets, yet they become assets only when used. In terms of
liquidity, they belong to potential liquidity outflow as other liability classes. Therefore we treat them in line
with liabilities given the common feature that they all exert liquidity pressure.
2The collateral type contains U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. government and government-sponsored agency
debt securities, corporate bonds, equity securities, and other collateral. The collateral value is further divided
into groups by the counterparty, for example, a) bank and security firms, b) Monoline financial guarantors, c)
hedge funds, d) sovereign governments, and e) corporations and all other counterparties.
Data under item 15 is required to be completed only by the bank holding companies with total assets of
10$billion or more, and such requirement starts only since the second quarter of 2009. Not surprisingly, we only
find such data for large BHCs such as J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, etc.
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Given the borrowing stigma and inflexibility of open market operations, the Fed proceeded to introduce
additional facilities increase liquidity, including the Term Auction Facility (TAF), Term Securities Lending
Facility (TSLF), Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual
Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF), Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF), Money Market Investor Funding
Facility (MMIFF), and Term Asset-Backed Securities (TALF). Fleming (2012) provides a summary on these
lending facilities. We summarize their key features in the following table.
Facility Announcement Expiration Participants Term
TAF Dec12, 2007 Mar08, 2010 Depository Inst. 28 or 84 days
TSLF Mar11, 2008 Feb01, 2010 Primary dealers 28 days
PDCF Mar17, 2008 Feb01, 2010 Primary dealers overnight
AMLF Sep19, 2008 Feb01, 2010 BHCs and branches <120 days for D⇤
of foreign banks <270 days for non-D
CPFF Oct07, 2008 Feb01, 2010 U.S. CP issuers 3 months
MMIFF Oct21, 2008 Oct30, 2009 Money Mkt Funds 90 days or less
TALF Nov25, 2008 Jun30, 2010 U.S. eligible banks <5 years
*: D denotes depository institutions; non-D is non-depository institutions.
The Fed announced the first facility, Term Auction Facility (TAF) on December 12, 2007 to address the
funding pressure in short-term lending markets. Through the TAF, the Fed auctioned loans to depository
institutions, typically for terms of 28 or 84 days. Later, to address liquidity pressures in the term funding
markets, the Feds introduced the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF) on March 11, 2008. Through TSLF, the
Fed auctioned loans of Treasury securities to primary dealers for terms of 28 days. Another related facility, the
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (PDCF), was announced on March 16, through which the Fed made overnight
loans to primary dealers. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008 led to unparalleled
disruptions of the money market. On September 19, the Fed announced created the Asset-Backed Commercial
Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Liquidity Facility (AMLF). It provided loans to U.S. bank holding companies,
and U.S. branches and agencies of foreign banks to purchase eligible asset-backed commercial paper from
money market mutual funds. On October 7, the Fed further announced the creation of the Commercial Paper
Funding Facility (CPFF), through which the Fed provided credit to a special-purpose vehicle (SPV) that, in
turn, bought newly issued three-month commercial paper. Two weeks later on October 21, the Fed established
the Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF). All three money market-related facilities expired on
February 1, 2010. Lastly, the Fed introduced the Term Asset-Backed Securities (TALF) on November 25, 2008,
through which the Fed made loans to borrowers with eligible asset-backed securities as collateral.
338
Appendix D
Appendix to Chapter 4
D.1 Pricing of Eurobonds with exogenous safety demand




















































so in the symmetric case: f (s1|s2) ⇠ N
 















































































































































































































































+ Dsf (a)2 +
 
µDs   Dµ
 1
s
p
2p

1 F
✓
ap
2
◆  
340
